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STUDY MANUAL

~~SECRET~~ HANDLING OF SOURCES

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this booklet is to provide the basic information on handling of sources. This booklet is dedicated to CI concepts in the handling of sources; obtaining and utilization, location of the employee, placement of employees, training of employee, communication with the employees, development of an identity, scrutiny of employees, separation of employees and control of employees. The term Special Counterintelligence Agent (SA) refers to all those persons who convey or contribute in to counteract the collection of information of the multidisciplinary intelligence of hostile services. This booklet is primarily directed to those persons involved in the control or execution of CI operations. Likewise, this booklet has a significant value for other members of the Armed Forces who function in the security areas or services and other intelligence departments.

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HANDLING OF SOURCES

CONTENT

	Page
INTRODUCTION	
CHAPTER I. Obtaining and utilization of the employee	1
CHAPTER II. Location of the employee	22
CHAPTER III. Investigation and Initial Contact	40
CHAPTER IV. Assignment of Tasks	57
CHAPTER V. Placement of employees	70
CHAPTER VI. Training of employee	82
CHAPTER VII. Communication with employees	109
CHAPTER VIII. Development of an Identity	128
CHAPTER IX. Scrutiny of Employees	140
CHAPTER X. Separation of employees	150
ATTACHMENT A. Control of Employees	161

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CHAPTER I

OBTAINING AND UTILIZATION OF EMPLOYEE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has as objective to present the procedures that must be followed on obtaining and utilization of personnel required to gather information with intelligence value for the government. Also discussed is the need of:

- a. Rely on government sources in places and organizations that fall in the hands of insurrection elements
- b. The types of sources (employees) used in the intelligence system of the government.
- c. Exploitation of the inherent weaknesses to all insurrection movements.
- d. The mission and analysis of the objective.
- e. The procedure relative to obtaining and use of the employee's services.

DEVELOPMENT:

a. **THE EMPLOYEE:** We can define the "employee" as that person who renders his services in exchange of remuneration or compensation. Since the insurrection movements could emerge in different zones of economic, political and geographic influence, the government is not able to depend only on the information provided voluntarily by faithful citizens or information obtained involuntarily from insurgents who have been captured. There must be some incentive to assure the continuous supply of information to the government. Consequently, it is necessary to disseminate in all society segments individuals suppliers of information whose services may be remunerated. An employee is that person who provides information of value to the intelligence in exchange of some compensation whether in money or some other kind. This person could be a peasant of the hamlet, a member of the cell of the insurgent organization, or a propaganda leader.

The suppliers of information must be dispersed in all places considered important, in all popular organizations, regardless of their size and in all places where could appear some insurrection outbreak.

B. TYPES OF EMPLOYEES

The CI agent must use the services of a variety of persons in order to be able to evaluate all aspects of national life. These

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persons represent a diversity of characteristics. Each employee is an individual with his own personality and he must be treated as such. The tasks that these employees have to perform are also of individual nature. There will be times when the supervisors will be forced to direct the activities of various employees.

1. The Supervisor: A supervisor is the chief of a network of employees, organized to perform specific tasks of information collection. When the government CI agent is not able to supervise the employees or he does not do it for security reasons, he tries to find a supervisor whom he trains to deal with this task. Said supervisor responds before the CI agent and works under his direction. The degree of orientation that the agent provides to supervisor shall depend on his competence, training, trustworthiness, function, personality, etc. On planning information gathering activities, the agent must use a supervisor only when it is necessary.

a. Tasks: The supervisor must direct the activities of the group of employees and provide the direction and control that the agent would normally provide. Must perform administrative as well as operational functions. In addition, it is his responsibility to evaluate the work of the employees in order to test their motivation, discipline and security measures which they observe in their operations. He could demand to obtain employees so that then present them with fictitious histories. The supervisor on performing these serves as a screen for the CI agent and acts as an intermediary between him and the employees.

2. The Information Collectors: The information collector is a trained and remunerated person to carry out tasks related to gathering of information. Said individual could be asked to affiliate himself to a syndicate, who attends the meetings and who reports above all what happens. At the same time, he could be asked to obtain information from merchants why certain primary need articles are not available.

He could present himself as a disagreeable individual, who fits well in the insurgent organization. The information collector is a person directly linked to intelligence mission. It is bestowed on him to obtain the requested information and to report on the same.

3. Support Personnel: As support personnel are known those persons who collaborate with the information collectors. These persons do not participate directly in information gathering activities, but without them the information collectors could not carry out their assignments. The agent uses the support personnel to carry out security, communication, technical assistance tasks and an unlimited number of various projects.

a. Security Personnel: Security personnel includes the

-2-

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intermediary, the vigilant and the investigator. The intermediary is the connection between the members of an information gathering organization who do not know each other. He can transmit information or could deliver documents or other objects. His principal function consists in watching over the security of operations. The vigilant is to observe and report on the activities of other employees, of individuals that could be considered as employees in the future and other matters of interest related to intelligence personnel administration. The investigator conducts discreet investigations about an individual supposed to be employed as information collector for the government. He could also investigate specific organizations and persons to provide the agent information on which to base future operations.

b. Technical Personnel: The technical personnel provides the support necessary to perform certain missions. They could be demolition specialists, carpenters, tailors, preparation of documents or any other specialized branch.

c. Service Personnel: The special service personnel is varied and versatile. This group includes employees who take the place of contact personnel, who have exceptional persuasion gifts, personnel versed in teaching and personnel which procures to find promising employees. There are also employees, usually a couple, whose residence offers all the security of the case, in a way that the agent as well as the information collector could meet there for training purposes, consultation or training when this is necessary.

The purchasing personnel, which discreetly and in secret obtains the required equipment to carry out a specific mission, is also found in this category. The CI agent must direct many and diverse information gathering activities in order to identify and exploit the insurgent. In order to perform this mission successfully, must make use of the services of a variety of employees. The best results shall depend on the agent's ability to find, employ, train and evaluate personnel capable to carry out a diversity of tasks.

C. VULNERABILITIES OF THE INSURGENTS: An important aspect of the whole insurrection movement and a great difficulty for the implementation of countermeasures is the fact that the subversive activities and the organization of the insurgents remains hidden in the initial stages. The appearance of guerrilla or paramilitary units occurs when the movement already has already acquired substance. Said units are organized only after a solid base of direction and support has been established.

1. CHARACTERISTICS: The process of creating a revolutionary base is characterized by the number of activities that must be carried out:

a. Personnel recruitment

-3-

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- b. Organization of clandestine cells
- c. Infiltration in organizations that gather large masses of persons.
- d. Acquisition and storage of supplies.

The subversive elements usually unleash a psychologic offense, taking advantage of the agitation and propaganda, with the objective of discrediting the government and to intensify and canalize the popular discontent.

2. **PLANNING:** On planning operations, it is highly important to point out that, even when there is not any activity felt on the part of the guerrillas, an insurrection movement could be in gestation. Every countermeasure that concentrates only on the activities of the guerrillas, without taking into consideration the secret organization and the great preparation before the violence explodes, is destined to fail.

The mere elimination of the guerrillas does not alter in any way the basic organization of the insurgents. If it is to achieve a victory permanent in nature, the internal defense operations must be planned before the guerrillas initiate their operations, attack that contemplates the subversive secret elements as well as its military arm, once the movement reaches its second phase.

3. **UTILIZATION:** In order to use the government employees in a more effective manner in their information gathering task, we must know how to distinguish the vulnerabilities themselves in the structure and methods of functioning of said organization, in order to be able to indicate to employees specific points where they must concentrate their efforts.

4. **SECURITY:**

a. The insurgent secret organization justifiably concedes much importance to security, since it functions clandestinely. An organization created to provide the maximum degree of security to personnel that operates in it suffers from certain inherent deficiencies. In a secret organization divided into department, there is very little horizontal communication among the cells. All written communication is transmitted by a labyrinthic system of intermediaries and third persons. In addition, centralized control is exercised in the insurgent organization. Even though this system allows great security, on the other hand it has its disadvantages. A deserter, for example, could be more or less certain that there will be no reprisals against him if all other members of his cell (who are the only ones who know that he was part of this cell) are eliminated by the government security forces. This circumstance could be used to persuade insurgent deserters to provide information to the government.

EXAMPLE: In a rubber plantation in Malaysia a worker was

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observed while he was carrying supplies illegally to communist guerrillas. The police, informed of his activities, allowed him to continue until they had sufficient information and compromising evidence. One afternoon they arrested him in a deserted road presenting him with all the evidence against him.

The worker found himself in a dilemma. He could be imprisoned for ten years for having helped the terrorists or he could be executed by the terrorist on finding out that he had cooperated with the police. Because of secret security measures only five terrorists knew the worker's name. The police suggested to the worker that he could resolve his dilemma if he mentioned the names of the terrorists. That way, said worker gained a reward, at the same time freeing himself from the threat of retaliation.

b. If the government succeeds to convince an insurgent organization that it has been infiltrated, the organization naturally increases its security measures. The more strict the security measures may be, the less are the probabilities that said organization would be concerned in secret activities against the government.

c. The secret insurgent organization usually places the new elements in positions where they do not have access to valuable information. Only after many severe tests the member succeeds to receive a position of responsibility. The government, however, could obviate these security methods.

d. In an effort to find a person to infiltrate the Huk organization, the Philippine military command secretly came in contact with the parents of various Huk commanders until it found the cousin of a commander who stated that he was willing to cooperate. After some months of special training, the cousin was sent where his relative Huk was. As relative he had access to his cousin, but in order to justify his joining the ranks of the Huks, the Philippine army burned his home, imprisoned his brother and evacuated his parents. The government, at that time, agreed to pay all damages and discomfort that had been caused. In view of the fact that he had obvious reasons to dislike the government, the cousin was accepted without any problem in the Huk organization, assigning him the post of tax collector of the Hacienda Nacional Commission (the supplying secret arm of the organization).

e. In order to allow this "infiltrator" to advance within the Huk organization, the government helped him to collect medicines, munitions and weapons. For some months the Huks received government supplies through the "infiltrator".

Through a complex system of signals and contacts, this government employee transmitted valuable information to security forces about the most important collaborators and members of the Huk Hacienda Nacional Commission.

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f. The communication methods used by the insurgent secret elements also break down, which provide the opportunity for infiltration by government employees. In the initial stages, almost all insurrection activity originates among the population. The insurgents primarily depend on messengers and hidden secret places with the anticipation of receiving and transmitting messages. When they are discovered by the government security forces, as a rule they are not immediately captured, but they keep them under surveillance in order to be able to identify the other contacts. By means of this surveillance, the government security forces could come to know the principal insurgent messengers, who could be persuaded to work as government employees.

g. During the initial phases, the insurgents are feverishly busy to form facade organizations and to infiltrate in institutions composed of large masses of persons. We already have seen that a relatively small number of individuals could succeed in controlling an organization by means of infiltration and fixed elections. The government could easily find out of the insurgent activity in these organizations, through the distribution of its employees in all organizations that it suspects to be of interest to insurgent groups. Among the principal organizations of this type one could mention the political parties, the syndicates and youth and student groups. The operating method of the insurgents could be noticed by the government employees, since the tactics follow a pattern that is continuously repeated.

h. The government must, much before, to watch the members of the communist party in the locality, who devote themselves to selecting persons for training outside the country in subversive and insurgent tactics. When it succeeds to identify the selected individuals, must try to induce them to work for the government without abandoning the insurgent organization. Likewise it must try, much earlier, to infiltrate the insurgent organization placing government employees in positions where they could be recruited by the insurgents.

i. Since the insurgent organization is weak and vulnerable in the first phase, obtaining precise and timely information is of great importance for the insurgents. During this phase all efforts are concentrated to subversion of individuals and organizations, to establishment of operation bases and to consolidation of their position. The success in the formation or subversion of organizations is directly related with the ability of the insurgent to gather information. The insurgents depend almost totally on the population to obtain information. Said information provided to the insurgents could come to the knowledge of government employees. When there are groups of people dedicated to providing information to the insurgents, the government could simple place its employees among said groups.

j. During the insurrection movement in Malaysia, for

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example, the English depended on certain villagers to provide information to local authorities. They had to find a way to protect said persons against the threat of terrorism of the insurgent elements. In one case, the police visited each house in a village, delivering to inhabitants a page of paper on which they should write, without putting their names, any information relative to activities of the insurgents in the village. The following day the police returned with an sealed urn and proceeded to collect all the papers, whether they were blank or otherwise. Since each house in the village had been visited, the insurgents could not determine who were the government employees.

k. The insurgents depend on the population not only to receive information, but also as a source of supply of personnel and provisions. The importance of this support increases at the rate the reach and magnitude of the that the operations of the insurgents increase. The insurgents need the population for the expansion and replacement of their military and paramilitary forces, for the establishment and operation of information supplying networks and early warning service and the construction of base and training camp areas. The population represents the principal source of food, medicines and construction material.

On the other hand, the population provides to the insurgent the necessary means of concealment, allowing him to mingle with the population in order to avoid being discovered by the government. Since the insurgent depends so much on the support of the people of the locality, the government CI agent could take advantage of this situation using personnel coming from the locality.

l. The principal objective of the insurgents in the second phase consists in continuously increasing the guerrilla force. This could only be achieved by intensification of the recruitment program of the insurgent elements. The guerrilla command must increase its forces until it reaches the size of a regular army. This exigency, nevertheless, conflicts with the normal practice of observing extreme care in testing the trustworthiness of every guerrilla recruit. It is impossible to achieve a rapid increase of the forces and to conserve at the same time high security standards in the process. Consequently, the insurgent military organization finds itself exposed to infiltration and penetration by government employees.

m. The manual, labor required for the construction work in the base area exceeds, as a rule, the capacity of the insurgent forces. The insurgents rely on civilian manual labor, which could be obtained voluntarily or involuntarily. Therefore, a great number of persons who live in the locality will have knowledge of the location of said classes of operation. The CI agent must try to obtain this information from these persons. Some will talk voluntarily, while others will have to be persuaded.

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n. Regardless what its motivation may be, however, there is a condition which must be guaranteed before any person agrees to be employed by the government in a zone dominated by insurgent elements. The fact of being government employee must not imply some compromise, and having done so, must protect the individual as well as his family against reprisals by the insurgents. This need for secrecy involves carrying out covert activities such as the proliferation and operation of information gathering networks by the government. However, open methods could be employed for information gathering to take advantage of the vulnerability previously pointed out in the organization of the insurgents. The "anonymous report" system, used by the English in Malaysia, is an example of information gathering in an open manner, through which the identity of the source is protected.

o. The insurgents will be forced to come into contact with certain persons in the locality, such as merchants and suppliers, in order to obtain provisions and other articles. When they are persuaded to work for the government, said merchants could help identify the individuals of the connection used by the insurgents in these operations. After the surveillance of said individuals in order to discover the identity of other key elements of the insurrection and at the same time find their bases of operation. The information relative to the purchases made by the insurgents could also be used by the experts in intelligence analysis to evaluate the troops, the need for essential supplies and the operations that the insurgents could attempt.

p. It would be impossible to handle all these possible deficiencies or vulnerabilities that an insurgent organization is suffering from. For that reason, we have been limited in making observations in place of categoric affirmations. Even when the insurrection movement in its initial stage is clandestine and apparently intangible, it could be discovered and destroyed through the timely and effective use of personnel entrusted of supplying information. The insurrection is a bad one and must not be tolerated. The secret organization could be identified and exploited. However, the CI agent must know how and where to look to find the focus of insurrection and for that must possess the necessary information. In addition must know the characteristic weaknesses of the insurgent organization and how to proceed to exploit them.

D. MISSION AND TARGET ANALYSIS:

1. Before talking about obtaining and using government employees, we see the many factors which the CI agent must consider before using persons for a specific mission. WE said that he ought to rely on information gathering individuals before any indications of the insurrection movement appear. We also mentioned that as soon as the movement begins, the CI agent must select the targets which must be investigated by the government employees, in order to allow

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for easy and timely gathering of essential information. Then the missions could vary from the gathering of information in general until the infiltration of the staff of the insurgents, the secret supplying system or cells of the insurgents.

The CI agent must study each mission and analyze each target before proceeding to select the employees for the mission. The steps which the CI agent should take upon receiving an order from his superiors to collect information are:

- a. Analyze the mission.
 - 1) Analyze the requirements
 - 2) Analyze the target
 - 3) Develop plans
 - 4) Select the employees
 - 5) Execute the plan.

2. ANALYZE THE REQUIREMENTS:

Just as this diagram indicates, the CI agent first must analyze the information requirements. He must ask himself, "What information is wanted?" He must study the directive to make certain that understands it entirely. Then he must reduce the order in the most simple form and select specific targets that have to be investigated. He must also perform an exhaustive investigation to obtain all pertinent information and experience previously acquired on the subject. This way, will acquire general knowledge which will allow him to prepare a solid, logic and concise plan. All planning will have as basis the specific information that he asked for about the specific target.

3. ANALYZE THE TARGET:

We are now going to analyze the target. The type of target selected depends, frequently, on the stage of the insurrection movement. Said target could be in a rural or urban zone, could deal with commercial or political matters or it could imply infiltration or surveillance. Where an insurrection movement exists there will always be a multiplicity of circumstance that could be exploited to obtain information.

1) We can define the target analysis as the detailed investigation of the target and the zone of the same in order to find any condition that could impede or facilitate the government's mission. The analysis of the target could also be described as the process of collecting, comparing and evaluating information with respect to a target in order to be able to prepare plans for a specific mission.

2) After gathering and arranging all the pertinent information, the evaluation of the same follows. In this aspect, the analysis of the target is of primary importance in order to

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find the most appropriate way to exploit it. Through this process secondary targets are going to be found and identified. The priority of the principal targets is determined at the same time.

4. PLAN PREPARATION

a. once a target is identified, must proceed to prepare an operation plan. The CI agent must consider the method of operation that is necessary to carry out the mission, if it is necessary or not to look for a person with specific abilities, how and when to assign specific tasks to the employee, the identity that said employee will have to adapt, the nature of support that he will have to offer, etc.

b. The factors considered in the selection of an employee will be summarized in this chapter and explained in detail in subsequent chapters. In this aspect, the exigencies of the mission, the place where the activities are going to be carried out and the requirements which the person who is going to carry out the mission should have, must be considered. Failing to analyze carefully the potential employee, getting to know his history, access and motivation could result in failure of the entire mission.

5. PLAN EXECUTION:

Finally, a decision must be made in regards to the execution of the plan. The experience of the CI agent, the ability of the individuals who participate in the operation, the availability of essential support articles for the successful execution of the plan, and above all, the time available shall determine how and when the plan will be placed in operation.

E. OBTAINING AND USE OF THE EMPLOYEE SEQUENCE:

1. At this time perhaps there is some curiosity about the subject related to obtaining, training and use of employees. It would be best to ask: Who are these persons employed by the government to collect information? What are these persons? Where could be found? How are they trained to carry out their tasks? How can their services be utilized for maximum benefit? What salaries they must be paid? What is the fate of these individuals when the government does not need them?

2. We hope to be able to answer all these questions in this manual. We shall also explain procedures that have been used and are presently used in other countries to intelligence to support stabilization operations.

3. Obtaining and using employees represents a cyclical chain of events that include the following general procedures:

a. Locate the potential employee

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- b. Initial investigation of the employee's history.
- c. Contact and negotiation.
- d. Assignment of tasks.
- e. Training of the employee
- f. Development of an identity.
- g. Scrutiny of the employee.
- h. Termination of employment.

4. We shall explain these procedures step by step in the following chapters. We shall also study the methods used to place the employee at the target zone, provide protection to the individual and to the cell, establish secure communication between the CI agent and the employee, and to keep personnel records.

5. Each step in the sequence of obtaining and use of the employee does not suddenly determine to begin the next step. The planning, although it does not appear in the previous list, is a continuous task that begins the moment the CI agent receives the order to obtain information and ends after the employee has been separated from government service. Said planning must be complete and exact, it must also be flexible. Must embrace, in a general way, all aspects of a project and a specific analysis of each phase. Must take into consideration the characteristics of the target zone, as well as the personality, history and competence of each employee. The effective gather of information requires a detailed planning. If the CI agent does not prepare complete and continuous plans will often fail in his attempt to obtain the required information.

6. LOCATING THE POTENTIAL EMPLOYEE:

a. The CI agent must plan and initiate an early and continuous search for potential employees who have the enthusiasm and meet the necessary aptitudes to obtain the information that the government wants. Must know where to find the different types of employees that could be needed. The ability to find at any time potential information collectors is indispensable for the successful outcome of intelligence.

b. Before the infiltration of insurgent elements in the community becomes obvious, they must procure the services of individuals who are in a position or who could be placed in a position that allows them to obtain essential information. Networks of government employees must be established in the rural as well as in the urban zones. Said employees must be dispersed in anti-government organizations, in commercial centers and in any place where there is suspicion that insurrection outbreaks could emerge.

c. The CI agent must be prepared to use said individuals in obtaining specific information in specific zones when incidents of some insurrection emerge. The organizations that have been infiltrated, the villages from which they obtain farm products and

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the groups of discontented people represent places of interest for the insurgent elements.

d. The CI agent must use the services of all employees available to exploit to maximum every vulnerability of the insurgent organization. Must infiltrate secretly the organization of the insurgents, get into the structure of the same, prepare a list of the members, determine their spheres of influence and exploit its communication system. He must be constantly in search of potential employees in the zones and organizations where he could obtain valuable information. The individual employees must have access to information wanted and to be sufficiently motivated to carry out the mission.

e. Having access carries with it the ability of the employee to place himself in a position that allows him to obtain specific information without being discovered by the insurgents. This implies the surreptitious or accepted presence of the government employee in the same place where the information is. Said employee must have the means to reach the organization or target zone and to remain there without anyone finds out that he is searching for information.

f. When we speak of motivation, we refer to incentive or enthusiasm which stimulates the employee to work for the government. There are many types of motivation, some better than others, from the CI agent's point of view. In accordance with the sentiments that motivate him, an employee could be trustworthy to his government or become a traitor. What ever the employee's motivation may be it serves to indicate whether he will be faithful and worthy of trust, the CI agent must analyze this factor very carefully.

7. INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S HISTORY:

a. Every potential employee must be subject of investigation before his services are requested. The CI agent must determine if he is dealing with a person to whom he can confide, the reasons that he could have to work for the government and if he meets the aptitude to apply himself to secret activities for the purpose of collecting information. The first investigation is carried out before employing the individual and it is repeated while he remains employed with the government. It is an investigation similar to that in which persons are submitted before allowing them access to confidential information. The former as well as the subsequent investigations should be carried out with discretion, without arising any suspicion in the individual who is being investigated.

b. The initial investigation begins after having discovered an individual who is deemed that he could help the government to obtain information. The investigating agent must

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find out all the information about the individual that would rule him out; that is to say, disloyalty, emotional instability indications, being employed with another intelligence agency, etc. The investigation must be tedious, in order to allow to ask for data about the courage, weaknesses, personality, ideology, religious beliefs, economic situation, political affiliation, family ties, education, professional training and military history of the potential employee. And for which it is even more important, said initial investigation must contribute to determine the potential employee's motivation to establish if he would be compatible in his status as government employee.

8. CONTACT AND NEGOTIATION:

a. In this stage, the CI agent tries to persuade the potential employee to agree to work for the government. This could be carried out in a day, but in all probability could take weeks or even months. The CI agent must cultivate the friendship of the potential employee, trying to hide the reason of his interest in him. He must study the individual and suggest to him discreetly at the most opportune moment to accept to work for the government. These actions end when the duly trained and motivated person, that could be controlled, accepts to work for the government.

b. Appropriate security measures must be taken in the entire process of dealing with the potential employee. The degree of control must be such that allows to achieve the objective without lessening the security measures. When it becomes evident that this would not succeed, then the actions must be suspended.

c. It is necessary to prepare a careful planning and a careful initial investigation before approaching the potential employee. This process implies, on the part of the CI agent, a series of steps that allow to have the potential employee under constant surveillance. We shall deal with this subject in more detail in a subsequent chapter.

9. TASKS ASSIGNMENT:

a. The CI agent must plan carefully every aspect of the task that he is going to assign to the employee. Must consider the employee's ability in relation to the intelligence mission. He must be totally familiar with the different aspects of the zone of the objective, in order to be able to provide to employee up to date data related to the situation, the conditions and the environment in which he will have to work. The CI agent must also develop and provide to employee the necessary documentation, clothing, equipment and other articles which he will need to carry out his mission. The task assignment must be planned and the employee must be given detailed and specific instructions in regards to the mission to be carried out and how it would be carried out.

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b. The CI agent must also ascertain that appropriate security measures are adopted in selecting and assigning tasks to an employee.

The existence of convenient security measures increases the probability of a happy conclusion of the mission and guarantees that in case of disloyalty or capture, the employee will not be in condition to reveal but a limited amount of information. Must seek at all cost maximum protection at the intelligence effort of the government.

10. EMPLOYEE TRAINING:

a. The purpose of training consists in assuring that the employee has the necessary knowledge and training to perform his functions successfully. For greater security, the employee must be trained only in those specific aspects of the tasks that will be assigned to him. At the rate he is assigned new tasks, he would also be given the required training. The training of the employees must be polished and continuous.

b. There are three factors that determine the content and the range of training provided to the employee. Said factors are: The nature of the mission, the ability and training of the employee and the operational situation. The nature of the mission, as a rule, indicates the type of training to be provided to the employee; the competence and experience of the employee with influence in his ability to assimilate data and acquire new skills, whereas the operational situation shall determine the training environment. -

1) For example, the mission could demand the employee to determine if the opposition in an organization that brings together a large number of people obeys to subversive influences, to determine the type and amount of consumption articles do not reach their original destination. The employee's history could influence in the way he reacts in respect to training and lack of specific abilities. The operational situation could determine if the employee will be available to receive training, likewise the attitude of the people in the training area, and the possibility that there may be infiltration of insurgent elements in said area.

11. DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDENTITY:

a. We are going to see now, briefly, the manner of selecting an identity for the employee. Once the potential employee agrees to work for the government, the CI agent must create an identity and train him in its use.

The identity of an employee could agree with his real history, concealing only what refers to his activities of

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information collector. Or could conceal not only his activities, but also everything related to his real life. His identity could serve to justify the reason for which he works and lives in a specific place or could serve to explain his actions when they may have been devoted to the task of obtaining information.

b. There is an unlimited number of identities that could be chosen. Before selecting an identity for an employee, the CI agent must analyze the mission, consider the history, personality and intelligence of the employee and to study the environment where the operation would have to be carried out. The employee must understand why he has been given a specific identity. He must also study and exercise the use of the same in a way that his reaction may be immediate and correct in any circumstances.

12. EMPLOYEE RECRUITMENT:

a. An employee's scrutiny begins from the moment the CI agent approaches him to induce him to work for the government and ends when he is separated from government service. The employee must submit to testing to determine the veracity of his declaration regarding his history, his sense of responsibility and emotional ability. This way could be determined if the insurgent movement enjoys the employee's sympathy or if he has been employed by them, the degree of control that the CI agent must exercise on the employee's activities and the accuracy of the reports presented by him. The frequency with which the employee is subjected to testing will be a competence matter of the CI agent. The CI agent must evaluate continuously the information and activities of the employee. He must compare them with known data and with the activities of other employees. This way, the CI agent will be able to discover discrepancies indicative of dishonesty or control failure.

b. You will learn that there are many ways to test an employee. A complete report by the employee after having carried out the assigned mission is always necessary. The CI agent must be prepared for the presentation of this report with the same polish and care observed in the planning and assignment of the task.

Must listen attentively, observe all actions of the employee when he makes his report and to be alert to discover any discrepancy that may arise. The scrutiny of the employee must be scrupulous and continuous during the entire period that the employee remains in government service. This way, the CI agent could maintain the necessary control and the degree of security indispensable in these operations.

13. EMPLOYEE TERMINATION:

a. The employee's separation must be considered before the process of requesting the collaboration of the same. On

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agreeing the individual to work for the government, the CI agent must already have prepared a plan that contemplates the moment in which the services of said individual may not be needed. He must also be prepared to consider all conditions that the employee could propose in that respect. The CI agent must come to an agreement with the employee on any subject that is within the range of his authority.

b. The CI agent must also consider the manner of releasing an employee who turns out to be disloyal or incompetent. There are many options that refer to dismissal of employees. All dismissals must be considered in relation with the mission, the employee's past performance, his present efficiency, etc.. The possibility of using to advantage the services of said employee in the future must also be considered. The CI agent, as you will learn, must prepare complete and detailed reports immediately after the employee renders his report following his separation from government service.

SUMMARY:

A. In this chapter we have summarily considered some procedures used in obtaining and the use of persons to government service dedicated to secret activities of information gathering. There are many other sources of information and the information that could be obtained openly is considerable. Nevertheless, there is certain information which could only be obtained by secret means. If the government is to be fully informed about insurrection indications and to be prepared to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent to insurgent organization, it is necessary to undertake activities of broad projections, employing for that the services of many employees.

B. Must keep in mind that every insurrection movement suffers from deficiencies in respect to insurgent organization itself and the way in which it usually carries out its operations. The agent must gather as much information as he can about the organization, the communication system, the organizations subject to infiltration and the personnel recruitment tactics used by the insurgents. Then, he must arrange and study this information through analysis of the mission and the targets. Finally, he must prepare a plan and choose the employees to exploit specific targets. For the selection of the appropriate employees without disrespect to security, the CI agent must follow the procedure related to obtaining and use of employees, namely:

1. Locate the potential employee
2. Initial investigation of the employee's history
3. Contact and negotiation.
4. Task assignment
5. Employee training
6. Development of an identity.
7. Scrutiny of the employee
8. Termination of the employee.

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C. The CI agent must plan carefully every phase of these activities. He must consider his own potentials and those of the insurgents, the possible courses of action that could be adopted by him as well as by the insurgents and must determine what are the most lucrative objectives.

D. Once a decision is taken, the CI agent must prepare detailed plans, try to meet persons suitable for the work to be carried out, carefully investigate the history of said persons, and to cultivate their friendship for the purpose of persuading them to agree to work for the government. Before assigning these tasks to some employee, the CI agent must evaluate the competence of said employee and to analyze each aspect of the mission and of the objective. Then he must train the employee correctly, providing him with all the instructions and information necessary to allow him to carry out the assigned tasks.

E. The CI agent must be certain of the employee's honesty in order to being deceived or place himself also at the service of the insurgents. For that reason, the employee must be constantly subject to testing. Must develop plans for when the time comes to get rid of the employee's services much before becoming interested to work for the government. The CI agent must constantly exercise great care in carrying out successfully information gathering activities through systematic planning and appropriate use of a large number of people.

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CHAPTER II

LOCATING THE EMPLOYEE

INTRODUCTION:

The intelligence targets must be selected and investigated by the CI agent at the beginning of an insurrection or preferably before the beginning of the same. The agent must be constantly in search of individuals who domicile in the same center or zone of the insurrection, or who, could with time succeed to approach directly or indirectly in a continuous manner the place that is subject of the investigation. The agent must also know how to determine if an individual has the necessary qualifications to be an information collector. He must exercise the proper control on the employee from the moment he asks him to work for the government until his separation from his employment or use. One of the most important factors to be able to exercise the proper control on an employee is the reason that induced him to work for the government.

DEVELOPMENT:

a. REQUIREMENTS WHICH THE EMPLOYEE MUST MEET:

1. Among the factors to be considered on looking for a person for the intelligence service could refer to patent manifestations of his character, the manner in which he could serve the interests of the government and the manner he develops in his environment.

a. The two most important qualities that a potential employee has are:

- 1) To be in or near the target zone.
- 2) To have access.

b. Being in or near the target zone refers to the physical location of the employee with respect to the target or objective. The employee must inside or be able to enter in this zone to perform productive work. An individual who happens to be a native of the geographic zone where the target may be has the advantage of being familiar with the region and its inhabitants.

c. Having access refers to the ability of the employee to be able to obtain specific information desired by the government. This is a highly important factor on considering the selection of an employee. The rest of the desirable qualities are not important. Whoever has access or the possibility of gaining access to required information is absolutely indispensable.

d. The ideal, of course, would be an employee who is in the same zone with the target. Gathering information under this circumstances involves a minimum of effort and risk increasing that way the security of the employee as well as of the operation. The

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high the position which the employee occupies in the organization subject to infiltration, that greater is the possibility of obtaining the information. But, regardless of what the position of the employee may be, the importance is that he more closer the possible to the target.

e. At times it is impossible to recruit an individual within the same zone of the target in dealing with a zone with excellent security and custody measures by competent personnel. In this case may be necessary to select a person from outside the target zone. Perhaps the organization that is desired to be infiltrated carried out commercial transactions with commercial companies who periodically send representatives in that area. In this case, it would be wise to try to obtain the services of an individual who has to visit this area frequently. Even though he would have limited access to information, it would be much better than no information at all. It is possible, at times, to recruit a person from outside the target area and then place him in it.

f. In certain situations, even the slightest penetration in the target area is impossible. In this case, the CI agent could use the services of a person who lives near the zone, who in his turn would obtain information through a close surveillance of the objective and pump some information from the individuals working in said area.

g. Another factor that must be considered that refers to accessibility is the desire to penetrate the target zone in the most highest echelons. Normally, it would preferable to recruit one of the organization leaders for penetration purposes instead of being concerned with ordinary members. In dealing with a subversive organization, however, this is not always possible since the members are carefully selected and mistrust one another.

It is difficult to become a member of an organization of this kind, where always investigate the history of their potential members. In addition the trustworthiness of the members is subjected to continuous tests, which often include interrogations and surveillance by the security elements.

h. A high level official in a subversive organization would probably have access to valuable information, being responsible for the execution of the organization rules. Nevertheless, if the services of said individual cannot be obtained, an employee who has the possibility of becoming a high level official in a short period of time could be selected. Another possibility would be to find an employee who may provides the necessary information that would allow the CI agent come in direct contact with a member of the organization willing to collaborate with the government.

i. We said that being close or inside the target zone and

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having access to valuable information are the two most important requirements that an individual, whose services have been solicited, must have. The services of an individual without these requirements lack in value. We are now going to mention some other qualities which are desirable. We shall discuss those positive qualities that all employees must have, as well as those necessary to carry out special tasks which demand special knowledge.

j. Try to think of all the requirements that would be demanded from an employee who has to carry out secret information gathering missions. Consider first the general characteristics that you would wish all the employees to have, so that then to examine those that would be needed in very special situations.

B. QUALITIES TO BE CONSIDERED:

1. INTELLIGENCE: The employee must have at least average intelligence, good judgement and common sense. He must have a good retaining memory, in a way that he only needs to take few notes in order to be able to present a truthful and precise report. The requirements in regards to intellectual ability in question, vary considerably according to the nature of the mission that has to be carried out. The intelligence is always a factor of supreme importance in the ability of the employee to be able to absorb training.

2. EDUCATION: This includes academic education and all types of training as well as military education and at work. For example, a person who does not know how to read often finds himself at a tremendous disadvantage. As a rule, better results would be obtained if the employee has received training related with the subject about which he would have to report. If the employee, for example, must present a report on a political situation, it is necessary to be verses in political matters. The employee's ability to understand advanced specialized matters depends, in great part, on his academic preparation.

3. TECHNICAL ABILITY: There are an unlimited number of special abilities that would be needed to help the individual in carrying out the assigned tasks. Said abilities could vary from the ability to drive specific types of vehicles and make certain apparatus function, being an electronics expert.

4. SOCIAL POSITION: Here we refer to the position that the individual occupies within the social structure of his country. This condition is determined from a series of factors, such as birth, education, economic status, place of residence, religion, nationality, manners, marital status, employment and the aspirations of the individual. Often it happens that the individual does not know his true social position. The CI agent must determine this comparing the history of the potential employee, his appearance, his apparent education and manners with the known

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social conditions of the community in which he lives. The social condition in very rare occasions could change without considerable effort, in a way that it is a factor that must be considered on evaluation the ability of the potential employee to be able to adopt to a specific environment. This is particularly true when the employee will be asked to penetrate in an objective area.

5. PHYSICAL CONDITION: It is important to know if the potential employee suffers from some illness or affliction that could impede him from carrying out his tasks. It is understood that the employee will have to work regularly, to obtain and provide information about the indicated target, at previously agreed times and meetings. Working full time seeking information about any objective would be a highly difficult task for any employee who may have a physical impediment.

6. SEX: The CI agent must not discard the possibility of employing women. Women should be employed in some situations, while in others, they could be used with greater effectiveness than men. Remember that women are, as a rule, more emotional than men, but there no difference in their intelligence. Whatever success the employee may have will depend on the individual. The decision to employ a woman would be subject, of course, of many factors.

7. AGE: Worthy employees of great trust are mature individuals, objective and emotionally stable, who are not letting their own personalities influence their observation abilities. Immature and emotionally unstable persons, worrying about their own problems, as a rule, are persons on your you cannot confide. The children often are very observant and they can provide precise information about things that they have seen and heard, in they are questioned in a proper manner. However, it is indispensable that said individual be trustworthy, honest and sincere in his relations with the CI agent.

9. RELIGION: The religious beliefs of the potential employee could, at times, be a factor of high consideration in the selection of the individual. A person could have certain convictions or beliefs that would impede him from performing specific tasks.

C. This list of the qualifications that a potential employee most have does not include, without any question, all the positive qualifications. In order to determine the desired requirements, the CI agent must consider the local environment, the customs, the needs and the economic and social aspirations of the zone.

The requirements that the candidates to be employed should meet must be sufficiently flexible, in a way that they could agree with the mission for which the individual may be employed. Rarely we find a person who meets all the qualifications that we consider desirable. Therefore, the CI agent must evaluate the potential

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employee bearing in mind the positive qualities and to proceed from here in the selection of the most qualified individual. Some qualities are indispensable, while others could be overlooked always and when the individual shows to have the aptitude to be trained. For example, almost any technical ability that an employee must have could be acquired after he has been employed.

D. EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION:

1. We will go on now to discuss some of the factors that are usually considered in the selection of persons who have to work in intelligence operations. We shall limit the discussion to factors which are related to the employee, such as his personality and the environment where he lives. We particularly shall consider his motivations, that is to say, this inner impulse that determines his way of thinking, feeling and acting, and which reveals the form in which the CI agent could exercise influence on said employee.

2. There is a diversity of motives that induce individuals to accept work in intelligence activities of the government. We shall analyze in detail some of the most common reasons, in order then to consider how said motives could be observed or identified. The potential employee could allege any reason to justify his interest in the job, but it is the responsibility of the CI agent to know how to discern the true motives of the employee, so that he may be able to persuade him to accept to work for the government. However, this is often difficult and the necessary ability could be acquired through experience. The agent, for example, must know when to appeal to patriotic sense of the individual, when to indicate to him that it would be best to be anticommunist, or when to offer him money or some material thing.

3. Place yourself for a moment in the position of the persons who appears to offer his services for this type of employment. This person is risking his security and possibly his own life on agreeing to enter the target zone to obtain information which the government needs.

It is serious decision in which the CI agent could contribute in the final decision that the potential employee makes. But, for that, the CI agent must know the individual, the feelings which motivate him and the factors that exercise influence on his way of thinking.

4. We are now going to discuss the variety of reasons that attract persons to these activities. You, by your experience on the behavior of persons, could provide many ideas to this discussion. We shall consider three questions: (1) Which are the reasons that induce the individuals to work in intelligence operations? (2) In what form are manifested or could be observed these reasons? (3) what techniques the CI agent must use to exploit said reasons for the benefit of the government?

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5. IDEOLOGY: It has been frequently proven that the belief in an ideology is the most convenient motivation that the potential employee could possess. When the ideological concept motivates the employee, his points of view, especially those that refer to politics and economics, harmonize with those of the government. Consequently, said employee will frequently accept to carry out tasks and missions that normally would decline if he was motivated by other factors. The employee motivated by ideology, as a rule, is more reliable, faithful and dedicated to his work than persons moved by other motives. The ideologic motivation implies adhering to abiding to specific government concepts, such are the anticommunist struggle or on behalf of democracy. The devotion to conservatism, liberalism, individualism, etc., could also be classified as ideologic motivation. Even when they are necessarily linked to specific political party, the propose however specific political ideas and way of life.

a. The political motivation of the individual could noted by the interest he shows in politics, that is to say, his participation in discussions about political subjects, reading of books about politics and his membership status in political action groups or making comments or making comments about political events. It could also be noted by his reaction to events of current importance, by his attitude in respect to social reforms and even by his way of dressing. When the potential employee is motivated by an ideology, the CI agent could show interest in political and economic ideas that do not necessarily have to be similar to those of the candidate to be employed.

Could identify the government with the same ideals that the potential employee has and suggest to him that, by being a government employee he would be in a better position to effectively continue towards realization of said ideals.

6. PATRIOTISM: Patriotism is another convenient motivation in the character of the potential employee. The patriot loves his country and he is dedicated to it. Above all the welfare of his country concerns him, and he wishes to promote its prestige. An individual motivated by patriotism normally includes the danger which the insurrection threat represents and would be willing to do much more than it is expected if that was necessary. The patriotic motivations, as a rule, walks together with the ideologic motivation.

a. The patriotic motivation could be distinguished by the way the individual thinks, acts and feels. His contentions are not necessarily a clear indication of patriotic motivation. An potential employee, motivated by patriotism, as a rule, would not be willing to accept employment in a dangerous situation alien to every patriotic consideration. However, said individual could be induced to work for the government provided his employment was related with a specific patriotic objective.

-23-

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(*) WHICH IS THE MOST COMMON MOTIVATION FACTOR AMONG POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES?

(*) ANSWER: The expectation of some remuneration or compensation.

7. DESIRE OF PROFIT: The great majority of potential employees are driven by the desire of profit, that is to say, they work with the intention of being paid for their services. When this tendency is noted in the individual, it must be tested until there is no doubt about that. The way in which he solicits to be paid and the manner in which he is going to spend what he receives must be determined. In addition, the fact of being paid in a short or long period of time must also be considered for security purposes.

a. The desire of profit probably is the most common among the mercenary motivations. Frequently happens that the potential employee is working, but he wishes to supplement his income. Even when money is the most common medium used, the individual could ask to be paid with specific articles difficult to obtain.

The remuneration for the services of the individual could cause a security problem if precautions are not taken to have satisfactory explanations to justify any sudden improvement in the economic condition or standard of living of the individual.

8. DESIRE OF PERSONAL SATISFACTION: The desire of personal satisfaction is something similar to wish for material benefit. However, an individual motivated by personal satisfaction does not try to benefit in the material sense. He could ask to be compensated with a job that provides respect and certain social position in the community. Or, he could ask for a favor of great personal value, totally lacking monetary value.

a. As a rule, it is not difficult to distinguish the individual who accepts work for material compensation or personal reasons. A negative test would usually give good results. The CI agent simply pretends to find out if the individual will work for nothing. The person motivated by mercenary intentions will usually accept to work for the government if it agrees to his demands. Nevertheless, any other method that could suppose interest the individual must be exhausted.

9. PROFESSIONAL GOALS: Another type of employee is the one who is motivated by professional goals. Said individual could have had experience as police investigator, private detective, CI agent, or investigator for some other government agency. The persons with experience in investigation work could carry out tasks such as secret information collectors with greater ease and skill than those who have not had such experience. The professional motive in these cases is important, since said individual often want to continue in this type of work.

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10. DESIRE OF REVENGE: The desire of revenge is another motivation factor that prevails among many potential employees. Revenge is the urge of removing real or imaginary injustices. Some of the most obvious reasons that drive the individuals in this direction are: loss of their properties or business, loss of the privilege to exercise a profession and personal reasons such as having been victim of robbery, violation or personal injuries. Although this individual could often provide very good information, the CI agent must take note that because of their personal sentiments they could prejudice things and, therefore, present exaggerated or distorted reports.

Employees motivated by vengeance must be dealt with high care, since generally they are emotionally unstable persons.

a. Potential employees stimulated by motives of injustice could be easily distinguished, since these generally could be revealed in the conversation. If not so, the most flagrant offenses could be noticed through a study of the individual's history. A sign of sympathy and the wish to help on the part of the CI agent would normally induce this type of individual to accept to work for the government. Recruitment of this type of persons is a comparatively an easy thing. The CI agent could suggest to potential employee to join a movement, some activity or organization with which he could identify, providing him at the same time the opportunity to get it off his chest.

11. WHAT ARE THE DISADVANTAGES OF FEAR AS A MOTIVATION FACTOR.

a. Normally fear could not be successfully used to motivate individuals. Experience has shown that information obtained on the basis of fear is unreliable. Employees with negative attitude tend to offer passive resistance. Therefore, the appearance of the least obstacle would be reason to stop fulfilling their tasks. In addition, if an individual has been recruited using fear as a weapon, the CI agent must be in a position of maintain the threat.

b. For example, an individual who had committed a crime in a specific country was recruited after threats that if he was not going to do it he would be punished for having violated the law. The individual then accepts the government generous offer and worked satisfactorily for seven years. However, when this period of time ended presented his resignation. He knew perfectly well that there is a legal disposition through which criminal cases prescribe to seven years and, therefore, the government now could not prosecute him for the crime committed.

12. We have until now dealt how to determine and identify some of the most common motivations that usually stimulate the potential employee. We have considered different methods through

-25-

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which the CI agent could evaluate the individual's motivation to induce him to participate in information collection operations for the government.

We said that in some cases, it is difficult to determine the true motives that could inspire some persons to work for the government. In other cases, could exist reasons that appear to be intimately related. Very rarely an individual is found who is motivated only and exclusively by a single factor. You, as CI agents, must know what methods to use when you try to separate and identify apparently conflicting motives and emotions. When the individual is driven only by mercenary purposes, it is necessary to tread carefully. If the government can acquire the services of a person for a specific price, the guerrillas also could obtain them for a higher price.

E. METHODS USED TO LOCATE POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES.

1. Now we are going to consider some methods that could be used to find competent employees. The CI agent must exhaust all efforts in this search, trying to carry out his activities with discretion and without revealing why he is interested in a specific person.

2. The possibilities of finding persons willing to collaborate with the government, in the place where an insurrection movement is developing, are immense. Specific individuals, organizations and commercial companies must be the object of infiltration by government employees, in order to obtain information about the guerrillas. Now we shall consider how the CI agent, with discretion, could locate and identify potential employees who are placed and who have access to desired information. He knows exactly the qualification which the potential employee must have, but the problem is to find the appropriate person.

3. METHODS USED TO LOCATE EMPLOYEES.

Archives and Records

Activities of the CI agent

Other government agencies

Military activities

Local religious workers, physicians, etc.

Other employees.

a. ARCHIVES AND RECORDS.

-26-

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1) Archives, records and publications represent a good starting point in the search for potential employees. The archives and records contain information related to objectives of value. The lists of names of persons and organizations could help to find persons who have the necessary qualifications. An archive, for example, which contains the names and information about the families and friends of persons who have been victims of the guerrillas could be of great value. It is logical to suppose that said individuals detest the guerrillas and that they could be willing to participate in the intelligence activities of the government.

2) Archives about criminal matters could also be useful. The CI agent must keep in mind that a criminal does not necessarily have to be a guerrilla. Even though the guerrillas many times are accustomed to using criminals to carry out contraband operations, circulate fake money, traffic in contraband articles, etc., must not commit the error of confusing these two. If the government places the criminal and the guerrilla in the same category, it could force the criminal to collaborate with the guerrilla. On the other hand, a former criminal who does not sympathize with the cause of the guerrillas could be a good bet to accept to work for the government.

3) The records of commercial companies who deal in munitions, sanitary material and other equipment that the guerrillas need could provide data that will allow to locate potential employees in said companies. Having a government employee in a commercial house of this type allows to guard in advance against possible guerrilla activities and to obtain detailed information about specific operations. Checking the archives could also supply additional information about persons already considered as possible candidates for employment by us.

b. CI AGENT ACTIVITIES:

1) The search for potential employees must be carried out as part of the normal activities of the CI agent. He could be busy, usually, in policy type projects or some other kind that may allow him to cover the entire zone.

But regardless of the type of work that he performs, it is indispensable to rely on the respect and voluntary cooperation of the population. Achieving this assignment, the population in its entirety should be considered as potential employees.

2) The CI agent will undoubtedly have in his round the opportunity to get to know government officials, merchants and peasants, small business proprietors, workers, etc. Said persons could very well be converted to guerrillas or information collectors for the government. The CI agent could

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direct the conversations towards subjects that would allow him to evaluate his interlocutor and thus obtain the information that subsequently could confirm in the archives. Nevertheless, he must keep in mind that any individual with whom he strikes up conversation could very well be a member of the guerrilla organization.

c. OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

1) Government agencies could in many cases help discover potential employees. However, even in this case, the CI agent must conceal all interest that he may have in said parson, since there is the possibility that the guerrillas may be informants within the government. On the other hand, a trusted official could inadvertently reveal said information.

2) The CI agent must review the records of all government agencies dedicated in investigation and verification of employees' history. This allows to identify the parents and friends of guerrillas, as well as individuals originating from the zones dominated by them, who could be useful to the government. It is to be expected that in the refugee camps and centers, in all the places where interrogations are conducted, in the food distribution and control centers, and even in warehouses and markets, records of some kind would be found.

3) The CI agent could take advantage of the assistance programs through which the government supplies food, clothes, medical assistance and housing to population. Since these are programs with which the government is already identified, the individuals who have benefitted from them could be persuaded to collaborate in the search for persons willing to work for the government.

The CI agent must offer presents and compensation for information leading to the arrest, capture or death of guerrillas. This is another method that could be used successfully to locate potential employees.

d. MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

1) Performing patrol service or other military activities that imply establishing contact with the population is another discreet way of obtaining information. The military units, in performing their usual reconnaissance tasks in the villages, usually search the houses and interrogate the villagers. The CI agent or one of the supervisors could accompany the patrols and to make certain that a routine interrogation mission is carried out.

e. LOCAL RELIGIOUS WORKERS, PHYSICIANS, ETC>:

1) Educators, physicians, social and religious

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workers in the locality could also provide much information to CI agent. Said individuals, as a rule, maintain a close relationship with the population and enjoy the respect of the same. They are used also to conserve a variety of records that could be a strong source of useful information.

f) OTHER EMPLOYEES:

1) At times, individuals in government service could help to find other employees. In some cases, the use of persons who already work for the government is absolutely indispensable. In other cases, the CI agent could use an individual whose unique mission is to find potential employees. For security reasons, of course, the individual in charge of the task of finding potential employees must not be told if the persons recommended by him were subsequently employed by the government. The practice of using persons already employed by the government to find other employees could be dangerous. The CI agent must conserve absolute control in these situations and have complete confidence in the judgement of the person to whom the mission of finding other employees has been delegated.

F. SEARCH FOR EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION.

1. We have considered more or less in detail the essential requirements and the factors which motivate employees or potential employees. We discussed some of the most common procedures used to find said employees. On discussing the importance of accessibility to valuable information, we said that in these situations it was most advisable to procure the services of persons who belonged to the guerrilla organization. It is logical, therefore, to understand that the search for suitable individuals must be concentrated and limited in the first place to persons who serve in the files of the subversive organization. The possibility of using the services of persons connected one way or another with the insurrection movement must not be neglected.

2. The ideal regarding every infiltration attempt would be to be carried out at the highest level of the guerrilla organization. Considering the security measures themselves of these organizations and ideologic indoctrination of the leaders of these movements, such enterprise would be very daring. Nevertheless, none of the possibilities must be discarded before it is seriously and carefully thought out. The guerrilla is human and, therefore, subject to make mistakes, to incur in wrong evaluations and to be negligent in what refers to security measures. The cases of key individuals who have abandoned the ranks of a guerrilla movement for almost any type of imaginable reason, from the philosophic to psychopathic, abound in history.

3. The middle echelon of the guerrilla organization is the next most advisable place to look for employees. They are more

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numerous at this level, who as a rule are less decided and convinced persons in their personal and ideologic beliefs. This provided a much wider field to find potential employees, but naturally the degree of access to information that these individuals could have generally diminishes in proportion to the influence and power of the individual.

4. Must keep in mind that within the structure of the guerrilla organization, there are persons who either by negligence, carelessness and other reasons, alien to every ideologic consideration, find themselves in vulnerable positions.

Often, some principal members of the movement could mistrust others because of envy, result of some decisions taken, personality differences or in the struggle to gain power. The persons who have been disciplined by the guerrilla organization are, as a rule, good candidates for us. At times, the government could even foment discord among the ranks of the guerrilla elements through well palled and executed plots.

5. Any of these factors or a combination of them could provide the CI agent with the opportunity to obtain the services of individuals in administrative positions in the guerrilla organization. However, any attempt to reach individuals at the middle or upper echelon of said organization must be made with the utmost discretion after careful selection of the employees. The continuous and methodical investigation of the archives, records and reports must be complemented and confirmed through careful observation of the individual who is investigating for our objectives.

6. At the lower level of operation of guerrilla activities, access of the individuals to valuable information is highly limited, but if an infiltration is achieved at this level, that could be a valuable source for information about guerrilla activities in the locality. The security measures at this level are not always effective and often individuals are found at this level, with the promise of obtaining some personal benefit or monetary compensation if they are willing to cooperate.

7. Another method of being able to infiltrate the guerrilla organization consists in recruiting persons who are known to be involved in clandestine intelligence activities for the benefit of the guerrillas. Even when this method is difficult and implies certain some measure of risk, if it is successful, the results could be highly satisfactory. Any hostile employee who is capture by or is in a compromising situation with the government must be immediately subject of an exhaustive evaluation, in order to determine if his services would be beneficial for the government.

8. The support base of the guerrillas is another

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propitious place where to look for potential employees. To the extent its organization grows, that greater is the dependency of the guerrillas on the local population for purposes of logistic support, economic support, human resources and shelter means.

Within this support base, the security measures are usually weak, being probable the existence of a number of persons not identified with the guerrilla cause. Some could oppose the guerrillas, when there is discretion or for ideologic or patriotic reasons, or due to some misfortune directly or indirectly attributed to acts of intimidation, terrorism and repression of guerrilla elements. Persons in these situations could join the insurrection movement for reasons of convenience or as means of survival. Consequently, the individuals in these conditions could be considered as our logical candidates.

9. In places where the guerrillas have succeeded in attracting workers, shopkeepers, students, peasants, women and other groups in disciplined support nucleus, the government must try to have employees in each group. As a rule, it is much more easier to try to obtain the services of founder members of these groups than to try to introduce a person in said organizations.

10. In zones where the guerrillas have succeeded in establishing a support base within the population, educators, doctors, clergy and civilian leaders frequently remain faithful to the government in view of their positions. Said individuals could provide information and make very valuable recommendations in regards to potential employees. Must not arbitrarily disregard any company, organization or group that maintains relations or carried out transactions with the guerrillas.

11. Experience has shown that the radius of action of the guerrillas is limited only by their physical ability to reach all their targets. Some high priority targets are universal, while others could be peculiar to a specific country. Among the most common targets of the guerrillas, one could mention the universities, syndicates, religious organizations, circulation organs, local political parties and police and military organizations.

12. A government threatened with an insurrection outbreak must not leave the guerrillas get the advantage in recruitment of employees within said organizations. Each known objective and those that is expected to become future targets must be subjects of a periodic investigation seeking to procure the services of those individuals who meet the necessary requirements.

13. The range and magnitude of every infiltration within an organization must be considered in relation with the circumstances existing in the same. In some cases, it could be necessary to hide a single key employee to obtain the required

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information, while in other occasions the proliferation of government employees in the organization could be possible as well as advisable. Generally, it is preferable to infiltrate every known organization where guerrilla elements work instead of trying to predict its strategy to be later proven mistaken.

SUMMARY:

A. We have discussed the methods used to find suitable persons for work in government service in information gathering secret activities. We considered some of the requirements that said persons must meet and we established some general standards to serve as criteria in the selection of personnel. Nevertheless, we recognize that every standard must be sufficiently flexible to allow quick adaptations depending on the nature of the work that the person has to carry out. In addition, we said that in rarely is a person found that meets all the desirable positive qualities.

B. We also talked how to take note and identify some of the most common motivations which stimulate potential employees. We warned that it is difficult to precise the true motivations which drive the individual in some cases and that in others, said motivations could be intimately related. And so the importance of knowing how to separate and identify the different emotions and motives that could be stimulating the individual.

C. Finally, we discussed the usefulness of registers and archives and the help that government employees, government agencies and other employees could provide in the task of finding potential employees inside the guerrilla organization, in its support base and in places where project to develop their activities.

CHAPTER III

INVESTIGATION AND INITIAL CONTACT

INTRODUCTION:

As you probably have guessed, there are three steps that must be followed in acquiring a potential employee: Finding him, investigate his history and establish contact. All other subsequent steps are part of the utilization phase. We have considered the procedure that the CI agent must follow in order to find a presumed employee. Must consider the possible position of the presumed employee and the facility with which he could operate in a given environment, in addition to considering all his aptitudes. Must also scrutinize the motivation that the individual could have. Must know the vulnerabilities of the guerrillas and how and where to look for presumed employees.

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DEVELOPMENT:

A. When the CI agent has tentatively found a presumed employee, he must initiate an investigation of his history in order to obtain all available information, before he actually begins to establish contact with him. On conducting the investigation he must use his support personnel where it may be necessary. In order to obtain the pertinent information should be able to use all investigation resources. The CI agent must dissolve the personnel which for some reason for another may not be appropriate for the mission. He should investigate all pertinent archives including those of all governmental agencies without revealing the true nature of the investigation. The CI agent in essence, carried out an initial thorough investigation of the history of the presumed employee, of his personality, his outstanding characteristics and vices, his likes and his dislikes, etc.

B. Once the initial investigation has been completed, the CI agent shall analyze the information and shall develop a plan to reach the individual. In other words, he initiates the procedure to establish contact, at the moment in which begins to analyze the information and to evaluate the individual.

As I informed you in the acquiring phase, the step to establish contact is a complete procedure that must be planned and developed so that the CI agent can convince an individual to accept the employment. We recognize that there are occasions when, due to the nature of the mission and the fact that the CI agent may have established a good relationship with the individual, perhaps may not be necessary to conduct a detailed investigation and the elaborate procedure to establish contact. In such rare cases, it could be possible to do without the acquiring phase. But, in the majority of cases, the CI agent will have to follow the procedure to establish contact.

C. This procedure could be divided into defined steps depending on the action that has to be carried out. We already mentioned the evaluation step, in which we analyze the information obtained during the initial investigation and to determine the method that we are going to use to convince the individual to collaborate with the government. Then we plan how we are going to reach the individual. This shall be done pleasantly in order that we are able to win his respect, his friendship and his confidence. Before trying to reach the individual, must establish the relations necessary to win his confidence and respect at the beginning, as well as subsequently his faithfulness and control. The CI agent, in the phase of finding a presumed employee, must have analyzed that motivation that the individual could have and must have expanded his study after the initial investigation.. On becoming familiar with the individual, the CI agent shall determine the reason that he could have and use it totally. Shall cultivate the friendship of the presumed employee and develop it until he has had

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sufficient time to study him thoroughly; then and only then is when he will really try to establish contact --- try to convince him to collaborate with the intelligence service.

D. As it can be seen, in order to be able to determine the acquiring phase it requires much time, detailed planning, analysis and great skill. We are dealing with human beings who have their own ideas and act individually. When the investigation is completed and establishing the contact itself has begun, we depend on the information and the ability to analyze the individual and to develop the situations. The majority of the operations related with presumed employees are analytical.

Nevertheless, due to the fact that we are working with individuals, certain parts of our operation could be considered as an "art". We must recognize this fact and develop this art necessary to successfully conclude the procedure to establish contact. If they study the analytical part and learn to apply it as well as their common sense, intuition, knowledge and art, there is no doubt they will be successful.

E. INVESTIGATION OF PRESUMED EMPLOYEES:

1. SYSTEMATIC SCRUTINY:

- STRONG POINT
- WEAKNESSES
- PERSONALITY
- IDEOLOGY
- RELIGION
- ECONOMIC SITUATION
- POLITICAL INCLINATIONS
- EDUCATION
- TRAINING
- TRAVELS
- HABITS
- FRIENDSHIPS
- LANGUAGES

2. Let's suppose that a mission was assigned and that we already have analyzed his requirements as well as the target. We also have found some presumed employees who seem to meet the necessary qualifications to be placed in an area and to operate easily in a given environment in order to carry out a mission. Now we must study the best qualities in order to carry out the mission. This analysis is a systematic study of the individual, which includes his strong points, weaknesses, personality, ideology, religion, economic situation, political inclinations and affiliations, lineage, education higher professional training to obligatory, travels abroad, habits, friendships and his linguistic knowledge. We conduct a detailed investigation of each individual in order to be able to eliminate those who are not suitable and to select the most qualified.

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3. This investigation is carried out carefully but without any one finding out. The CI agent and his superiors are the only ones who must know the true reason for which this investigation is being conducted.

It is important to bear in mind that all the information, whether derogatory or not, is important for the investigation. Therefore, the CI agent in investigating the archives must search for all the information that he could obtain about the presumed employee, since only on the basis of it he could plan and perfect his procedure of establishing contact, when he has all the information in his possession. The same as in any other operation, in order to achieve his objective, he should plan every movement to be able to assure a systematic and without problems operation.

F. INITIAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES:

1. During the initial investigation, the CI agent must develop the necessary information, keeping the following question in mind: Should I continue the investigation? If the evidence indicate that the individual works for another friendly service or collaborates with the guerrilla movement, we must continue the his utilization for another type of mission in the last case. We could continue the investigation, but probably it will not be with the intention of using the individual in the mission we had in mind. If it is determined that the individual is a criminal or a swindler known in the intelligence circles, normally the investigation will be discontinued. However, remember that perhaps in some situations the services of a person of that nature are required, therefore do not automatically discard him. You will have analyzed his mission and will know the type of individual who could complete the mission; so that the most suitable to be selected.

2. In almost every case, it is necessary that the investigation begins with a check of the archives in our own office. There could be isolated cases in which would be required to carry out an immediate check of the archives of another agency, since it is possible that said information is not available before hand or due to the fact that the information in such archives is urgently needed. Whatever the case may be, the CI agent must be flexible and use his common sense. As a rule, we conduct an investigation in our own archives in order to determine if some of our presumed employees have voluntarily contributed information or if the name is recorded in said archives for some other reason. Frequently, good trails and excellent investigations have been developed because the CI agent began with a thorough investigation of his own files.

Since the main office is at a higher level, in addition to having information about our area of interest, it also has information about all the activities under its responsibility. We

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have two great advantages when we conduct the investigation in the archives of our own agency: First, it is very probable that the veracity of the source of said information may have been evaluated with precision, thus simplifying the analysis; and, second, there is less probability of compromising the security and the pertinent problems could be resolved much easier. In the first case, the CI agent will always be able to ask questions from his colleagues who interrogated the source or conducted the prior investigation. If he is not able to make contact with the original investigator, he could obtain the classification assigned by him about the veracity of the source. If he is conducting the investigation within his own organization, it is less probable that security problems would develop since there is no need to have to reveal the names of the individuals or other persons outside his agency.

3. Frequently, neither his own office or the main office have the required information and the CI agent will have to analyze the archives of other agencies. On investigating said archives, he must not indicate the purpose of his investigation. For example, our intelligence agency would normally have relations with other units and military and civilian intelligence agencies and the police. There must be a good connection, probably could investigate the archives of another agency and this way eliminate the risks of security compromise. However, all agencies do not allow anyone to see their archives, but if you provide them a list, they themselves would conduct the investigation. The CI agent could conceal his true intention or the nature of the investigation in different ways. For example, he could submit a list of 15 or more names some of which are presumed employees and could request to be provided all the information that the agencies may have on each one of the individuals. This would conceal the true nature of the investigation in addition to passing out the names. Other methods could be used, but he must make certain that security is maintained all the time.

4. The CI agent on concluding his investigation could determine that the individual is not collaborating with another agency. Although he may have had contact with the agency, it is possible that his representatives may have had their reasons for not providing the requested information. An investigation of the archives which gives a negative result usually would allow the CI agent to conclude: First, that the informant has no criminal record for the intelligence; second, that if he is a criminal or a guerrilla, he has been sufficiently audacious not to be discovered. A source or a competent intelligence agent of the enemy will be well trained and will avoid being discovered. He will have learned many of the same techniques that the government CI agent has and will be very interested not to compromise security. The lack of information, as a result of an investigation of the archives, indicates that the investigation must continue. The CI agent is not able to reach conclusions or develop a plan if he does not have information.

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5. The CI agent, after checking the archives, must carry out an investigation in the community to verify above all the reputation, personality, character, habits, favorite hobbies, social customs, etc., of the presumed employee. He could conduct this part of the investigation himself, or he could assign the mission to support personnel of investigations. In friendly areas the investigation in the community could be carried out easily. Normally it is not convenient for the CI agent to conduct investigations in areas controlled by the guerrillas. We must assume that the guerrillas are watching and his operation would fail; must employ his support personnel of secret investigations to look for information. These could be any means for the collection of information, depending on the personnel involved and the specific situation. He is located in the area, knows the majority of the villagers and can casually ask questions without raising suspicions. He can perform the role of a talkative traveler who is interested in selling his merchandize. He must seek the information without raising suspicion.

6. The CI agent as well as his assistant have many identities which they can conceal when they carry out an investigation in a friendly community.

For example, since the government has many projects that include town improvements, rural reconstruction or agrarian reform, it is common to see representative in the community asking questions and taking notes. To assume the identity of an investigator for the department of statistics who is taking the census of the population is very useful. The CI agent on assuming the identity of such representative could look for much information without raising suspicions.

7. Although the surveillance techniques will be considered in detail farther on in training, we must consider them here from the point of view of their usefulness in the investigation of a presumed employee. During our consideration of the investigation, we stipulate that it could develop trails that could help immensely. If for some reason or another, there is no information in the archives and a thorough investigation in the community is inadequate, the CI agent could use surveillance to conduct his investigation. Perhaps he wishes to verify the activities or interests; and could wish to investigate the relationship or ideas that the presumed employee may have in respect to guerrilla movement. They need a thorough planning, as well as trained and intelligence personnel to conduct an investigation surveillance. The surveillance must be carried out in secret so that neither the individual nor the guerrillas discover the operation. The same will all other measures.

8. In singular cases where all other investigation methods do not contribute adequate information, the CI agent could try to talk with the presumed employee. He must plan such

conversation to the last detail before trying to speak with the presumed employee. The conversation is such, like the word implies, an informal talk. The individual will have the impression that he is conversing friendly with a courteous individual. The CI agent must try to obtain the information that he needs without the individual becomes suspicious of his purpose. Once such conversation has been planned, that is to say, when the manner how he is going to present himself to the individual and develop the required information casually has been determined, the conversation itself will depend on the ingenuity and his imagination. He must be able to capture any observation that could be used and must be prepared to develop additional information. He must retain in his mind all the information obtained.

G. PROCEDURES TO ESTABLISH CONTACT;

1. It is difficult to consider the initial investigation in relation with the start of the procedure to establish contact due to the fact that they overlap. The CI agent naturally must begin to evaluate the presumed source as soon as he has information that requires to plan the manner how he is going to approach the individual and establish contact. But the individual must be kept under continues investigation. As a result of the initial investigation, a large file is developed that could be followed in other trails. The CI agent would wish to know every action and inclination of the individual, not only during the phases of the initial investigation and of the contact but also during his training, discharge of his obligations and all his projects. Therefore, a continuous investigation shall be maintained, not daily, but in an irregular manner to be up to date in all the activities of the presumed employee.

2. Once the CI agent has considered adequate the information to analyze and evaluate the presumed employee, he shall begin the procedure to establish contact itself. A procedure is a particular method that is followed to carry out something that generally includes different steps or operations. The procedure to establish contact is the method that is followed to know, cultivate friendship and subsequently convince him to collaborate. This is a sequence that must be followed if the CI agent has to convince the individual to accept the job. It is not an arbitrary step or actions that he has to carry out with common sense. The procedure begins with the evaluation. This is done on studying the information gathered during the initial investigation. Concurrently, once we have finished gathering the principal characteristics about our individual, we prepare a plan to approach him and subsequently to meet him. We must begin the necessary relations with the individual, cultivate them and win his confidence. The procedure reaches its culminating point when we ask him if he wants to work with us. The common sense reveals that although these steps follow a certain order, some will be

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continuous and certainly others will overlap. The evaluation of the informant is a continuous procedure. The CI agent must be ready to capture any indication of disaffection, of too much confidence or talkativeness.

He must be prepared to change the method that had been planned to cultivate relations with the individual, after evaluating him in accessible phase. It could be that the presumed employee does not have the personality that the analysis reveals from the information obtained in the initial investigation. The development of relations with the individual is another continuous step that will last the entire time that the relationship has to be maintained. Must establish some relations of mutual respect and trust in order to maintain this harmony.

3. Once the initial investigation is ended, the CI agent shall analyze the information and evaluate the presumed employee. He must determine when, where and how to approach the individual. This must be carefully planned and to the end, since the manner how the individual is going to be approached is a highly delicate step in the procedure to establish contact. If the initial evaluation is in error, the manner how to approach the individual is reflected in the degree of success that can be achieved. We shall consider, in the analysis of the second step that we are going to follow, the plan of how we are going to approach the individual. The CI agent carries out the encounter with him. During this initial personal encounter, he continues analyzing the individual. Using this personal evaluation as a base, he could determine if the individual is adequate for the job. Analyzes the individual's personality and concludes the plan to cultivate his friendship and finally could convince him to collaborate. There is no limit in the amount and type of information that could be obtained in this initial encounter. This offers the CI agent the opportunity to obtain the details that he needs to complete his file. It is possible that said details may have not been available until this initial encounter, simply because the presumed employee was the only one who knew these factors.

4. In addition, the subsequent encounters will allow the CI agent to be able to continue evaluating the individual, cultivating his friendship and developing his methods to establish the contact itself, in accordance with his personality and motivations that he could have. Therefore, the procedure to establish contact begins with an initial evaluation, he continues studying and evaluating him in order to be able to determine the best manner to convince him.

5. The initial evaluation will help the CI agent to develop a plan to approach the individual.

A plan is formulated to anticipate the problems that could emerge and to reduce errors. For example, if according to his

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evaluation, it is determined that the presumed employee is not adequate, he must have devised a method to distance himself from the individual casually and to discontinue the relations, without him coming to suspect the truth. On the other hand, if the evaluation is favorable for the presumed employee, the CI agent must have planned the time and place where the encounter is going to take place. Each detail of the initial encounter is planned to assure us that all the imaginable possibilities have been considered. The purpose is to carry out a real and natural encounter with the presumed employee. A written plan is prepared, in order to be carefully studied and to annotate all the pertinent information. Although there is not a single format that must be inflexibly followed, nevertheless, we will show below a typical example:

a. HEADING:

Like in any other plan, there is a preamble. We note all the information like the name of the presumed employee, the date and place of birth, his residence, place of employment, etc. We also include the date of the plan, the project number, and any additional reference. the heading must be written like a form with blank spaces that have to be completed clearly outlined; these spaces must make it easy to make annotations, also to be simple to read. The project number is clearly indicated in order to be able to file and easily located later on.

b. SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION OF THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION:

Although the information that was received as a result of the initial investigation is controlled and filled under the assigned project number, the plan to approach the individual must contain a summary of the information. The condensed version includes all the pertinent data together with the archives number and must offer to CI agent some adequate references to prepare the evaluation. That is to say, includes all the principal factors related with the suitability, trustworthiness, personality and history of the presumed employee that could influence in his collaboration with the government.

c. EVALUATION

The next step in the plan is the analysis of the information obtained in the initial investigation and the evaluation of the presumed employee. The CI agent must have studied all the pertinent information obtained from the archives, the community and the surveillance and he, using the information as basis, must reach some firm conclusions with respect to the individual. He describes the personality of the presumed employee, indicating his strong characteristics, weaknesses, idiosyncracies, as well as those experiences which he may have had that could affect his employment. The CI agent indicates the possible reasons

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that the individual could have. Also he analyzes the information to determine the best way to approach him. He determines when, where and how to carry out the encounter with the individual. The following questions must be answered: What type of encounter is projecting? when and where will be carried out? what pretext the presumed employee will use to be there? which are the details of his journey and that of the CI agent to reach the meeting place? Which surveillance and countersurveillance means are going to be used? What other security measures are going to be used? What reasons has the individual to be away from the place where he works?

d. ANALYZING THE MEETING DETAILS:

1) There are many factors that must be considered when the first meeting is going to be carried out. The CI agent lists each one, forms plans for each one, and determines before hand his own identity, in addition to the phrases that are going to initiate the conversation and the manner that is going to follow.

2) If the presumed employee meets all the qualities and is ready to try to convince him to collaborate with the government, the CI agent must be prepared to establish the contact himself. He must be prepared to offer him a guarantee or a contract, as well as to train him on the communication means, identity and security. He must have formulated the plans for a future encounter, together with the signals and the identity that he is going to use to arrive there. On the other hand, if the CI agent determines that the individual does not meet the qualifications for the job, he must have anticipated how he is going to distance himself from the individual without him understanding the reason for the meeting or his true identity. Finally, the CI agent must have ready how he is going to end the meeting, whether the individual meets the qualifications or not.

e. REMARKS:

1) The final part of the plan includes additional remarks of recommendations. The plan must be submitted to be carefully studied and approved before establishing the initial contact.

2) Although the CI agent will have analyzed the information that he compiled during the initial investigation, he will not be certain in the manner how the presumed employee is going to react at this meeting. Therefore, he has planned this meeting to the last detail, he must allow sufficient flexibility to be able to deal with any eventuality that may arise. On formulating his plans, the CI agent carefully considers the place where he is going to talk. The initial meeting, as well as the rest that may be carried out in places where he is cultivating the friendship and confidence of the individual, must be carried out in tranquil

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establishments which are not frequented by his friends, acquaintances and associates. In normal circumstances, well known establishments and government buildings are not used. The place to be selected depends completely on the social position and work of the presumed employee, as well as the environment. In some circumstances, a room in an innocuous hotel room is sufficient, in others, a fishing boat could be opportune.

3) There are different ways that a CI agent could introduce himself to a presumed employee. On method that is used is to be introduced by a third person, that is to say, the CI agent is introduced to the individual by a mutual friend. This type of encounter has a disadvantage from the security point of view. This third person will know the identity of the presumed employee and the interest that the CI agent has in him. This disadvantage could be overcome if this third person works for the CI agent or if said CI agent has assumed a false identity to conceal his true occupation or his motives. If this mutual friend has confidence in the CI agent, the presumed employee will have to confide in him, offering a good opportunity to cultivate his friendship and to win his confidence.

4) If security is one of the principal concerns and the situations allows it, the CI agent could make use of the casual encounter method.

It is an apparently accidental and extraordinary encounter, like in a fiesta, festival, cantina, sports game, etc. Although the individual believes that this is an accidental encounter, the CI agent has planned it to the last detail. The method of a casual encounter is the safest because there is no third person involved. However, it is difficult to establish an immediate friendship and to win this person's confidence with this method.

4) In specific cases, the CI agent could make use of periodicals, publishing employment opportunities, in order to attract presumed employees. The individual would be required to submit a written application or to personally appear to a job interview, which provides a direct manner to approach him at the beginning. This technique also offers an easy exit in case the individual is not considered adequate. If he meets all the qualifications, could agree to another interview with the pretext that he is going to be employed. Similar notices could be published in circulars or be attached on bulletin boards where notices are attached, with the aid of the local employment office. What kind of employment could the CI agent announce? In the first place, he should publish the qualifications that the presumed employee must have, without giving details about the employment. He could indicate the salary, the work hours, the advancement opportunities, etc. The interview with the presumed employee is health in a place like a hotel room. The initial information that he could obtain will depend on the man. Remember, it is not

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necessary that the CI agent provide him any information. He must let the presumed employee speak, since he could evaluate him better on listening to his conversation. If the CI agent believes that it is necessary to describe the job, the description that he offers must be similar to the true employment. The job offered must attract the appropriate individual. For example: You are a specialist in industrial or agricultural research that needs a local assistance to compile material or information for a certain philanthropic or educational specific installation. You could pass as an economist who is gathering data for a book about the economic development of the country or could pass as an engineer carrying out topographic or geodesic reliefs for the preparation of some maps. These are only some ideas that could be used. Other identities that can be assumed will depend on the mission, on the presumed employee and the situation. The purpose is to obtain data about the individual, to evaluate him personally and to provide an opportunity to be accepted and to win his confidence or to reject him.

6) Although we already considered this step as the one to be carried out before approaching the employee, we know that the CI agent maintains harmonious relations while he develops the manner to approach. he is evaluating the personality of the individual to determine which subjects and manner of talking will be adequate in the conversation. Once he has already known the presumed employee, the CI agent must try to establish some friendly but professional relations within. This could be achieved through a careful study and consideration of the individual's interests. The good CI agent does not reveal his own beliefs in contentious subjects such as social, economic and religious problems presently in the country. He must ask pertinent and intelligent questions from the individual about conversation subjects that would allow him to talk.

7) The development of friendship and maintenance of harmonious relations do not end with the initial encounter; appropriate harmonious relations are maintained while the individual is employed. Nevertheless, we must remember that the CI agent must control the operation; the employed must obey him. They must develop and maintain a mutual trust and respect. The CI agent is the superior and the employee the subordinate. In order to maintain the necessary control and to demand the necessary trust and respect, the CI agent displays confidence and his knowledge. In brief plans shows his qualifications as master of command when he controls the individual.

8) In our study of Finding a Presumed Employee we considered in detail the motivation that he could have. We determined that there are many motivations and that there are different methods to take advantage of them. Motivation is another step in the proceeding to establish contact that overlaps considerably. As we know, the CI agent considers the motivations

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that the presumed employee could have when he initiated the search. One of the principal concerns during the initial investigation is to discover what drives the employee to accept the job. During the evaluation we analyzed the motivation which the presumed employee could have and we formulated the plans to develop them. More details are added to the plan after the initial meeting and the method to be followed to convince the individual to collaborate is decided. The CI agent must recognize the importance that motivation has. Certainly this is the force which impels men to try to surpass and face life.

What is what impels this individual to collaborate with you, the CI agent of the government? One this determination has been made with prediction, the motivation could be successfully developed and matured. He at the same time will correctly perceive the control that could be exercised on the individual and will be ready in any indication of dissatisfaction. In brief, the CI agent must know the reason and its intensity in order to be able to control his employee and to develop his abilities.

6. CULTIVATING HIS FRIENDSHIP AND WINNING THE CONFIDENCE:

a. Before the CI agent really offers the job to the individual, he must cultivate his friendship and win his confidence. There are occasions when said friendship is cultivated during the initial encounter. For example, one of the requirements could be to demand that this friendship to be earned immediately. The CI agent does not have time to cultivate the individual's friendship and to employ the tact that is normally used. He must approach the individual in a "bold" manner. This implies an initial investigation, analysis and an evaluation carried out quickly and when the CI agent approaches the individual to conduct a hurried personal evaluation and to establish the contact with him himself. For that reason, this method requires a hurried evaluation.

b. However, in normal circumstances, will have time to develop the friendship and prepare the individual before he accepts the job. Some individuals do not trust other persons so quickly. To cultivate a friendship takes an intuitive ability and artistic talent. This is a step in which the CI agent, with experience and well trained could show his ability. We previously mentioned that these operations require analysis and art. The CI agent, on cultivating the friendship of a presumed indecisive employee, uses his experience and common sense, he is flexible and he is prepared to meet all contingencies that may arise; it is the art of a subtle persuasion. He must convince the individual that he, the CI agent, is reliable, competent and professional. He has to win the trust and confidence of the presumed employee before offering him the job. If the step of cultivating the friendship has been duly concluded, the individual will normally accept the position.

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7. ESTABLISHING CONTACT:

a. The culmination and purpose of every investigation, planning and cultivation of friendship is carried out during the contact itself; that is to say, that the individual accepts the job. When we talk about the contact, we want to say that moment when the CI agent really offers the job to the individual. The contact itself could occur in the initial meeting if the presumed employee is ready or if he has to be approached with audacity, or could occur after many months of being cultivating his friendship and winning his confidence. The conversation to be carried out on establishing the contact itself and how an indecisive individual is going to be convinces are skillfully planned.

b. The CI agent, in order to prepare for the establishment of contact, considers all the subjects that were studied in the plan to approach the individual. On being analyzed from the practical point of view, we are aware that a thoroughly prepared plan to approach an individual allows the CI agent to deal with any eventuality that could arise. For example, if the plan includes those actions that must be taken to establish contact when the individual is ready to accept the job and if the question cannot be made during the initial meeting, he could use the plan afterwards. Must have formulated the plans to offer a salary or contract that have been approved by his superiors.. He must discuss the terms with the presumed employee and it is possible, make him sign and be prepared to train the presumed employee in regards to future security procedures. The individual receives training on the communication techniques in order to allow him to meet with the CI agent afterwards. He must be given an identity, a justification for future meetings with the CI agent and a reason to be away from his home, job, family, etc. In other words, his true relations with the CI agent and his whereabouts must be concealed during these meetings. Therefore, this delicate action must be planned to the last detail. His considerations are persuasive and thorough, since it is in the point of establishing contact where all the effort of acquiring the presumed employee culminates.

SUMMARY:

a. In the previous chapter we considered two essential steps in obtaining a presumed employee.

We stipulated that once a CI agent has found a presumed employee, he must conduct a thorough investigation to determine if the individual meets the qualifications for the job. This investigation is known as the initial investigation. The purpose of said investigation is to recompile all the information that could be obtained about the presumed employee so that the CI agent could evaluate it, to determine the reasons that he may have, his qualifications, history, etc., 'This evaluation allows the CI

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agent to complete the proceeding to establish contact and to obtain the employee. There are various sources that we could take advantage of and different techniques that we can use to investigate presumed employees. First, we must search our own archives. WE, using the information obtained as a result of the investigation of the archives, we could develop the trails and extend the investigation to the archives of the services who cooperate with us. We must never divulge the true purpose of our investigation or the identity of our individual. If the investigation of the archives does not produce the required information, the CI agent must initiate an investigation in the community and a surveillance of the individual. Security is one of the principal preoccupations since neither the personnel being interviewed nor the individual must discover that an investigation is carried out. The CI agent, as last resort, must meet with the individual and interview him personally; however, this technique is highly dangerous and requires a careful planning.

B. Once the information has been gathered, the procedure to establish contact will begin. We must not approach every step carefully once again, but we must remember that the contact is a series of actions that are carried out only after a careful planning and a thorough study. The presumed employee must be totally evaluated and each phase of the initial meeting must be planned in detail --- the manner how he is going to be approached. The complete proceeding, the time, the place where it is to be carried out, the methods to be used, depend on the mission, the individual and the operational situation. Very few procedures for establishing contact are carried out in the same manner. Some take months to be completed while others require only hours or days. The CI agent is evaluating the individual constantly and maintains a flexibility as its situation develops and expecting each action. The skilful cultivation of friendship and the easy development of the individual's confidence until he accepts the job, after having established contact with him, is when the CI agent will successfully have ended the procedure to make contact.

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CHAPTER IV

TASK ASSIGNMENT

INTRODUCTION:

One of the goals that a skilful agent wants to achieve is to obtain the greatest amount of information useable from his employees in the most secure manner. He must always consider the mission or the purpose for which the employee was originally contracted, and to evaluate the amount of work that he has to do. Factors to be considered are security, capacity and availability of the employee. Only with a careful evaluation of these factors in relation to the mission, the agent could complete his mission and maintain a stable and effective work relationship with the employee individually. In this chapter shall be discussed the details that an agent must consider when he assigns the tasks to his employees. Also the orientation and postorientation preparation shall be discussed.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. Purpose of the Employee:

If the agent has properly evaluated and contracted the employee, there will be no doubt in regards to what he can or cannot do, and must work according to this. The agent could successfully complete his mission only when using each employee properly according to his individual abilities.

B. Employee Security.

Tasks that could place the employee in a position in which he could not give a logical explanation of his presence must not be assigned to him. However, there are some cases in which the need of the operations forces us to deviate from this principle. The agent must do every effort to assure the safety of his employee. The agent must maintain his employee within his rules of action already established. If he usually returns to his home early at night, he must not ask him to attend meetings late at night. The meetings and communications with the employee must be planned keeping in mind the security. The agent must be concerned with the security of the employee but he must keep in mind above all the importance of the mission.

C. Ability of the Employee:

On assigning an operational task to an employee, the agent must carefully consider the employee's aptitude to carry out the mission. He must have an extensive knowledge of the employee's history, a large part of which he must have obtained before and after contracting him. The agent must be able to assign to the employee valid and appropriate tasks based on individual

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aptitudes.. Also he must think of such things as the regular occupation of the employee and to avoid assigning to him many missions that could risk his job and possibly his security. For example, if the position or location of an employee is placed in an area of great interest for the operations, we would be tempted to the extreme to give him more tasks than he could possibly complete. Making an employee work excessively could contribute to an employee becoming discouraged, or worse, could cause to be detected by the guerrillas.

D. SECURITY:

1. The agent has to deal with two different security aspects on carrying out any orientation with the employee. The first is about an evaluation of how well the employee has responded to training that he has received about security, and how effectively has put into practice what he learned. In this respect, the agent wants to be certain that the employee has a reasonable opportunity to carry out effectively the operational task that has been assigned to him, using the personal security measures that he has been taught. The special orientation of an employee for a specific task must give him a complete direction and objectivity. For efficiency the employee must receive the most precise, exact and possibly specific instructions. It is here where the second aspect emerges. On comparing the security to the efficiency, the agent must decide up to what point the intelligence organization could be prejudiced if the employee was discovered. In addition, although the task in itself was small, its disclosure to unauthorized persons ---- this commonly would apply to any disclosure to any person, since the agent is the only "authorized person" in regards to what pertains to the employee --- could provide to guerrillas information about the existence of the intelligence organization and its objectives in general.

Giving the employee too much information would also make more difficult the work to evaluate the employee so that he may fabricate the information. The agent must provide sufficient information to give the mission every reasonable opportunity for success, but he must not give more information than necessary to carry out the mission.

2. As a rule the orientation is given orally. A guide for the orientation must be used as a verification list to make certain that it was reported with sufficient details, and from the intelligence point of view to have more control about that information that will be disclosed to the employee. The orientation guide which the agent uses as a verification list for the oral orientation must be part of the agent's file that will be used for the postorientation of the employee when he returns from his mission. The orientation aids must be limited to those that are necessary to successfully complete the mission, and must not reveal more than necessary about the objective zone. If some written

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material is to be provided to employee, two things must be done:

a. The written material must be kept to minimum and serve mainly as a reminder.

b. What is needed to be written must be reduced to a code and be adequately concealed.

In giving his explanation to the employee, the agent must be careful to avoid using intelligence jargon or imprecise terms.

E. Requirements of an orientation or postorientation area:

1) The orientation or postorientation area shall be determined on the basis of existing time limitations, the operation security requirements, the conditions under which the agent must work, and the complexity and sensitivity of the orientation or postorientation that will be given to employee. When the use of considerable technical aids is necessary for the orientation or postorientation, such as large scale maps, photographic files, etc., the place must be one where such facilities could be provided. In addition, when the information presentation requirements are complex, such as in cases where coordinates must be traced, the identification must be exact and it must keep the orientation, it is necessary that the agent uses places where the orientation can be carried out without interruptions.

The questions about convenience, as well as requirements of the intelligence task must be answered favorably on selecting a place for the orientation or postorientation. The place chosen must allow the agent, his organization and the employee to conserve their identity.

F. Duration of orientation or postorientation:

The duration of an orientation/postorientation is governed by the complexity of the mission, the focus of the objective, the employee and the method of operation. If an employee who lives in the objective zone is receiving an orientation or postorientation, his documentation as well as the last events relating to the environment or operational conditions in the objective zone present little problem, and could be informed of them in a brief manner. Emphasis is made in the fulfillment of the mission and in that the employee is given specifically detailed instructions about the nature of the task he has to perform. On the other hand, if the employee who is oriented requires many documents, the introduction to this and the explanation of his relation with the mission to be carried out must be in a more detailed form. Also a comparison could be made of an orientation or postorientation of an employee who lives in the objective zone, who is oriented or post-oriented by an agent under conditions that may require maximum security on the part of the participants, with an orientation or post-orientation conducted in a domestic zone under conditions provided by the accommodations.

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G. Use of Orientation Aids.

1. Since the agent is familiarized before hand with the nature and location of the objective, he must make all possible preparations to provide these elements that are necessary for a complete orientation. Above all, the agent must prepare an orientation plan in order to be able to give the employee all the details of the operation. The orientation plan serves as a verification list during an orientation and assures that there is not a prejudicial omission.

2. The employee's orientations under practically every operational situation must be a verbal process in its totality. Consequently, the agent must be able to communicate in an effective manner with the employee.

This facilitates the use of orientation aids (some in graphic art form, photographs or models for illustration purposes) to the extend that it is necessary for a perfect comprehension during orientation.

3. The maps must be used to indicate the location of the objective and the travel routes to and from the objective zone. The models of the known security barriers must be used to orient the employee about the infiltration and withdrawal methods. In addition to that, photographs, models of the objective and of the equipment, uniforms, recorders and other types of aids could be used to facilitate the orientation.

4. The previously mentioned diverse aids are as a rule used during the training phase to prepare the employee for his task before the final orientation. The orientation then will show to the employee how this particular training applies to this specific situation, and also will allow the agent to determine the effectiveness of the employee's training.

5. The same principles that apply to aids used during the orientation apply to post-orientation.

H. Objective of Orientation:

1. The orientation of an employee could be considered as an extension of his training in very specific fields. Even though it is, up to a certain point, a training continuation, it is more than that because actually prepares or must prepare the employee for an immediate operational task that he is expected to carry out. Invariably case, the degree of success that the employee would have in completing his mission is directly related to the orientation that he received from the agent before undertaking the task. The employees orientation consists in providing him the most recent events that could affect the operation, a general review of the pertinent operational facts and detailed instructions regarding the task itself. Thus we can say that the orientation of an employee consists of two different parts:

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a> Prepare the employee for the task, giving him the most recent information about the conditions and environment within which he is expected to carry out his specific task.

The first phase of the orientation consists of the review and evaluation of the situation. The preparation of an employee to undertake a specific task includes all these abilities, knowledge and experience that form the basis for his selection for the job. It includes also the training that he was given in order to allow him to reach this expertise that the agent considers necessary for the task. The orientation, well, must give in its first phase all pertinent information about the present situation, based on the most recent facts which the intelligence organization has available. It must include a review of the most recent information regarding the measures and security restrictions in effect in the area of operation (such things like curfews, travel restrictions, documentation requirements, the presence of specific security personnel). On the other hand, this step provides an excellent opportunity for a general review of the pertinent facts, plus a review of the understanding that the employee has about his task, but cannot substitute the employee's necessary preparation for the task, which should have been given during the training periods.

b) Prepare the employee for the task, giving him specific instructions and details concerning the task or tasks that he is expected to carry out and the manner in which he is expected to carry them out. This constitutes the issuance of orders. The second step in the orientation is the detailed instruction in respect to the task itself. The agent must give to the employee the most precise, exact and specific instructions concerning the nature of the operation, the form of being carried out and its programming.

I. Orientation:

1. A prior but flexible planning is necessary to carry out successfully the employee's orientation, as well as all other phases of the operation. The appropriate planning requires a logic sequence during the orientation. This sequence consists of the following:

a) Initial period of the harmony establishing meeting:

As a rule, this is not the first meeting of the responsible agent with the employee and, as such, this phase is intended for social courtesies, for the relaxation of the atmosphere and for the "harmony" continuation between the agent and the employee.

The agent, although he is concerned with the general welfare of the employee, must take care to maintain an appropriate relationship and to maintain control of the meeting. Control during the meeting could be facilitated through a complete preparation on the part of the agent and his ability to effectively answer any questions that could be formulated by the employee. This is

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extremely important. The employee must respect the judgement and the opinion of the agent. The inability of the agent to give the employee complete and credible answers would diminish in part the respect that the employee has for the agent. This could place in danger the success of the mission due to lack of control. As a result of a situation such as this, the employee could criticize the plan and, if the mission continues, he may not follow the agent's instructions.

The agent could use the preliminary phase of the harmony establishment to review recent information about the activities and history of the employee, which at times could be related with the future job.

b) Review of the employee's State:

Before the true details of the planned mission could be revealed, the agent must determine if the employee is competent, ready and willing to carry out the assigned tasks. The first matters of interest for the employee are the last information referring to the employee, his family, his health, his regular employment (if he has any), his identity for the job (if there is any) and his way of thinking. The agent then must concern himself if the employee is ready or not and able (from the security point of view) to perform the assigned tasks. Finally, the agent must be certain that the employee is completely trained as it is expected and that still retains the degree of expertise indicated at the time of completing his instruction. Upon conclusion of this phase, the agent must determine if the employee is prepared or not for the planned mission.

c) General description of the mission:

Once it has been determined that the employee is able, ready and willing to carry out the assigned tasks, the agent is prepared to enter the orientation phase about the " General Description of the Mission". A preliminary general idea is given to the employee during this phase about what is expected from him to do, when it is expected to be done and how it is expected to do it.

As a rule, this is the first opportunity of the employee to learn exactly what is expected from him to do. Consequently, the agent must use this phase to entice comments from the employee about the convenience, viability and acceptability of each point. However, the employee must not be given the prerogative to refuse a task or discard the planned fictitious identity on the basis of his personal sentiments, likes or dislikes. During this phase the orientation will be general with respect to the itinerary, the method of travel, duration of the trip and the staying time in the zone of the objective, the form and use of funds, documentation, communications and operational tasks to be carried out. The agent must be prepared to answer any critique of the plan and to adjust the plan if he believes it is necessary.

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d) Explanation of Identity.

The orientation is specific and detailed during this phase. Every type of identity (having some) which the employee will be using is explained in detail. Although the fictitious identity was already taught to the employee during his training period, it is repeated here; the documents (having some) will be introduced as they are needed, and their functions will be explained in due time. This way, his fictitious identity will be more clear then if they had been delivered to the employee all together at the beginning or at the end of the orientation.

e) Instructions about the itinerary:

At this time, the agent will give the employee specific instructions about the itinerary of the mission. This will include instructions referring to the point of entry to the area, the route and the method of travel, the activity inside the area, and the route and method of travel from the area at any point of exit point. These instructions frequently require the use of maps, drawings, city plans, etc., that may be available. The need of extensive and detailed maps will depend on the complexity and type of the mission to be carried out.

f) Specific tasks:

At this point of the orientation, the employee will be given specific instructions about the support tasks and search to be carried out.

In respect to search tasks, the employee will be given a detailed description and the location of each conformity requirement with the security limitations and assignment of the employee; what information wishes to know point by point; the manner of finding and approaching the place or position; the desired observation period and the manner of visual or photographic observation. At this stage the employee must also be warned that on returning from his mission, must deliver a complete report with the description of how he carried out the mission, the effectiveness of the identity and of the documentation, the security precautions in effect in the area, etc. Essentially, the employee must broaden the knowledge that you have - pretend to know.

g) Equip the employee what he needs:

During this phase, the employee is given funds to be used during the mission, clothes, and technical or special devices that he may need according to assigned tasks. The type of the employee and the type of the mission to be carried out shall determine the type or amount of equipment to be delivered. The employee must have received prior training and must be able to use

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properly all the technical or special devices that are delivered to him.

h) Specific security instructions:

Before the orientation is concluded, the employee is given brief and specific instructions about what to do and not to do in relation with the assigned mission. Some of these will be a repetition of the instructions previously given; others given to employee for the first time, will be instructions that limit certain activities of the employee, which could be affected by recently acquired information.

i) Review and inspection of the mission:

At this point, all instructive phases of the employee's orientation have been completed and the employee has received all the instructions, as well the necessary guidance to successfully perform all the tasks that were assigned. This phase is used above all to review completely all the instructions given the employee and to test the employee's aptitude to carry out the assigned task.

The agent tries to refute the employee's fictitious identity through questions about his history and his documentation. Must observe and correct immediately all the areas in which the employee evidently shows weakness or in those that he has not clearly understood like he should. This phase is used then for the final inspection of all the equipment and material delivered or by delivering to the employee according to tasks that have been assigned. The agent as well as the employee must test every piece and how to use it carefully. Finally, the agent must make certain that the employee does not carry anything but those that are absolutely necessary for carrying out the task, which could compromise the employee or the mission. The time that has to be used to this "review and inspection" will depend on the complexity, sensitivity and the type of the mission.

j) Termination of the meeting:

It is now supposed that the employee has been completely oriented and that he is able to carry out the mission; therefore, the setting of the date, time and place of the meeting or the instructions about the meeting is stressed. Alternate plans are discussed and emergency signals and communication means are established. Financial and other support matters are determined. The agent warns the employee of the latent danger carelessness and inconsistent security imply, having reflected on what could happen if he relaxes his own technique of personal security, if he is confiding to people of the place, or if he visits his friends or parents in the area. On arriving to this point, the orientation has entirely been completed and the employee is ready for his

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mission. The agent must show a sincere interest for the welfare of the employee. The employee with recognize and appreciate this, carrying out the termination of the orientation and send off in constant harmony.

This has been one type of orientation. An exact form cannot be followed because each orientation is carried out according to the type of the mission and type of employee.

j) Objective of Post-orientation:

1. The post-orientation objective is to obtain from the employee the greatest amount of information possible. This begins immediately after his return. You do not expect an employee who just returned from a mission to come to you and provide you a complete report, automatically responding to each one of his requirements. You must work under the concept that you trained the employee, prepared him for the mission or oriented him about what he must look for, assuring him thus that the only pertinent and useful information is produced, within the framework of the requirement. In the post-orientation, in addition to the task of obtaining information, you must also be interested in the morale and personal problems of the employee. Consequently, it is your duty as agent not only to extract useful information from the employee when he returns from a mission, but to do it in such a way that he wishes to remain on the job and progress in the performance of his duties.

2. In the post-orientation sequence, everything must be carefully planned. Like in other meetings with the employee, the agent must be in complete control.

a. Establish harmony:

The is confronted with a person who has been carrying out a task that demands initiative, ingenuity and exposure to danger. The employee could be nervous, tired or afraid from this, and hopes for the proper interest for his physical welfare and appreciation for having completed his mission, but he must maintain at all times the proper relation between the employer and employee.

b. Post-orientation:

With the aid of the post-orientation plan and various post-orientation aids, the agent makes every effort to obtain all the information with respect to the mission. The employee must narrate the mission from the time of departure until his return. The agent will formulate pertinent questions in order to assure a complete and precise information. The sketches, the maps, the photographs, etc., will identify the area with precision and will assure a complete report in response to his requirements. If the employee met physical or equipment elements, he will be

interrogated about the location and circumstances of the gathering.

A special effort must be made to ask the employee about his experiences in the area in regards to fictitious identity and the documents he carried. When the time and security allow arrangements must be made as soon as possible for an additional post-orientation after a tentative evaluation in order to allow clarification, explanation or verification of the information provided during the initial post-orientation.

c. Tentative evaluation:

The agent must study the employee's conduct, manner of speaking, and make a comparison between the known information and the version of the employee in order to make a tentative evaluation of the employee's veracity and of his information.

d. Payment:

The employee is paid for his services and his expenses. Operation expenses are paid in full. Bonus and other special payments are paid according to plans that you may have previously decided.

e. Final harmony:

The agent must concentrate in guaranteeing that future relations with the employee will be harmonious. The employee must feel that his welfare and his personal problems are taken into consideration. If arrangements must be made for future meetings, a date, time and place must be established that is acceptable to both. It must be remembered that his personal safety is necessary.

f. Failure of the mission:

Until now we have based our explanation on the supposition that the mission has been successful. In the event the employee indicates that he was not able to obtain the information for which the mission was undertaken, it is not expected that the agent bounces with happiness, but he should not be critical of the employee until he knows all the facts. It could very well be that the reasons for the failure of the mission were not due to employee's inefficiency and could prove to be of value for future operations. Whatever the causes of the failure may be, a corrective action must be taken.

This has been a type of post-orientation. It cannot be followed exactly because each post-orientation is carried out according to type of mission and type of employee.

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SUMMARY:

In order to be successful the agent must plan, train and use his employees effectively. Each employee must know what he is looking for, how to look for it and, finally, how to supply the information once it has been obtained. The agent must keep in mind the reasons for which the employee was contracted and use him for that purpose. The agent must be concerned for the safety of the employee but above all must keep in mind the importance of the mission. He must constantly emphasize the security to the employee. Before assigning tasks to the employee, the agent must prepare him and use plans of the place, timetables and auxiliary means for the orientation. When he actually assigns a mission to the employee, there are three steps to approach a field: The orientation preparation, orientation and post-orientation. These are of vital importance to the employee as well as for the agent because if any of the three is not perfect, the mission and at the same time the employee will be compromised. Each employee is a considerable investment of time, money and effort. Do not use them badly, but remember that they are to produce information for you, and it is your job to see that they do so. The orientation and post-orientation determine in great part the value and punctuality of the information which the employee will obtain for you.

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CHAPTER V

PLACEMENT OF EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION:

After taking the steps to develop all types of employees, you should keep in mind that there are still areas where there is not any employee. This could be an area that is outside the control of the government. This factor perhaps must be due to deficient communication or transportation means. It could also be an area isolated by natural barriers, such as dense forests or mountains. The areas perhaps are not covered by your employees by being inhabited by persons who stay away or they are against the legal government. Whatever the reason may be, it is necessary to recognize the vulnerabilities of the area before the guerrilla operations. Consequently, immediate steps must be taken to place employees in these areas. It is possible that it may be already late and that the guerrillas operate actively in the area, making thus difficult the placement of employees. Nevertheless, important questions will emerge that could only be answered through the placement of employees in the area and within the guerrilla organization. The sooner the CI agent succeeds in placing employees in the area which is under the influence of the enemy and infiltrate them inside his organization, the sooner the government will be able to neutralize or destroy the insurrection movement.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. Place of employees in the area.

1. Before the guerrillas take control:

The placement of an employee in an area is much easier when the guerrillas are not yet well organized. However, once they are organized in a remote area, they will be expected to discover the employees that the government may have in the region. The best way to prevent an insurrection from becoming a threat is to discover it early. It is necessary to have employees in the entire country to discover any indication of an insurrection. These indications without any doubt will provide additional targets, which will make the CI agent to need additional employees.

The CI agent by necessity must have employees in an area before the guerrillas appear, in order to discover and neutralize them in the incipient phase of the movement. Each CI agent must select his employees and supervisors and train them, in the identification of signs of insurrection. When these signs emerge, he must anticipate what could happen and select the most efficient and reliable employees to operate in the area, even when the guerrillas succeed to control the area. These employees and

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supervisors will need an extensive training if the guerrillas have already taken control. When there is an indication that the guerrillas increase their control of the area each time more, the CI agent may decide to discontinue communications with the employees and their supervisors for security reasons. While the guerrillas reinforce their security and acquire greater force, the CI agent will have to depend on other employees to obtain the information he needs. The principal task of the supervisors who already were able to be introduced into the area will be to remain there, to continue their usual activities accepted by the guerrillas. When the supervisors decide to approach presumed employees will come in contact with the agent using the communication methods agreed beforehand in order to receive instructions and guidance. The CI agent perhaps decided to make contact with the employees and their supervisors in order to verify the effectiveness of the communication means or to give additional instructions. The CI agent must understand that the supervisors need time to organize their employees in the area controlled by the guerrillas. The initial information which some employees will submit through the communication method agreed before hand should refer to recently arrived guerrillas and other insurrection activities. All the employees will render two kinds of services: The immediate task of sending information about the guerrilla activities inside the area and the prolonged task of remaining inactive until they win the confidence of the guerrillas and then form cells inside the insurrection area. In order to develop these employees and their supervisors, the CI agent begins his search for potential employees before the emergence of insurrection signs.

2. During the control by the guerrillas:

The task of placing an employee inside the area during the organization of the guerrillas is so very difficult before it happens.

The CI agent will have more freedom of action due to the threat that the guerrillas represent, and it is possible that the population becomes more hostile. Therefore, he will have to depend on the employees that he has trained to find potential assistants. It will be easy to find many potential employees during this period; for that reason, he must try to train them as soon as possible. The CI agent looks for individuals who are ready to infiltrate in the area of the guerrillas and to inform him about their activities. It is necessary to find other individuals who can move inside the area without calling attention and to inform about the guerrilla activities, their camps and their personnel. Must select those persons who have relatives among the guerrilla elements and approach them with the objective of making these relatives to abandon the guerrilla organization. Even when the activities of the guerrillas shall limit the movement of the CI agents to a certain degree, the opportunities that these activities

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offer to place employees compensate for the growing disadvantages. It is to be expected that the guerrillas are occupied recruiting members for their organization, and in general, obtaining support for their movement. Each CI agent could take advantage of these activities to place employees in key areas inside the environment in which the guerrillas move. The guerrillas will be alert to any movement against them on the part of the government and will employ their own security personnel to protect them. It is of high importance that the CI agent locate, identify and investigate this security personnel. The CI agent seeks for these individuals for two reasons. In the first place, he must locate them in order to protect the operations of his employees. In the second place, must find the motivation and the weaknesses of these individuals and to look for the way to induce them to abandon their organization and join the cause of the government. Perhaps he will succeed to persuade the individual appealing to him through his parents, guaranteeing him his safety and promising him a remuneration. The principal objective is to persuade these individuals to abandon their cause without abandoning the place in a way that they could provide valuable service to the government. The CI agent must also use his system of obtaining employees find the guerrillas. This could render valuable service identifying the members of the guerrilla organization and their targets a=engaging them deceiving them and at the same time supplying them erroneous information.

This same plan will be successful if the CI agent succeeds in placing one of his employees in the guerrilla area making him pass as one of their informants. In all operations of this type, the CI agent must be assured of the trustworthiness of the employee maintaining the proper control on the same. He must watch for employees who could be supplying information to him as well as to guerrillas at the same time, or to him and also another government representative. This type of employee is specially dangerous.

3. After the guerrillas take control:

Placing an employee in an area controlled by the guerrillas is a real problem. It is very possible that the CI agent has absolutely no access to the area. In this case, he will have to recruit a person who travels regularly in the area where the guerrillas are. This person will need special training, since he must also learn to locate and possibly recruit and train other employees inside the area. If he waits until the guerrillas seize control of an area, the CI agent will find out that he does not have access to the area, he will rely only on a limited number of employees and will have to confide to them more information than he would normally confide to them. An alternative in case of being able to recruit an employee among the individuals who travel frequently to the area and remain there. He will have to locate an individual who is willing to enter an area controlled by the guerrillas, win their confidence and then begin to supply

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information through previously agreed communication methods. One obvious disadvantage of this type of employee is the time factor which is critical. It will take much time to train this employee in order to be able to provide a valuable service. Another possibility is to infiltrate an employee so that he may locate potential employees and set up organizations of employees under his control. The operations of which began after the guerrillas have seized control will have marked disadvantages from the beginning. The CI agent will not have direct control over his employees. Consequently, he will always have doubts about their reliability and veracity of the information they supply. It is possible many employees could be placed in an area, however, their value as information suppliers will be limited due to their low position, the restrictions which impede them from moving from one place to another, the guerrilla security measures and problems related with the communication means.

In order to be valuable, the information will have to be timely supplied. A great part of the information supplied by the employees in an area which is under control of the guerrillas does not reach the CI agent early enough to be valuable. The CI agent must rely on employees in an area before the guerrillas seize control of the same.

B. Placement of employees in organizations.

1. Before the guerrillas take control.

The CI agent must consider all the organizations as possible guerrilla sympathizers. He must train and place his employees inside these organizations so that they may inform him about their activities and discover any indication of a latent insurrection. We are especially interested in identifying the members of the guerrilla command structure, the organic picture and support base. By infiltrating his employees in different youth, worker, political, commercial, social and charitable organizations, we would be able to identify the parents of these guerrilla elements, their support agents and the sympathizers of the insurrection movement. This way, the CI agent could train supervisors to be able then to form cells within the different organizations. The more employees the government has working inside these organizations, that much easier will be to control the threat of a guerrilla movement; to the extent that this grows, these employees will achieve positions of greater responsibility and, consequently, will be even more valuable to the government.

2. During the rise of the guerrilla movement:

When the guerrillas are active trying to form their organization, it will be more difficult for the CI agent to place his employees in the different organizations. Many organization will be known as sympathizers of the insurrection movement. The CI

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agent must place employees in these organizations for the purpose of identifying the leaders, cadre personnel and insurrection sympathizers.

Some of these employees perhaps may have to join an organization, win their acceptance from the other members and acquire importance in the same in order to be able to provide information at a higher level. The CI agent must also investigate other organizations which are not yet under guerrilla control, since without any doubt these will have members who sympathize with the insurrection movement. Therefore, it will be necessary to identify these persons. The employees should identify the guerrilla personnel and their security procedures in a way the CI agent could develop programs to induce them to abandon their cause or, at least, to neutralize their activities. It will be easy for the government employees to infiltrate in guerrilla organizations when they are preparing their movement, since their goal is to obtain a massive support and accept many recruits in their organizations. It is necessary that some of these recruits are government employees who could then render valuable assistance in the attempt to destroy the insurrection.

3. After the guerrillas have taken control:

Once the guerrillas have seized control of an organization, it will be very difficult for the CI agent to place his employees inside said organization. The guerrillas will intensify their security program for the purpose of protecting themselves. Even when a government employee joins an organization controlled by the guerrillas at a low level, he can not only to identify the leaders of the movement and some of their activities, but also, what is more important, to be able to supply information about possible recruits for the government program. The employee who is able to identify a guerrilla of the high hierarchy who is unhappy with the insurrection movement will also have identified a potential employee for the government. Once a security agent of the guerrilla organization has been identified, he could be forced or induced to abandon his cause without abandoning his position or he could be neutralized. If the informants of the guerrillas are identified they could be supplied false information or be induced to abandon the insurrection movement. If the CI agent waits until the guerrillas have gained control of an organization, he will face great and more serious obstacles when he tries to place his employees.

He must begin to infiltrate his employees in the organizations and insurrection movements as soon as it is possible. The sooner the government is able to discover, locate and identify the guerrillas, the sooner will be able to destroy the insurrection movement.

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C. The Target:

1. GUERRILLA WEAKNESS THAT THE CI AGENT COULD EXPLOIT.
 - a. OBTAIN RECRUITS.
 - b. DEVELOP A SUPPLY SYSTEM.
 - c. ACTIONS THAT IDENTIFY GUERRILLAS.
 - d. LOCAL ADAPTATION.

The CI agent is in the process of obtaining information about the guerrillas at all times; before, during, and after these elements have succeeded to control an organization or an area. As part of this information, also rests with him to collect information that will help to place his employees in the guerrilla organization. During his investigations the CI agent will get to know that the guerrillas suffer from specific weaknesses which he could use to infiltrate the organization of said elements. Let's examine now some of these weaknesses.

2. It is necessary that the CI agent knows exactly how the guerrillas direct their recruitment program. In the first phases of the program, when the guerrillas are cementing their base, they normally are very cautious in the selection of new members. When they are ready to expand their base and their organization, they will have to approach many persons for the purpose of obtaining recruits. The CI agent must know what type of person the guerrillas prefer, what person they have approached to induce to join their cause, how they approached the person and how they will accept a recruit.

3. In addition, the guerrillas frequently develop a supply system using buyers, carriers and watchers of the supply points.

The CI agent must determine how the guerrillas obtain critical supplies, who buys or steals these supplies, where they keep them, and how they transport them.

4. The guerrillas are also subject to be identified as such because of the actions that some of their activities involve. In spite of the security measures they take, they are exposed to be discovered when they recruit informants, buy or use explosives, circulate propaganda or carry out submissions. Just as they recruit members to form their organization and their supply system, they will also have to look for help among the population for these special activities.

5. Even when all guerrilla operations are similar, the guerrillas have to adopt them in each region. The local adaptation

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could create additional weaknesses in the guerrilla organization. Consequently, the CI agent must investigate which are these weaknesses. If the guerrillas have been away from their place for a long time, they will possibly try to communicate with their families. On the other hand, perhaps their families will try to communicate with the guerrilla in case of death of a member of the family, in important holidays or if they receive news that the guerrilla is wounded. The guerrilla could lack an indispensable basic food, which will force him to come out from his hiding to look for assistance.

These are examples of some of the weaknesses from which the guerrillas suffer, which could be exploited by the CI agent. Therefore, it is not a complete list of all the weaknesses. For the purpose of infiltrating his employees in the guerrilla organization, each CI agent must look for and exploit the vulnerabilities of these elements.

D. Placement of an employee:

After locating the guerrilla target, analyze its weak points and study how to infiltrate one of his employees, the CI agent must plan in detail the steps that must be taken to place said employee. As a rule, there are three types of placement:

- Joining the guerrillas
- Remaining in the guerrilla organization
- Promoted in the organization after being recruited as government employee.

1. Joining the guerrillas:

a. The employee could appear to be an ideal recruit pretending to be unhappy with the government and its position. These actions must appear real and natural, they must be carefully presented in a way that they call attention to the recruited or agent of the guerrilla organization.

b. The employee could be ordered to approach an individual that he knows or suspects that he is a recruiter for the guerrilla organization. In this case, the employee must show his discontent with the government. He will have to win the confidence and acceptance of the recruiter. By being so, the recruiter probably will approach the employee to propose that he joins his cause.

c. The system of sponsors, checkups and close surveillance that the recruiters use is an obstacle in infiltrating the guerrilla organization. This signifies that the employee will probably have to be recommended by at least two elements reliable to guerrillas, who act as his sponsors. Then the

-64-

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employee will probably have to pass a testing period during which he will be watched and tested in order to determine if his motivation is truly anti-government and/or pro-guerrilla. Even after all this, the employee will probably have to submit to a final examination as positive proof of his loyalty.

d. Other ways of joining the guerrillas will depend on the employee's ability to supply a service or product valuable to guerrillas. The guerrillas will probably be interested to the employee if it appears that he can provide valuable information, spread propaganda or act as messenger. This interest could also be developed if the employee would appear to be able of supplying weapons, mines, explosives, radios or maps. Nevertheless, this service or product may perhaps be only the first step to infiltrate the organization. The agent should prevent that the employee's value to guerrillas as sympathizer or agent lacks in a way that impedes his infiltration in the guerrilla organization.

e. In this carefully planned and controlled operation, the agent must discover what other actions are needed to strengthen the employee's pretention an ideal guerrilla recruit. A vital part of this program is the educational system tending to indoctrinate and recompense government employees who inform when a guerrilla element approaches them and tries to recruit them. The CI agent could cause the arrest or detention of the employee's parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization. Since he will have to plan carefully all these demonstrations and employ them at the right time in order to strengthen the employee's assertions.

2. Remaining in the organization:

a. The CI agent must always try to locate those guerrillas that could be recruited in order to remain in the guerrillas as a government employee. The recruitment task requires careful planning on the part of the CI agent.

b. The careful interrogation of captured guerrillas are a vital part of this program. The first program consists in establishing communication means. therefore, the CI agent must be willing to run a deliberate risk letting free a guerrilla prisoner, a parent or a friend of his in order to establish the links between the CI agent and the potential employee. This is an indirect and risky way to develop an employee, and the CI agent must use all resources that he knows to test, check and control the employee.

c. It is possible that the CI agent to have control over disillusioned guerrillas who have been captured as terrorists, agents or informers. They must be pressured to consider and look at the possibility of persuading the captured guerrilla to work by

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returning to join the guerrillas. They must also consider what steps must be taken to conceal the capture and freeing of the potential employee. It would be convenient for the employee to return to the guerrilla organization as soon as possible after a pacification or before they become aware that the individual has been arrested.

3. Being promoted in the ranks of the guerrilla organization:

a. Using employees who have joined, who have returned to join or have remained in the guerrilla organization, the CI agent could continue developing the means of placement and access to his employees. This could be attained increasing the value of the employee before the eyes of the guerrillas, causing a series of incidents tending to strengthen the confidence the guerrillas have in the employee and showing his gift of leadership. He must be willing to be patient, not to act every time he receives information from a source who has a higher position and, even more important, he must maintain control but to limit communications to a minimum.

b. The CI agent could increase the employee's value destroying the structure of the guerrilla organization around said employee. This could be done by means of arrests, executions or pacification taking care not to expose the employee as the information source. If the employee is one of the few survivors, he could be a key member in a new or different guerrilla organization. Also the employee's reputation could be strengthened in this occasion by means of story fabrication, documents and witnesses, who are not only credible but also difficult to refute, since there will be very few guerrillas that have survived.

c. A more difficult method of contributing to employee's promotion in the guerrilla ranks is to assure his success in the tasks that the guerrilla have assigned him. The employee could achieve his promotion by accumulating a series of successes.

d. The CI agent must select an individual who has leadership qualities, quality that will help him emerge from the ranks of the guerrilla organization. It is less common to find a individual who has the exceptional ability of being able to deceive a large number of people by means of a fictitious identity. In many cases, it is possible that this ability may be fictitious, however, it is necessary that the individual has certain natural ability.

e. There are other methods of providing external assistance in order to assure the promotion of an employee. A method of achieving this promotion is by influencing an employee who has a much higher position in the guerrilla organization, another is to eliminate a potential rival among the guerrillas.

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This methods show the value that employees who have infiltrated the guerrilla ranks have.

SUMMARY:

It is much more difficult to place an employee in an area or in an organization after the guerrillas have seized control. The CI agent must place an employee before, during or after the guerrillas have succeeded in controlling an area. However, the sooner it is done, the greater will be its success.

The methods of placing employees in an area or in the guerrilla organization require a detailed and continuous knowledge of the personalities and activities of the same. First, the CI agent must compile the essential information to place his employees through his own efforts or by means of employees who are already in the area. Through this compiling, the CI agent should consider specific targets in the guerrilla support base, its communication network, its cadre personnel and its command structure, and must place employees in all these areas. The next step is to determine the method of placing an employee in the target. After these two phases, should be able to take steps to place the employee, whether he is trying to join, remain or be promoted in the guerrilla organization. The placement of employees in the guerrilla organization is the most effective operation even when perhaps is the slowest. The CI agent must initiate this type of operation as soon as possible and spend a large amount of time and effort.

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CHAPTER VI

EMPLOYEE TRAINING

INTRODUCTION:

The agent must consider the mission of the employee, his history and the operational situation to determine what type of training he must receive. For security purposes, the employee must be taught only those techniques that he needs to know.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. The employee's training consists of three general phases:

1. The essential training which includes security measures, how to pass and receive information and how to use a fictitious identity.

2. General or basic training which includes map reading, compass use, observation and description, preparing sketches and submitting reports.

3. The training for a specific mission which includes skills that an employee must use to carry out specific tasks.

Training is an important means by which the agent can develop efficient employees and improve the operational situation of the employee in general.

B. PURPOSE OF EMPLOYEE TRAINING:

1. The purpose of training is to provide the employee the general knowledge and special skills that he needs to carry out effective and without risk the tasks assigned to him. The employee's training reaches its maximum value when this individual learns and accepts the basic principles of the intelligence activity.

2. Now that the objective is known, we will analyze the training possibilities. Training must teach the employee the following:

- a. Understanding of the techniques that guarantee the security of the organization, its members and its activities.

- b. The required aptitudes and skills necessary for the efficient fulfillment of its intelligence tasks.

- c. Understanding of his identity and necessary techniques for all out survival.

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-68-

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3. Training is a continuous process. This never ends. It begins with the first contact between the employee and the CI agent and continues until the termination of the employee's services. There are three factors that govern the training program:

The nature of the mission.

The history of the employee

The operational situation.

4. The mission determines but does not limit the type of training that the employee must receive. If the employee's responsibilities increase, the need of training him in special techniques increases proportionately. The training reaches its maximum value when all the basis principles of the intelligence activities have been explained, understood and accepted by the employee. Once this has been achieved, the employee could continue developing and improving through experience.

5. The experience the employee may have had will be a determining factor in his ability to learn and acquire new skills. His ethnic history could influence in his attitude and degree of training he has will influence his ability to acquire new skills. The experience that he may have acquired in military service thanks to observation and practice should facilitate his training. The specialty which he has professionally or as an amateur acquired will also be important in the training of an employee.

6. The CI agent must plan the training which he is going to give the employee in accordance with the operational environment. The factors that must be considered here are:

The availability of the employee to be trained.

The attitude of the persons who live in the area where the employee is receiving training.

The number of guerrilla elements that operate in the area where the training is carried out.

C. SECURITY IN TRAINING:

1. Due to importance of training of the employee and due to the fact that this training must be carried out discreetly, security is a very important factor. The same as any other intelligence activity, training must be protected through an appropriate identity. At times, it will be necessary to use more than one identity to be able to carry out the training in the most rigorous secrecy conditions. We see that identities or activities will be necessary to protect during the training phase.

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a. In order to maintain the security of the operation, it will be necessary to create individual fictitious identities for the training place or places, the (presumed) employee, CI agent in charge of training and encounters between him and his employee. It is possible that other general security factors could emerge that will have to be considered. However, the most important factor is the fact that the training, particularly special training, will reveal to the employee the true aims of the intelligence organization. It is necessary that every CI agent understands this, therefore, they will have to take the necessary measures to assure that the intelligence organization and the CI agent carefully compare the security with the efficiency and can thus decide up to what degree will risk this revelation to organization and its members, given the case that the employee might compromise or desert to the guerrilla organization.

b. In order to be able to guarantee the security of the operation, all members of the intelligence organization, including the employees, must understand all the principles and methods which they must follow in order to achieve personal security of all and each one of the members of the intelligence organization. Therefore, the employee's training must include all the information which contributes to this understanding. Below, we list the points that must be emphasized:

- 1) The individual identity and its concealment.
- 2) Surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques.
- 3) Places and areas that must be avoided. We must understand here that these are not the same for all places. However, an analysis of the operational data available will give us the necessary information to train the employee. For example, it is possible that the guerrillas control certain roads. Unless these are specific targets assigned to employee, he must not frequent these roads.
- 4) Persons with whom must avoid contact. here we list the following persons:
 - a) Known delinquents.
 - b) Politicians whose steps may be watched by the government or the guerrillas.
 - c) Persons who are under police surveillance.
 - d) Any person that could draw the attention of the guerrillas to the employee.
- 5) Employee's personal conduct.

Factors that could attract public attention to an employee and compromise him:

 - a) An employee who frequents night clubs, bars, etc., and spends considerable sums of money in these places.

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b) An employee who smokes foreign cigarettes and has luxury articles that link him with other privileges which most of his neighbors do not enjoy, risks to be discovered

c) An employee who has amorous relations with a jealous woman could find himself compromised because of that woman.

d) An employee who usually visits places of doubtful reputation could expose himself or his organization. These places are frequently raided by the police and this employee could easily be arrested with the rest of those in the audience.

e) Frequenting gambling houses could also place in danger the personal safety of the employee

f) Employees must avoid situation that could result in legal suits against them.

It is important that the employee abstain from taking part in any activity which brings hi to the attention of the guerrillas in an insurrection environment, such as sympathy demonstrations in favor of the government.

6) Employee discipline: Discipline is of vital importance for the security of the employee as well as of the organization. An employee who visits a parent or a friend who resides in a certain area when he has been warned not to do it, not only compromises himself but he also exposes his organization. It is necessary to emphasize the importance that discipline has in intelligence activities during the employee's training. Discipline is a vital attribute that the employee must have.

D. TRAINING SITUATION:

In the first place we are going to analyze the obligatory training methods. These include the basic elements that are found in a civilian university, in an Army services school or in the training of any employee. These basic elements are the following:

- Training preparation.
- Presentation.
- Application.
- Examination or evaluation
- Critical review.

1. PREPARATION:

a. In our situation, the student is the employee and you, the CI agent, is the instructor. The instructor's preparation is of high importance since it is necessary that he knows well the material before he is able to teach the student or employee. And so our proposal is to begin your preparation; you will acquire more

-71-

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experience on the subject through practice and continuing to study this same subject, once a mission has been assigned to him, it will help him to acquire more experience.

2. PRESENTATION:

a. The presentation phase is self-explanatory.

Here begins the training itself. You begin by telling the employee exactly what you want him to learn, explained to him up to a certain degree because you want him to learn and, possibly, indicate to him the degree of skill that you expect him to acquire. Then the subject is presented to your employee, that is, it has to do with the reading of a letter, a reconnaissance, an observation, etc. Further on we shall explain various ways of doing this.

3. APPLICATION:

If possible, give your employee some problems, exercises, etc., in order to practice what he has learned. This applies particularly to subjects like observation, reading of letters, reconnaissance, operation of equipment, etc.

4. EXAMINATION OR EVALUATION:

Periodically during training, it is necessary to evaluate how the employee responds to instructions that he has received, his ability to remember and to understand, and the CI agent's ability to teach. This evaluation could be carried out by assigning test missions under supervision, written examinations and questions. Audio-visual techniques that have had success include, among other things, the use of models, silhouettes, drawings, tape recorders and photograms. That is sufficient to say that the weaknesses which the employee may have shown must be corrected. Must not accept as fact that something which is simple and clear to you will also be clear to the employee. The mission will be the decisive factor. If the employee returns to the mission with the information that he was sent out to look for, and if he followed all the orders, his training up to that point has been successful. If he does not return, it is possible that the CI agent had failed in his training or that he may have been mistaken in a principle on evaluating the capacity of the employee.

5. CRITICAL REVIEW:

When an employee returns from a test mission, he will be subjected to a post-orientation in relation with his mission. This post-orientation will point out some of the errors that could have been committed by the employee, or points that require additional explanation. This is the moment of correcting these errors, teaching new techniques to the employee and assuring him that he is going to learn well all that you have taught him. With this

-72-

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completed, you could continue the teaching with more advanced material.

E. TRAINING METHODS:

1. The training methods include:

- a. Practice exercise.
- b. Demonstration.
- c. Questions and answers.
- d. Orientation.

2. PRACTICE EXERCISE:

The best way to evaluate the skills of the employee is through practice. This way, the degree of skills that the employee has acquired could be determined, and give him additional training if necessary. In this training method the employee must work independently to the extend possible. Patience must be shown with the employee when answering his questions, correct his errors and repeat the training. It is better to repeat the training as a way of developing greater confidence in the employee.

3. DEMONSTRATION:

Demonstration does not differ greatly from other training methods. This is not but an explanation, through examples, or a practical way of showing how something functions or it is used. This system is generally used together with orientation, frequently used to questions, and must be complemented with an application of practice and tests. It is an important part of the training method which includes orientation, questions and answers. The employee must always learn how to carry out a task that requires skill, the CI agent could use the demonstration method. If it was necessary to train the employee for a series of tasks, it is more convenient to use learned theories. Must carry out a final demonstration which covers a series of complete tasks. A demonstration requires a careful preparation with an exact description of the procedure. Must determine that the equipment is needed and to test said equipment before meeting with the employee to begin training.

The demonstration method comprises in determining the purpose of the demonstration, studying of the tasks or skills that the employee must learn, prepares the instruction phases in the corresponding order, deciding which phases could require more training and testing the meeting with the employee.

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4. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS METHOD:

a. An effective training method is the meeting, which consists of a controlled discussion where the system of questions and answers applies. This method could be used to cover a wide variety of subjects related to training. This system is of special value since it gives the employee the opportunity to participate in the training and at the same time allows the CI agent to correct immediately any error which the employee could commit.

b. It also gives the opportunity to employee to exercise the mind and show if he has learned the instruction well. However, this method is more difficult to control and it is much slower. In addition, the CI agent must be better prepared to answer the questions and maintain the training under control. He must carefully analyze all questions that the employee makes no matter how insignificant they seem. All questions which the employee makes are important, consequently, must use them to adapt the training according to employee needs.

5. ORIENTATION METHOD:

The orientation method allows to cover a large amount of detailed information in a short time. It allows the CI agent to review and emphasize previous lessons and to give instructions for future lessons. On the other hand, the orientation has disadvantages that we must recognize. During the orientation, there is the possibility of presenting too much material and to confuse the employee. It is possible that the CI agent is so absorbed in the explanation of details explaining something that the employee perhaps does not understand, is not interested or does not want to apply the theory that is being taught. However, the orientation is one of the most important methods that the agent uses to give instructions to employee when the time is limited and justly before sending the employee to carry out a mission.

F. APTITUDES THAT THE INSTRUCTOR MUST MEET:

1. There are certain aptitudes that the CI agent must have to be a good instructor. These aptitudes include:

- a. Knowledge of the subject.
- b. Knowledge of teaching techniques.
- c. Personality.
- d. Leadership qualities
- e. Professional attitude.

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2. Discussion of aptitudes:

a. KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

One of the most important aptitudes that he must have is knowledge of the subject. That is to say, that the instructor must know well his subject in order to be able to teach others. However, the instructor commits a serious error when he takes for granted that experience by itself provides enough knowledge to teach a subject without any additional preparation and a continuous study of applicable material. The instructor must be absorbed in his subject in order to be able to teach and, naturally, must be prepared to answer virtually any question on said subject.

b. TEACHING TECHNIQUES:

Knowledge of teaching techniques. The purpose of this instruction is to introduce the teaching techniques which definitively is a prior requirement for a good instructor.

c. PERSONALITY:

The personality of the instructor. You have learned in other lessons that it is necessary to establish good relations with the employee and to motivate him to the extent that he complies with loyalty to the tasks that may be assigned to him. Therefore, it is essential that the instructor has the type of personality that allows him to establish good relations with the employee. He must have confidence in his instructor and in the instructions that he gives.

4. LEADERSHIP QUALITIES:

The CI agent must have leadership qualities in order to be able to control his employee in an efficient manner. The employee must submit voluntarily to his authority. This preferable must be established before beginning training.

e. PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE:

The CI agent is impartial, firm and kind. He shows a sincere interest in his employee and in his abilities. The CI agent's attitude influences greatly the behavior of the employee and in the success the latter may have. It is obvious that the instructor's professional attitude, his knowledge of the subject, and his dedication to this type of work must be genuine.

G. TRAINING AIDS:

1. Various factors determine the selection of the training place.

a. The time the CI agent and the employee have

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available.

b. The type of operation that is going to be carried out.

c. Security of the operation.

The CI agent will select the time and place that they should meet. Each case and each employee presents a particular problem.

2. Frequently would be necessary to conduct the employee's training in the area where the guerrillas operate, when this employee resides inside this area and it is not possible to justify his absence. In such cases, the training could be carried out in places such as an abandoned rural area, a hotel room or an apartment. The security and establishment of an appropriate identity to justify the meeting are the most important factors that must be kept in mind in selecting a place that is appropriate for training. Nevertheless, if the employee resides in a place which is outside the limits of the area controlled by guerrilla elements, or if under pretext of a business trip, vacations, etc., the employee could be "taken away" from the area where he resides, the training could be carried out with all tranquility in a safe area.

3. In rare occasions training is conducted in the formal environment of a classroom. The training aids could be effectively used in an informal setting always taking the pertinent security measures. The training equipment consisting of photographs, models and booklets that help to identify the objective could be prepared by the CI agent. If the mission demands it, technical equipment such as photographic cameras and recording devices could be added.

4. A warning for the instructor:

Must not show the employee exactly the objects or distinctive characteristics about which he must inform, but should show him objects of the same type which the employee could recognize and inform in that respect.

5. Some employees affirm of having seen exactly what has been shown to them during training, if the CI agent is not careful to prevent this from occurring. Scale models of border obstacles and defense models greatly contribute to lessen the psychological impact of these barriers in the mind of the employee. At times is not easy to obtain appropriate training aids; however, with a little effort, initiative and ingenuity satisfactory training aids could be obtained. The CI agent must be careful in concealing the training aids when he goes to the training place and when he returns from it. He must carry them with much dissimulation, such as a traveling bag bought locally or in a box which does not draw the attention. When the employee knows what is expected from him, understands the mission that he is going to carry out, has overcome the fear of the unknown, then he will be able to carry out the

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mission serenely and with success.

H. LEARNING PRINCIPLES:

The Ci agent must know the basic learning principles in a way that he can use them to his own benefit during the employee's training.

1. MOTIVATION:

The first and probably the most important of these principles is motivation. The employee had some motive which drove him to accept to work without or your organization. However, this does not end here. You must do everything possible to maintain and if possible to increase the motivation of the employee.

That is not an easy task, nevertheless, it is an essential factor and an absolute prior requirement for the future success of the employee. It is necessary to motivate again the employee in each opportunity. Remember that:

a. Frequently the employee himself does not really know what is that drives him to do certain things.

b. It is rare that a person is driven by a single motive; the majority of persons have various motives that drive them to do certain things or to act in a certain way.

c. It is not important what the reason may be, make certain of having identified it and use it advantageously.

d. If you recognize certain powerful reasons that motivate an employee, develop them, making certain that the employee does not understand that you have analyzed him.

The instructor could evaluate the present political situation to motivate many of his employees. For that reason he must keep up to date with the political events reading the governmental and anti-governmental papers. Keeping informed of the situation, the instructor could initiate his training session citing the damage that the guerrilla elements are causing to the country.

The majority of the employees with whom you deal will have personal reasons, such as monetary remuneration, protection of their families, etc., however, if you convince these employees that they also are contributing to the welfare of their country, your operation will have greater success.

Some ways to motivate an employee during training are:

- 1) Demonstrating the need for training:
Include valid reasons for which your employee must

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receive specific training. Emphasize the fact that his future success and perhaps his life could depend on his training.

2) Maintaining the employee's interest:

Make use of your personality, show enthusiasm, examples and illustrations. While more interesting is the material that the employee would learn quickly.

3) Encourage the employee to excel during the first stages of training:

The desire to excel is a strong force that drives the employee and strengthens him during training. During the first stages of the training program give the employee the opportunity to show his aptitude for observation and recognition of objects. Assign him simple missions which, if successfully completed, will increase his confidence in himself and in you.

4) Recognizing his merits:

Mention the good points of some work which the employee may have done. Begin with a favorable comment and then suggest different ways of improving his work.

2. OBJECTIVE:

This simply signifies giving the employee an incentive which stimulates him to work and indicate to him the degree of expertise that you expect him to acquire.

3. ACTION:

Should offer the employee the opportunity to think, speak, write and resolve problems during training.

4. REALISM:

This principle is sufficiently easy to adapt immediately to training. Present to employee material such as he will use in practice. Assign him simple test missions to give the employee a real idea of the task that he will have to face.

5. APPRECIATION:

Training is complete when the employee has acquired the attitude, appreciation, interest, ideals and habits that would allow him to apply correctly what he has been taught. Also he must have acquired drive, initiative and ingenuity. All these qualities are not directly taught but are rather acquired as a result of a program of fruitful training.

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I. ELIMINATION OF OBSTACLES

1. Each employee will react differently to discipline that he has to be subjected and it is possible that many of them will appear apprehensive. Perhaps he will begin worrying by the nature of the task that will be assigned to him, for the security of his family or by the type of compensation that he will receive. The CI agent must try to dispel these fears showing the employee that these obstacles are known, that he can overcome them and that the training which he will receive will help him eliminate the operational barriers easily. Every employee will have doubts and fears, which the CI agent will have to take into consideration and try to remove in a way that the employee can concentrate in his training.

2. A step towards the solution of these difficulties is the development of a well defined training plan based on the employee abilities, that will help him perform successfully the tasks assigned to him. The aptitude which the CI agent has shown during training will contribute to develop the employee's confidence. The physical distractions, such as deficient lighting, will impede training, consequently, it will be necessary to eliminate them by selecting an appropriate training place. In addition, must remember to bring to training place and offer to employee some refreshment for the purpose of breaking the tension and begin the training in a cordial environment. Must be alert at all times and observe all reactions of the employee during training.

3. Other factors which the agent must keep in mind is that, it is natural for the employee to appear reluctant to accept what is new for him or which will force him to change his habits. One of the principal causes of this attitude is that the employee perhaps is under the impression that the agent is determined to change his way of living. This obstacle could be overcome by placing on himself a strict discipline and limiting the basic training points to some simple problems, must not burden the employee with unnecessary details. Also, at times the entire training could be developed around the basic idea that the employee will go to places that he is used to visit and that he will do nothing out of the ordinary. The only difference is that he will observe and report in that respect.

4. The questions which reflect doubts, fears or insecurity of the employee must be answered frankly and sincerely as in may be possible; but above all, must not make promises that cannot be met. Proceeding with impartiality, understanding and courtesy, you could exercise great influence in the future success of the employee.

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J. TRAINING PHASES:

1. Many of the tasks assigned to employee could consist in actions tending to preserve the individual security and of the cell, to develop secret communications and to live a fictitious identity. These tasks are an very important part of the employee's mission, just as it is the collection of information. Also, the employee could be assigned a special operational mission such as to locate, investigate, recruit and train other employees. The employee could also contribute to the operation, acting as support personnel or as supervisor. All these tasks require training and represent different problems to CI agent in charge of training.

2. In a general way, the training could be considered in three general phases:

PHASE i: Immediately after the employee agrees to work for the agent.

PHASE II: The general preparation for the mission.

PHASE iii: Special preparation for the mission.

a. PHASE I: is that in which immediately after the employee agrees to work. It consists in pertinent instructions to communication means which must be established; the need to take security measures; and the identity that must be established to justify the concerted meetings between the employee and the CI agent.

b. PHASE II: The employee is prepared for the mission. He is not informed about the nature of the mission, but he is rather given instructions about all the subjects that he must know. The communication means, security measures and identity are explained in detail and are adapted to the individual.

Then he taught subjects of general nature such as:

- 1) Map reading
- 2) Use of compass
- 3) Preparation of sketches
- 4) Observation and description.
- 5) Annotation of information.

c. PHASE III: It is a special training pertaining to the mission. It includes technical training in any pieces of equipment the mission demands. This could be a vehicle, a photographic camera, or a radio apparatus. The employee will also

-80-

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receive more specific instructions about security, communications and identity.

d. COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF THE THREE PHASES OF TRAINING:

1) PHASE I:

In this phase security is very elemental. He has agreed to work even when he does not know the dangers to which he exposes himself if his activities were discovered by the guerrilla elements. One must keep in mind the existence of these dangers and also make him understand that he will not be of any value for the CI agent if the guerrilla elements discovered his activities. Should be explained to him that the least carelessness on his part could betray him, that the best way to protect himself is to act naturally, not to change his normal routine of his daily life and to avoid drawing attention, and he must not discuss with any one, not with his wife, friend, or with his parents, his true relationship with the CI agent. After it is ascertained that he will follow to the letter these simple instructions he will not run any danger and the mission will be successful. This training phase is presented at the same meeting in which it was proposed to the individual to work for the government. The pertinent indoctrination to security begins as soon as the individual agrees to work.

The identity for the recruitment meeting will have already been established and, as part of the security training, will be explained to employee that he must act naturally. However, the CI agent must give a simple explanation about he identity of the meeting in case and it is interrupted by strangers, public officials, guerrilla elements, friends or relatives. The employee must indicate the identity he will use for the following meeting and, according to aptitude of the individual, for the subsequent meetings. However, if the employee is assigned a special mission which requires a fictitious identity, only then the identity of the following meeting will be established. The pertinent instructions to the identity are given to employee as part of phase I are very simple and are related with his true identity. The pertinent training to security and to identity are closely related.

Phase I of the training pertinent to communication means is presented at the end of the meeting dedicated to recruitment of the employee. This phase consists simply in the instructions that are give for the purpose of establishing the future meetings. It is explained to employee that he will communicate in a certain prescribed manner for the purpose of setting the time and place of the next meeting. The CI agent must also keep in mind the security of the mission, therefore, he must not reveal to employee more than he really needs to know.

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2) PHASE ii: This phase begins after the employee has been recruited and is qualified in those skills that could be used in more than one mission. This phase could be considered as a general training which covers those basic skills which the CI agent considers necessary for the collection of information. The tasks that have to be carried out shall determine which type of training must be given to employee. For example, a guide does not need assistance in the technique of observation and description, however, he needs training in the techniques necessary to avoid the security measures of the guerrilla elements.

The lecture and the use of maps is one of the most important training which the agent could teach the employee in phase II. The purpose of the map is to allow / discover the surface of an area with all his principal characteristics such as the ones that the employee will see on the terrain. When it is correctly used, the map could indicate exactly the distances, places, elevations, best routes, the principal terrain characteristics and information about concealment and cover for the use of the employee.

The employee normally will be able to determine his own location with a relatively small adjacent area or in relation to roads, paths or villages through where he usually travels in his daily activities. This ability is not always adequate for presentation of information, because the employee must be able to locate in a uniform and precise manner different points in any part of his area. In addition, will be able to use the maps to identify places which are not easy to relate with characteristic points of the-known terrain. The most easier maps to train the employee are those obtained locally from private companies. The training in map reading is conducted gradually until the employee learns thoroughly this technique. Once the employee recognizes well the surface of the terrain, he will be able to identify any movement or activity which is carried out in said terrain. The simple knowledge of the location of an object, the distance and elevation that it is located, and the shape and decline of the terrain will have little value for the employee unless he knows well the direction in which could travel or the direction in which the guerrillas have moved. The training given an employee on map reading also includes instructions how to trace hastily a topographic map of an area, a road or the position of the guerrillas. The employee could be taught to trace a single line to indicate the horizon, just as the employee sees it from his observation point. Must insist that the employee include in his sketch characteristic points of the terrain easy to recognize in a way that the area could be found on the map.

Phase II could also include the use of compass and the preparation of outlines. This is not a difficult task, therefore, the employee must progress rapidly. This training is offered for a followup orientation of a practice exercise. A great part of the

-82-

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practice that will be needed to acquire the experience in map treading and the use of the compass, he could carry out on his own. Therefore, this is an advantageous factor for the security of the mission.

The art of observation and description is another subject that could be taught to employee as part of phase II. In daily life, a person usually is aware of what happens within the small circle of his vision and he is only aware of what happens outside this circle when something exceptional draws his attention.

Inconsistent observation habits result in incomplete and confused impressions. The conscious observation allows the employee to recognize, record and report objects and persons in a way that the information which he submits to CI agent will be clear, complete and concise. Teach the employee to acquire new observation habits in a way that he could describe in detail the objects and persons; direct his attention to perceive the exceptional together with the routine, and to develop new skills and observation techniques. Both must know the obstacles which limit the employee's vision. The employee must learn to eliminate these obstacles using patrol techniques to a better observation position.

Together with the observation and description techniques the employee learns to calculate the time and distances. Frequently this will be difficult in areas where the activities are not carried out at specific times. However, in order to be able to submit correct reports, it will be necessary to train the employee in these skills. If he has access to a wrist watch or any other type, he could be taught to read it if it were necessary. He could be provided a wrist watch provided it fits with his identity. The employee must be able at least to estimate the time making reference to a given moment, for example "immediately after siesta", or "exactly at sunset". The majority of the employees could learn to calculate distances and sizes, making again reference to known things. The agent could determine more or less the size of a vehicle belonging to guerrillas if the employee explains that this was "so high like a fully developed steers and so long like two completely developed steers". It will be necessary to repeat the training and submit the employee to numerous tests until he learns to be exact in his calculations.

The observation and description and calculation of time and distances techniques are some of the most basic skills. They could be carried out with a minimum of risk, since they do not require any special equipment and practice exercises could be used in which the employee learns these skills as soon as possible. The employee will use all techniques that he has been taught, consequently, they must not be dealt as separate subjects, but rather must be integrated to form a complete training program.

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Phase II probably would also include the preparation of sketches. The sketch consist in representing correctly ideas in graphic form without the use of special instruments. The employee uses the sketch to make certain that what he is describing is understood, therefore, his sketches must be precise, exact, proportionate and easy to understand. The use of sketches tends to make the observer more methodical, since he is looking carefully for correct details to copy on paper and for that his verbal explanations will have even more value. For the preparation of sketches he only needs a minimum amount of equipment. These material are easy to obtain in almost any part of the world and they are easy to hide. Almost any type of paper can be used, but if it was necessary a piece of cloth, an animal skin, and even the bark or the leaves of certain types of trees could be used in its place. The sketching instrument could be a ball-point pen, a pencil, a piece of wax, a piece of chalk or even a piece of wood with the tip burned. The most simple type of sketch is the lineal sketch that way the terrain is divided or the object is so tall. This simply is a map/sketch which describes the contours, the borders, etc., to that a legend is added for the purpose of explaining the objects represented and the dimensions and directions which appear in the sketch. Because the artificial objects are designed according to geometry rules, some of these basic rules could be to employee in order to be able to draw a sketch. It is not necessary that he is an artist. Even when it does not serve any other purpose, the sketch serves to retain and remember what has been observed in the past. However, the employee must acquire sufficient skill in a way that his sketches are easy to understand.

Just like the other general subjects that are taught to employee as part of phase II, the tracing of sketches could be combined with other subjects during practice exercises. This serves especially well for sessions in which observation and description is practiced. Due to the fact that this subject is simple, it could be taught with sufficient security and be practiced without arousing suspicion.

The security in phase II is an important factor. In phase I it was simply explained to employee that eh must act naturally and he was warned not to confide to anyone. The security in phase II is more complex and it begins in the meeting following the recruitment.

As we know, the major part of training during phase II provides the employee the general skills that he needs to carry out his task. The security training which the employee receives during phase II must provide him with the necessary knowledge to protect his training sessions. The training in general which the employee will receive pertaining to reading of maps, observation and description of objects and persons, the preparation of sketches, etc., could change his normal living pattern. Therefore, the CI

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agent must teach him different ways of giving excuses of convenience to friends and to family to justify his absence during these training sessions. These explanations must be logical and simple. The employee must learn how to determine if they are watching him, following or investigating him and what measures he must take. He must not only have an explanation to justify the interviews which he will frequently have, but also the trips that he will have to make as part of the training program. Another factor that must be taken into consideration is that he must have a logical explanation to justify the new skills he is learning, or must abstain from showing them. For example, if you have taught an employee how to tell time, he must fabricate a logical story to explain where, how and why he has acquired this skill or must continue pretending that he does not know how to tell time. Showing new skills without any doubt will draw attention to employee, which could expose his value as a discreet observer. The remuneration of the employee, according to prior arrangement with the same, could be made during the training sessions. The employee must be warned not to spend his money in a way that draws attention. Any equipment given to employee as part of his training must be protected either through a logical explanation or be kept hidden. Even such simple things like a notebook and a pencil could cause problems if the employee was not accustomed to using these material. The equipment acquired locally in most cases would pass unnoticed much easier than equipment acquired at a distant place. An important factor regarding security training is the social position of the employee. A simple farmer who is recruited and trained in a rural area to work in the same area would only need to know the basic principles of security training. His living pattern would change so little after being recruited, that would only be necessary to explain to him that he must not confide to anyone the information he has.

However, there are cases in which the employee could occupy a high position in an organization which maintains strict security measures. Being so, this employee needs much more training about security in order to protect himself and to be able to carry out his mission. The training given this employee will have to be adequate to his mission and to security measures that the organization uses.

Phase I pertaining to communications mainly consisted in instructions about how to coordinate the next interview. Phase II begins with a session following the recruitment. This is a general instruction about communications which includes the communication means that they use during the training period and the communication means that will be used in the course of the mission. The communications they will maintain during this period will consist in their greater part in instructions on the part of the CI agent to employee. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to establish a system through which the employee could communicate with the CI agent in case of emergency. Three channels of communication are established:

-85-

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The normal channel: Will be used to attend to normal problems and it is the one that will be used more frequently.

The secondary channel: Will be used in case the normal channel cannot be used.

The emergency channel: It is used when the normal channel as well as the secondary are not adequate.

In the case this system of three channel communications is used, it must be explained to employee that he must know how it functions and how to use it. This system will be modified as it may be necessary in the course of the mission. If its functioning is understood at the beginning of the training will be adapted to changes that may occur and the training period will be carried out with greater security. These periods include personal interviews. The CI agent will determine the time and place of these interviews. It is very possible that these interviews could be conducted at the same time and in the same place during the training periods. This will depend on the situation and the identity that is used to justify them.

During the second part of phase II pertaining to security, the employee receives general information about the communication that he will need to complete the mission. He must know the three channel communication system and the diverse signals that are used to activate each system. If the conditions allow it, he will be given instructions about the use of a telephone that could be used to set up a personal interview, which normally must not be used to transmit intelligence information, since it must be assumed that a telephone conversation could be intercepted. If the employee has to use the communication devices during the fulfillment of his mission, it should be explained to him which they are and how they must be used. In order to prevent operational elements from establishing direct contact, a secure hiding place is designated before hand where a person deposits the information or material to be picked up by another person. Perhaps the employee may have to try to deal with a person who keeps the information temporarily or the material deposited by another person and subsequently is picked up by another, or with a messenger, that is to say, any individual who knowingly carries messages and material between two points or individuals. In these cases, it is possible that the same employee is assigned the mission of custody and messenger, for which the major part of phase II of his training will deal about this aspect of the instruction. If his mission demands that the employee knows an address of convenience, an address in which the custodian could receive a form of public communication (letter, post card, telegram, etc.), and keep it to be picked up or sent to CI agent or to a specific individual, he must receive instructions how the convenience address operates and how it will be used. The employee must know the signals that

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are used to set up the interviews. A signal is a signal agreed between two individuals to indicate a secret understanding. For example, you have set up with the employee that along a specific road through which he travels every day to go and come from his job, he must look for a mark on a certain rock that is at the side of the road. Having a mark, that would signify to employee that there will be no interview. These signals are explained to employee in order to be able to use them during training and also later on during the operation.

Just as it was previously explained, the greater part of phase II pertaining to communications will deal with those means that the employee will use during training or that general information about communications which he will need to carry out the missions that are later one assigned to him.

Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that some employees have the mission of "being converted" to an address of convenience, a custodian or a messenger, and therefore, the greater part of their training evolves around the specific mission they will have to carry out. The amount of training which the employee receives about any subject will depend on the nature of his mission.

Phase II pertaining to the identity will consist in its major part in teaching the employee the art of fabricating explanations to justify his frequent interviews with the CI agent, trips that he makes to go to interview places or practice exercises. It is also necessary to give a convincing explanation about the acquisition and use of any equipment that the employee could receive as part of his training. For example, he could give as excuse that he is planning a trip to justify the acquisition of a map, or a gift on the part of the government to residents of a village would be a good explanation in regards to paper and pencils that may have been received. Certain recently acquired skills could be difficult to explain. In this case, the employee must be warned to refrain from displaying said skills. Perhaps a parallel training program could be established tending to conceal the true nature of training. The remuneration which he receives should also be accompanied with a credible explanation. In the instruction which we give about the remuneration of employees, we shall discuss this problem in detail, however, one must keep in mind that the employee will not be of any value if he draws attention due to sudden increase of his income.

In the first place, phase II pertaining to identity will consist in providing the employee an identity that he could use during training. Nevertheless, if he has been assigned a mission that requires a fictitious identity, he will receive a more detailed training and will be prepared for said mission. Likewise, some employees are promoted to supervisors and, therefore, will need a much more detailed training on the use of a fictitious identity. We emphasize again, the amount of training that an

~~SECRET~~ -87-

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employee receives in this aspect of training will depend on the nature of his mission.

3) PHASE III:

After the employee has been recruited, he receives basic training, that is phase I, of the pertinent security training, the communication means and use of identity. From the moment he is recruited until he is ready for his mission, the employee receives a general training of instruction, which will provide him the basic knowledge that he will use in the fulfillment of his mission. When the CI agent thinks that the employee is ready, then phase II of training will begin, during which he learns specific details that he will need to complete his mission. Phase III includes not only the orientation required for a particular mission, but also any special skills which the employee needs even when the need is possibly for one time.

This phase could include instruction in any type of technical equipment which he will need to carry out a specific task. It is possible that he may have to take photographs of specific installations, group of people or equipment. Therefore, he will have to be taught how to use a photographic camera. Perhaps the mission requires to drive a vehicle, if that is so, it is necessary to learn this technique. What he must keep in mind is that the employee has to use specific skills many times, he must receive instructions in that respect as part of phase II. If this skill is mainly needed for a single case, it is during phase III when he acquires this technical knowledge.

Just as you will remember, an orientation could be considered as a training extension of the employee that includes specific skills. Every employee receives an orientation before he is sent to carry out a mission. This orientation is part of phase III, since it consists in specific instructions. This segment of training includes also a period of questions and answers during which the employee could clarify any doubts he may have.

Phase III pertaining to security is more precise. The employee is told that he must not reveal his mission or his relationship with the CI agent to anyone. He is also taught how he must conduct himself during the fulfillment of his mission. He learns all pertinent details about security around his objective and the best way to avoid being discovered by guerrilla security elements. If the employee learns to handle equipment he must also learn what security measures must be used to protect himself and the equipment,

Phase III pertaining to communications includes those specific details that the employee needs to know in order to be able to receive instructions on the part of the CI agent and to

-88-

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transmit information. Radio communication allows for the quick transmission of information and adds an element of control on the information in inaccessible areas to the agent. If the employee has to use a radio receiver as part of his mission, he will receive instructions in the use of this equipment during this phase. At the same time, the employee could be taught the use of invisible ink and code messages in the event there is need to use them. The signals, communication devices and the means to transmit messages which the employee will use are carefully reviewed here. When the employee understands his mission, the agent must make certain that he will be able to establish a means of communication with the former in order to be able to receive the information that he is pursuing.

Phase III pertaining to the identity includes those aspects of training which he needs for the collection of information. Perhaps he needs an identity to travel to area of operations and another different identity while he is inside this area. He could assume an entirely different identity to communicate with the agent. In many cases, the identity which the employee received during phase II will continue, modified only a little. The true identity is usually best and will require few changes. Naturally, he must be informed about the story invented to explain any equipment that the employee could receive for his mission. In some cases, the story will not be effective and the equipment must be concealed. The training about the identity of phase III could be no more than a revision of the identity with the employee to make certain that he understand why all these aspects are necessary.

SUMMARY:

We have covered various training fundamentals of the employee, the learning principles, the five training phases, the dissuasive factor to disseminate the learning and how to overcome them, and how to apply all this in your case as instructor of the employee. We have explained the three training phases of the employee which involve security, communications and identity, and various other subjects about which the employee could be taught. To train an employee in the field, the techniques will be and must be different than those of the classroom used here. The training will be individual, this will be carried out under discreet conditions and will not be uniform, but is adopted to individual employee.

The most important technique used during training of the employee is that of maintaining harmony with learning. A good employee must be duly motivated. An unsatisfied employee is a considerable security risk. In order to motivate another person, one must motivate himself. In order to train another person, one must know the subject. In order to establish and maintain harmony, the employee must have confidence in his instructor. A good agent, who wishes to be a good instructor, must be sincere and be able to convey this sincerity to employee.

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CHAPTER VII

COMMUNICATION WITH THE EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION:

Until now we have dealt with the need to deal with the employee and the general importance that the mission has that they must perform in the intelligence effort of the government. WE have discussed the factors that determine the selection in the recruitment of a presumed employee, inciting on the access that he should have to information that we wish.

This chapter deals with communications with the employees. An employee could have the best access possible to information we wish, but if he is not able to communicate with the agent to transmit it the operation does not have any value. The ideal is that the agent comes into direct contact with the employee, but there are times they have to do it indirectly.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. THREE BASIC CONDITIONS:

1. There are three basic things that the agent must keep in mind when he considers to communicate with the employee, these are: Control, continuity and security.

a. Control: The agent is responsible to plan how the communication with his employees is to be carried out and to test and guarantee that this is constant. Taking into consideration the security of his employees, determines the time, place and circumstances in which contacts will be made. Does not come into contact with his employees without prior specific approval or a precise order from the control agent. Before using the system, must also consider carefully the type and method of material transmission.

b. Continuity: The flow of information, instructions and material must be continuous. Every effort possible must be made to prevent interruptions in intelligence operations. The information does not have any value if it is not complete, clear and timely. The operational condition could limit the amount and variety of communication channels available.

For better results, three separate communication channels must be established. That is, the normal, the secondary and the emergency. The normal channel will be used to attend to regular demands and it is the one that is frequently used. The secondary will be used in case the normal cannot be used. The emergency will be used to transmit information or material when the normal as

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well as the secondary are not sufficient. This could be the case if the normal channel as well as the secondary fail at the right time or in case that very important information, such as an alert, have to be transmitted. In the case of an imminent attack or an order to cease operations to a compromised employee. The emergency channel could necessarily be the most dangerous, however, it must be the most secure and quick to the extend possible.

c. Security: In intelligence operations we must consider the internal security as well as the external. Each member must be separate from other members in what pertains to knowledge of operations in general. members are given only that information of the operation which they need to perform the tasks assigned to them. The information which is transmitted through communication channels must be sealed and concealed in a manner that it is impossible to be read by the members who handle the message. Must use special envelopes, wax seals and other techniques to discover if the message has been compromised. Whenever possible must be materially hidden. The best defense is to prevent any stranger from finding out that some communication is established or will be established.

B. PERSONAL MEETING:

Any face to face contact between members of an operation is a personal meeting. This is the most common method of communication. Some of its advantages and disadvantages are:

1. Advantages:

- a. A greater exchange of information and a better understanding could be achieved in less time
- b. Questions and answers could be made.
- c. A personal relationship is developed which helps the mood of the employee.
- d. It is the best method to train or give specific instructions.
- e. The attitude, veracity and physical and mental condition of the employee could be evaluated.
- f. Offers the opportunity to exchange information, money or equipment.

2. Disadvantages:

- a. Others could associate them if they are regularly seen together.

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b. There is the possibility of falling into a trap if the employee is under the control of the guerrillas.

c. Could become very intimately compromised in personal problems of the employee.

3. Before authorizing a personal meeting or participating in it, the advantages and disadvantages of the same must be weighted. Security must be the principal consideration. How could a meeting take place in a protected area and safe manner? What is the objective of the meeting? Could this objective be achieved in some other way? What possible danger is there of compromising the employee of the CI agent? If after this operational analysis it is determined that the personal meeting is necessary, must begin to plan it carefully.

4. The personal meeting could serve as communication channel, whether normal, secondary or emergency. In considering personal meetings, the plans must include different contact places, different times and the procedures that must be used to establish new contacts. In more than one occasion the interested parties have not been able to come to the place or at the previously agreed time, thus it is necessary to anticipate this in the preparations that are made. If the meeting is for training purposes of the employee, the CI agent must make certain that he has all the instructions aids available at the meeting place. These aids could be maps, photographs, etc.

5. The place in which the meeting will be determines the finality of the meeting, the operational identities of the individuals that have to meet and the situation tactic (i.e. barriers through which the employee has to pass, combat zones and areas under guerrilla control). For short meetings, any place, whether under a roof or in the open air, serves the purpose, but for extended meetings or for post-orientation sessions, a place under a roof will be more convenient. many times, when the employee is a member of the guerrilla movement, the CI agent has to be careful of keeping the employee outside the area where he could be recognized. If the employee has to travel long distances to the meeting place, arrangements will be made to provide him temporary lodging and food in a safe place. This place must not be the same in which the CI agent is.

6. The fundamental consideration on planning a meeting is the time that the employee will be available. If the employee is a member of a guerrilla movement, his activities must be correspond to those of other members. He may not be able to slip away, or to remain away, when it is needed, or during the desired time. The protection of darkness could improve the security of the personal meeting in cases where one of the two members could be recognized by the local population. Other points to be considered are the availability of transportation means, the curfew regulations and the weather prognosis.

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7. It is necessary that both parties be on time when there are meetings in order to avoid arousing suspicions by being wandering around the area in which the contact has been established. Must have a plausible reason for the individual to be in a particular place at a prescribed time. When the CI agent does not arrive on time to meetings, the employee tends to be overcome with fear and could cancel the meeting or any future contact. Be punctual.

8. The number of contacts that operational personnel makes will be determined by the operational needs, the security and other factors. Security requires us to maintain a minimum number of face to face contacts in order to avoid the danger of being discovered. However, the operational need could require frequent meetings if it is to complete our mission.

There is no established formula for meetings. The CI agent and his control agent have to consider each case individually. Regardless what it is decided, patterns of action must be avoided. For example, must not always meet in the same place.. This would establish a pattern that could be of interest to strangers.

9. The members who participate in personal meetings do so knowing that there is a certain degree of risk or danger. The persons going to meet must take great care on going to the place of the meeting and on coming from it in order to diminish this risk. They must stop and make certain that they are not followed and to know what course of action to take in such cases. The best place for a meeting is one where would be difficult to be followed and to observe but which allows a clear field of vision to those who are taking countersurveillance measures. The place must be one from which the surroundings could be adequately watched. Surveillance must not be neglected even when the meeting is taking place. If the meeting is taking place under a roof, keep the voices low and if possible to play the radio or the record player. This will make it difficult for the guerrillas to use technical radio listening devices and could impede those who are listening concealed from hearing the conversation. The planning of any personal meeting must include escape measures in the event the meeting is discovered. The members who attend the meetings must know paths, roads, and other local entrances and exits. If the meeting is held under a roof, make certain that the employees know where the doors, the windows and any other escape routes that could be used are. Ascertain beforehand that all escape measures have been well considered and that the employees know what they have to do in case of emergency. Procedures must have been anticipated to establish new contacts in case that such an emergency occurs. When a meeting is held with an employee whose loyalty is doubtful or whose actions could be suspicious, the CI agent must have armed assistants posted in hidden places close to the place of the meeting to help him if that is necessary. The planned precautions, not known to the employee, are a good guarantee against kidnapping or capture on the part of the guerrillas. Exercise care when dealing with employees

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who carry weapons and must not allow to be placed at any time in a situation in which could be intimidated.

10. If for any reason a person does not come to a planned meeting, it should be considered to have the meeting held at a different time and place previously arranged. The CI agent and the employee must agree that if for some unforeseen reason lose contact, both would come on a certain day or days to a specific place. This is known as an "arranged meeting". There the one who did not come to prior meetings indicates with a signal if he can approach or not. If the indication is affirmative, the meeting is held.

11. A signal is a gesture, symbol or word arranged between the individuals to indicate a secret understanding. For example, you have agreed with an employee that he must look for a rock under a specific tree along a specific road that he takes every day to go and come from work. The presence of the rock signifies that they have to meet that evening at a place agreed beforehand. If he does not find the rock, no meeting is planned. This is only one example of the way that signals could be used to determine the place and time that they could meet. The possibilities are almost unlimited.

12. If the persons who are going to a personal meeting do not know each other and it is the first time they meet, we use an identification signal. This serves to establish the identity of the two individuals as authorized members of the organization. These signals are verbal crosswords that must seem part of a normal conversation. It is simple an "identification request" and a "countersign": For example, you, as the CI agent, have given instructions to a messenger to go to a meeting place in order to pass a message on to an employee who will be expecting it, whom he has never seen. The messenger approaches the man and asks him, "Are you Juan's friend?" (the identification signal previously arranged for the employee). The employee answers, "No, but I know his brother". (The response previously agreed for the question). This allows the two that they can confide to each other and they can continue with the mission that brought them there. They must establish different identification orders and instructions for each employee and the agent must note that they do not forget them. In this sense, it is essential to train each employee to be certain that there is complete understanding and to test his ability to remember the "identification" signals assigned to him.

The questions and answers must be sufficiently simple, distinctive and current so not to arouse suspicion in case someone hears them.

13. At times, the recognition procedure requires that each interested party presents a previously agreed object that cannot be easily duplicated. For example, A and B must present a dollar bill, both bills bearing successive numbers. There was a time in

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the intelligence services where a number of countries would divide an object in two parts and give a part of each one to persons who had to hold a meeting. However, an intelligence service arrested both secret agents, each one with half of the same dollar bill in his wallet. This way, the identification means, the two halves of a dollar bill, constituted proof that these two individuals who denied knowing each other belonged to the same conspiring organization.

14. The dialogue agreed between the interested parties, which serves as a watchword must be specific, on the contrary, could be deceptive and be a cause for difficulties, just as they occurred in the following incident. In Germany, a young CI agent was sent to a specific suburban bus stop in Berlin with instructions to meet with a messenger whom he did not know and to deliver a powder box that contained a roll of secret film. On arriving at the bus stop, the young man observed immediately a person who entirely answered the description of the man that he was supposed to meet. He approached him, smiled and said to him. "I am a tourist. I admire your beautiful country". "Yes, it is very beautiful, I am also a tourist", responded the man. His response was exactly what had been agreed. The young CI agent informed must later that he was ready to deliver the package to the stranger, when he suddenly explained, "this is my bus" and quickly boarded the vehicle.

15. In meetings in which the interested parties are known and have been working together, a series of different signals is issued. While waiting at an agreed meeting place, the employee executes some positive act so that the CI agent may know that he believes that the conditions do not offer any danger for the meeting. This wants to say that he has taken the necessary countersurveillance measures to attend the meeting, he is not suspected and expects to establish contact with him.

p. A danger signal is used to warn the CI agent to stay away from the employee. The absence of a security signal constitutes the danger signal. In other words, if a security signal is not given there is danger and the CI agent must not meet with the employee. If the employee uses a positive signal to indicate that there is danger, there is the probability that signal could be observed by the opposition thus placing in danger the CI agent, the employee and the operation.

C. OTHER METHODS:

1. The telephone must not be used in any way to transmit intelligence information. It is almost always used to arrange personal meetings. The CI agent must be aware of the fact that his telephone as well as that of his associates could be intercepted. Therefore, he must not use his own telephone to communicate with his employees. It is best to use public telephones in such occasions. On arranging a meeting with an employee by telephone, must try to

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deceive persons who may be possibly listening concealed by changing the time and place of the meeting. For example, if he wishes to see the employee on Wednesday at 8:00 p.m., if the agent adds " at your home or my home", that could signify the principal or alternate meeting place.

2. If there is a justified reason to suspect that the telephone of the person that is being called is intercepted, must be double careful. On answering the call the employee, the CI agent could fake that he has called the wrong number, excusing himself in a specific manner hang up. That would be an indication that will give the employee to understand that he must go to a specific public telephone, where he will call him in an hour and, if not being there at that time, a half hour later than the agreed one. Both persons must agree before hand to the significance of a number of phrases and some few indispensable terms that would allow them to express mutually simple things of their line. They must invent brief coded expressions for emergency situations that would allow the employee to inform his CI agent that he is under surveillance, for example that his house has been searched and they have seized compromising data, etc. Change a call from a private telephone to a public telephone is a general practice used much by intelligence agencies because it offers the possibility that their employees can talk without fear that the telephone call is intercepted. This way, they could maintain daily contact with different employees using various telephones.

Radio communications have given place to many significant changes in the intelligence practice. The true value of intelligence is related with the quickness that the employee can supply information to his superiors. Radio communications have tremendously increased the speed of CI. Besides the quick transmission of intelligence, radio communications have increased the control factor. In the past, when an employee entered an area dominated by the guerrillas, he was outside the immediate control. If it was necessary to change the orders of the employee, the CI agent had to deal with the problem of having to communicate with him quickly. Likewise, the employee could not transmit quickly the information that he had obtained, not been able either to receive new instructions or additional instructions while he was in an area dominated by the guerrillas. The result was that the CI agent lost effective control as soon as he entered the area of the guerrillas. The use of the radio, either the radio receiver or the transmitter - receiver has improved the control of the employee as well as the timely receipt of intelligence information.

The introduction of the radio in the information gathering technique has also raised new problems in addition to the advantages that it presents. A problem is that the operation of a transmitter-receiver requires a technical skill which is difficult for many employees. When this is so, must recruit to the extend possible persons who have technical ability in the operations of

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radio transmissions and in the repair of equipment. Another problem is that which radiogoniometry equipment raise. This technique has been perfected to the extend that it is possible to indicate with precision the house from where the radio transmission is made in a large city like London or New York or in a rural district not densely populated. Through a constant surveillance of all transmissions, those of unknown origin could be separated from those of known origin. When it stumbles on a transmission of unknown origin, radio markings are taken from two radiogoniometry stations located at different places. These radio markings are traced on a map and their intersection will indicate the general position of the unknown transmitted.

Two radiogoniometry stations are sent to the area and repeat the proceeding. This will define more exactly the position of the transmitted in the second stage. In the third stage the apparatus succeeds to precise a general area, in a street or in a field. In the fourth stage, could indicate exactly a particular house.

In spite of the efficiency of the detector apparatus, the radio operator has the means to avoid being captured. only in cases of need he will work in a hose or group of isolated houses. Normally, if possible, hides in a large and noisy city. He must always think that the opposition is aware of his presence in the city, and he must not remain in a single place and transmit from well separated points.

In the first phases of an insurrection, the technique of basic communications must be personal meetings, the radio is mentioned since the guerrillas may have been successful in the early stages to control certain areas which are inaccessible for a CI agent.

INVISIBLE INKS: The same like the radio, invisible inks are used when an agent and his employee cannot be seen together for security reasons. They are still used extensively. In order to be effective they must have three qualities: They must pass unnoticed by the opposition, must be easy to use and must be in a form that the employee can carry with him without raising suspicions in case his belongings are searched.

In order to read them, they have to be developed. The inks which are used have developers. Intelligence laboratories have worked to find inks whose developments are unknown to the enemy. These inks have reached such a point that although they are easy to use them, their development requires a complicated process. This limits the casual use that could be offered to CI agent and his employee.

The use of inks is extensive when the two are in different countries. In the first stages of an insurrection this technique is only used if the employee is in a delicate position and the contact could place the operation in danger. If the guerrillas gain

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control of the area then the inks, the same like the radio, could be used.

MICROPHOTOGRAPHY: It is possible to reduce a page to a point of a film that is not larger than the head of a pin with this method. In reducing the document, this microphotographic point can be treated to appear like an white opaque point that could be attached to a piece of paper or on an envelope and it is highly difficult to discover. The person who is going to receive it has been provided a "developer" which he uses on the envelop so that the point loses its opacity and appears like a black visible point o naked eye.

This technique has its disadvantages.

The apparatus necessary to do it is very large and complicated to give it to employee. This signifies that it only has one use, from the CI agent to employee. The employee will need a microscope with a magnification power of not less than 200 times in order to be able to read the microphotographic point. An employee who has a microscope of this kind could be reason to be suspected.

CRYPTO: This word signifies "something hidden", it serves to distinguish among "key" codes and "codes" because it refers to all systems to convert a secret (by means of symbols) to a "normal text" or a " clear text". The general term in all this field is today "cryptology", There are two sections:

The cryptography that has to do with preparation, projection, invention or protection of keys and codes for the use of our government.

The cryptoanalysis, has to do with the simplification and decoding of cryptograms, which is the translation of intercepted foreign messages in the correct language.

The art of preparation of our own messages in keys or in code is to write test by means of cryptography. The translation of our own messages and their writing in normal and current language is, however, "decoding".

A cryptogram is any coded document or message written in code. " Communications Intelligence" is information that has been achieved through satisfactory cryptoanalysis made of third party messages.

Certain keys and codes could be deciphered though analysis of the intercepted messages just as the cryptoanalysis, or in a more dramatic and simple way by obtaining copies or the books of the codes or information about the codes which the opposition uses or through a combination of these means.

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Normally, when communication with employees is indirectly carried out, whether by radio or through postal or messenger means, for security reasons the message must be written in an enigmatic or unintelligible way, something that is usually done through a system of keys and codes.

In a code, a certain word, symbol or group of symbols is replaced by a word or even by a group of words or a complete thought. We have, therefore, that "XLMDP" or "79648", depending on the code, whether letters or numbers are used, could signify "war" and each time they will appear in the message that is what it will signify.

In a key, a symbol, such as a letter or a number, represent only a single letter in a word. Therefore, "b" or "2" could signify "e" or some other letter. In simple keys, the same symbol always signifies the same letter. In complex keys that are used today, the same symbol would be represented a different letter each time it appears. At times a message is first prepared in code and then in key.

MAILBOXES: In order to avoid face to face contacts among operational elements, a system of mailboxes could be used. A box is an a safe hidden place, designated beforehand, where a person leaves information or material to be later picked up by another individual. A mailbox is a means of avoiding personal contacts among individuals of an operation in case one of the members is apprehended. He cannot provide information about the operation other than the fact that he picks up orders in a box and leaves the information in another box. The CI agent must understand that the use of mailboxes entails certain dangers since the material could be temporarily out of his control and may be exposed to be casually discovered. The material which is placed in a mailbox must remain there the least time possible according with the operational conditions. The longer it most remain there, the greater is the risk of being discovered. In order to avoid the establishment of a pattern, must not use the same mailboxes repeatedly. They must be changed as frequently as the operational conditions allow.

In selecting the hiding places that have to be used as mailboxes, the following considerations must be kept in mind:

Access: How close it is to person who are going to use it?
Can it be used without deviating from the normal activity pattern?
Can it always be used or only during the hours of the day or night?

Whether conditions: Will it be difficult to find it in rainy conditions or in other weather conditions? Would require a special envelope to protect the content in bad weather? Will extreme or extraordinary weather conditions allow to reach the area?

Compatibility: Could the individual who walk freely through

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the area do it without drawing much attention? Is it in a place where certain type of people frequent (campers, hunters, etc.)?

Size: How big is the material that is going to be placed in this hiding place?

Security: Is the mailbox located in an area where there may be danger? Could the employee use it without being captured by enemy forces?

Description: Could it be easily described in a way that a stranger could locate it by only following your instructions?

There are also certain signs that must be used with mailboxes for maximum security. These are the "in" and "out" signs. When an employee or a CI agent places material in the mailbox, one or the other goes to another place designated in advance and indicates by means of a sign to whom provides the service that he has a message "in" the hiding place. This could be done in many ways, a chalk mark in a certain building, etc. The sign must be made as far possible from the mailbox, so that the person who provides the service may take the necessary precautions of countersurveillance on going or coming from the point where the sign was made. Once the person picks up the material in the hiding place, he must go to a new place and make the "out" sign. This serves to inform the person who places the message that it has been transferred without incident. The distance from the place where the sign is made is determined by the same security precautions that are used in making the "in" sign.

The mailboxes must not be close to houses of the employees. If a mailbox is accidentally discovered, that could be reason to suspect everyone in the area. The mailboxes must not be close to bridges, railroad terminals, tunnels and other areas that could have military significance and therefore be protected zones.

HUMAN MAILBOXES: It is someone who temporarily safeguards information or material left by a person to be picked up by someone else later. The person selected as human mailbox must be one whose profession offers him the opportunity to deal with people of all social layers. A plausible excuse must be established that gives reason to repeated visits that member of the organization make to use his services. Doctors, singers, shopkeepers, etc. make good human mailboxes.

THE MESSENGER: Is an individual who knowingly carried messages and material between points or operational individuals. He must not know the content that he carried or the true nature of the material. The best person for this post is one that may have the capacity to walk among the operational elements without being suspected. This person could be a bus driver, a salesman, a traveling salesman, etc. In many situations, women are the best

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messengers. Women frequently do not have someone to whom to account for their time; they are subject to military service and in most cases they are not, like the men, exposed to careful searches. They must always use camouflage and cover methods to hide the fact that the messenger is carrying a message. The CI agent must be certain that the messenger's knowledge is limited to what he needs to know. They can be used among members of a network that does not hold meetings, but must be careful that the messenger does not get to know all the members of the network. The messenger must be trained in the methods used to discover if he is watched and the different uses given to signals, to mailboxes and personal encounters.

ADDRESS OF CONVENIENCE: It is one in which the custodian could receive a form of public communication (letter, card, telegram, etc.) and keep it to be picked up or delivered to the agent or a designated person. The custodian must not know the true nature of the content of the messages sent through him. These messages are normally harmless letters that contain concealed sings. The custodian must have a plausible explanation to receive the correspondence and a logical reason to put him in contact with the person that will eventually receive it.

This type of communication is satisfactory where postal services are fast, safe and adequate. It can be used when an employee could become a suspect if he receives it at his own address>

Many times, employees are apparently searched by the police because of their illegal participation in the guerrilla movement. Consequently, the police as a routine matter could confiscate any correspondence that is sent to the house of the employee. A letter send to a third party, previously recruited and trained could be possessor of an address of convenience, it could be picked up by the employe. The letter must be addressed to the custodian of the address, however, he must be warned through an agreed signal in advance on the envelope or in the letter, that the correspondence is intended to a particular third party. This sign could be part of the text of the message or the way the stamped in placed, etc.

If necessary the signs of the sender on the correspondence that is mailed to an address of convenience, must be a true address, although must not be the name and address of the person related with the information network. Usually the best current names are randomly selected from telephone books, advertisements, etc.

SAFE PLACES: The Ci agent and his employees are constantly faced with the need of looking for areas where they could keep their activities concealed from foreign elements. These areas, under roof or in the open air, are known as safe places. A safe

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place is a place over which a certain degree of control is exercised. When the place is in open air, such as a clearance in the forest, a "vareda"(sic) in a mountain, a bench in a park, etc., it is known as a safe place. Nevertheless, if the safe place is a residence, building or shelter of some kind, at times it is known as a safe building. We constantly look for desirable safe places when meeting of long duration have to be held. A safe place could be used to conduct meetings, as temporary lodging of employees and for storage of material that must not be compromised.

A good safe place must have various approaching avenues and must be selected taking into consideration countersurveillance measures. Because we call a place safe, it does not mean that it is safe. The users must be constantly alert to any possible discovery or compromise.

The operator must maintain a record of the safe places and their use. If one of the places is exposed, it must be avoided for all future contacts. A safe building must not be used in the recruitment of an employee or in operations with employees whose loyalty is unknown. Like in all phases of the operations, it must be emphasized that contact among employees must be avoided. They must remain separate and not be allowed to use the same safe places. On using a building, the different buildings that may be under your control must not be revealed unless the operations demand it. Although it is possible that various employees may have to come to the safe building, care must be taken that all may not be informed of the relationship that each one has with the operation. Change the dates and times of meetings among the sources and the agent in order that they do not meet coming or going from the safe place.

D. STORAGE:

1. Storage is the process of hiding equipment or material with the aim of being collected for use in support of an operation at a future date. In many occasions an employee will have to be provided food, medicine, money or other material to help him in carrying out his mission. He may be located in an isolated or unknown area where he does not have the necessary articles at his disposition. In such cases, it is the responsibility of the CI agent to make certain that the required articles have been placed in a way that the employee could get them as the need arises.

2. There are three storage methods, these are:
- a. Burial
 - b. Concealment
 - c. Submersion.

The burial is the one used most and which offers a high degree of security. The person doing it must keep in mind the following four steps which are very important:

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a. Packaging:

- (1) He must select a water proof wrapping of appropriate size to accommodate the material.
- (2) Must inspect each article to see if it is in serviceable order before placing it in the package.
- (3) Must protect all articles individually in order to prevent breakage.

b. Location selection:

- (1) He must choose a physical and operationally accessible area to personnel in charge of picking up the material, as close as it may be possible to a permanent and identifiable terrain characteristic.
- (2) Must not place anything in an area that could have military importance (under a bridge, railroad, military barracks, energy centers).
- (3) Must select a place that offers a certain degree of privacy.
- (4) Must select a place as close as it can possibly be to the area where the material is going to be used.

c. Location:

- (1) Must have a logical reason to be in the area.
- (2) Must place the material as quick as possible, having planned in advance the best time to do it.
- (3) Must be informed of the enemy security forces which are operating in the area.
- (4) Must make sure to inspect the area after the placement to make certain that it looks the same as before he placed the material.

d. Record:

- (1) Must prepare a record of the storage place in order to be able to find it easily.
- (2) Must annotate in the record the material he placed at each location.
- (3) The instruction for picking up the material must be always simple; may include sketches, maps, photographs and any other information that could be of assistance.

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(4) Must record the date, time, and circumstance of placement.

SUMMARY:

Various ways communicating with your employee have been discussed. It was emphasized that in the guerrilla early phases personal meetings are the best means of communication with your employee.

A. The advantages of these meetings are:

1. To provide a better harmony and understanding with your employee.
2. To give you more control in that in a direct way you give him instructions, you receive the information and you pay him.
3. It allows to continuously evaluate your employee.
4. Provides you a more effective way of recruiting an employee and to terminate his services.
5. Allows the CI agent and the employee to be in the same area during the early phases of insurrection.

B. The disadvantages of these meetings are:

1. If the employee works for the resistance, he will be closely watched by other members of the movement.
2. If he is a "secret agent" he could then obtain descriptive information regarding the CI agent and the meeting places.
3. Unless they have an obvious reason to be together, they could arise suspicions of other observers.
4. The CI agent, in as much as he may know his employee better, he could lose his objectivity in his relations with the same.

The telephone must be used only to arrange meetings and to transmit information, except for information that may be highly important. The telephone user must rely on public telephones and avoid using his private telephone, because this could be intercepted. The telephone messages must be coded.

The radio, messengers, safe places, microphotographic points, invisible inks, hiding places, codes and keys, and the storage are all valuable means of communication when it is not desirable or a personal meeting is not possible. It is possible that these techniques could be used in the early phases of the insurrection,

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but this is even more probable. If the guerrillas are successful and achieve control of certain areas, the CI agent could be forced then to use some of these communication methods. The examples given are intended to show you that it is not necessary and perhaps even undesirable to be complicated in your communications with the employee. The essence of your communication system with the employees is that the means which you choose are secure and continuous.

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CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDENTITY

INTRODUCTION:

In the previous chapters we discussed the vulnerabilities of the guerrillas. We already saw that the CI agent must be alert to recognize these vulnerabilities, and to base on these the operations of his employees. For example, he must know the five steps related with the latent insurrection, and how to exploit the objectives that are in each step. He also recognizes the relations that exist among the steps of intelligence, propaganda, organization, training and the struggle itself. The CI agent continues gather or searching for information through his extensive network of employees.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. Like future CI agents, you know perfectly that there are many types of employees and diverse operation that these must carry out. For example, the supervisor of the employee is intelligent, confident, flexible and able; he has good administrative and leadership qualities, since he is probably employed for different reasons: Let's see. If for security reasons, MUST NOT make contact with the employee, if the operation is carried out in a particularly hostile environment, if he has an extensive network of employees, etc. The person in charge of gathering information is the one who performs the work. That persons gives fulfillment to the mission - that is to say, satisfies the requirement. Now then, the requirement or the problem could be complicated, for example, this could be an operation of penetration of a dissident rural organization. It could also be of simple observation of the population and the surroundings of the village, in order to take in the whole activity. In order to satisfy this requirement, or give a solution to this problem, the CI agent locates, controls or observes and makes contact with the employees. He must rely on secure places or zones, where he could train and test his employees. Often he has to seek the assistance of experts when the mission demands technical support. In this way, we see that a THIRD TYPE OF EMPLOYEE is needed.. the support employee. We al know that the CI agent is an individual who although may have been well trained, he can only do a number of things in a specific time. Therefore, he employs support personnel for assistance in the operations.

We have then that there are many types of employees and diverse types of missions which fluctuate between the most complex penetration up to simple observation demands of a village.

- What fictitious identity must this individual have in order

-105-

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to be able to fulfil his mission?

B. Before sending him in pursuit of his mission, the employee must be given a detailed identity that will serve him to conceal the task that he is going to perform. Said identity could be TOTALLY fictitious or ALMOST true; the latter is more advisable.. Regardless what his nature may be, the identity must become part of the employee, he must know even the most intimate details. He must be so natural, as if it was his prior identity. All that the employee possesses gives credence to his identity from his personal identification documents to what he carries in his pockets. In other words, the employee lives his identity. he truly converts into the person that he representing. It is not matter what type of employee he is - supervisor, information collector or support employee, the person uses an identity when he carries out his search or information gathering obligations. In addition, the CI agent provides identities to a cell or group of cells that may be jointly working in a mission. All these persons could work to "protect" an established organization, whether public or private, providing a service or selling a product. In this aspect, the identity has to be complete, that is to say, the service that is provided or the product it makes have to be true. In this manner, while surreptitiously carry out his mission, the individual LIVES his identity and works for the good of the common cause of the organization.

C. NEED FOR AND HOW TO ESTABLISH AN IDENTITY FOR COVERT OPERATIONS:

1. The reason that supports the use of identities, whether individual or for cells, could be summarized in a single word: SECURITY. We already have dealt with the general principles of individual, cell or operational security. We also have dealt with specific measures that are put into practice to MAINTAIN this security. We said that the identity, cover and general principles were the means put into practice to MAINTAIN a good security system. The identity provides the employee excuse to live where he lives, to work where he works, and to deal socially with the persons he deals with.

The Identity, as we said before, gives credence to individual actions of the employee at the same time "conceals" his clandestine movements. The identity allows a cell or a group of employees to work TOGETHER. It helps the employee or the group to avoid suspicion of the guerrillas. In this manner, the identity protects the employee against the guerrillas, and places him in a position from which to carry out his mission. With good acumen, the identity could also protect the mission against worse consequences if the employee is discovered. We could well say that the identity is a true art since it deals with human beings, the relations among them, what they believe and what they feel, with their habits and their expressions, their aspirations and their actions.

-106-

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Sources and Methods Involved

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2. The same general steps that are given for an identity could be put into action whether the employee remains fixed in an area, travels through said area, or may have to be introduced in this after having been interviewed. In all cases, it is important to remember that the employee is able to perform the recommended tasks and at the same time to live his normal life. Nevertheless, the CI agent prepares an identity which hides the clandestine activities of the employee at the time he executes them, since the SEARCH FOR INFORMATION or the gathering of this information could be outside the normal activities of the employee. For example, an employee who lives his identity in a village which is under the control of the guerrillas has to conceal the act of interrogating the villagers with respect to guerrilla organization, and give the appearance that he is only casually interested on the subject. The information must be obtained, but the true reasons for acquiring it must be hidden behind a protecting identity that gives credence, and which the employee could live totally. Therefore, when the CI agent proceeds to develop or "manufacture" an identity, he has in mind the following: "How can the true identity and the natural activity of this employee be adopted to natural activities to be used to conceal two general types of identities: That which the employee lives daily, and that which gives the employee a reason to perform his mission during those occasions in which he performs clandestine actions. We shall call the first - POSITION IDENTITY and the second ACTION IDENTITY. The position identity gives the employee an excuse to live where he lives, the action identity provides the innocent pretext that conceals the search action or gathering of information.

On giving the employee his identities, the agent has in mind the following:

a. ANALYZE THE MISSION OF THE EMPLOYEE: For example, He often used a support employee only in certain phases of the search operation within the zone controlled by the guerrillas, whether to locate, investigate, or make contact with other employees, while an employee supervisor as a rule has the mission of controlling a cell, or more than an employee, in all his movements. Consequently, the CI agent studies carefully each phase of the mission to make certain that the identity is in accordance with the same.

b. CONSIDER THE EMPLOYEE: After analyzing the mission, the CI agent considers the employee. He decided then which identity would explain the WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN and WHY of the employee's actions and besides all this, to be in agreement with his personal history. He must work with the employee, study his history, analyze his intelligence and his personal qualities in order to decide then which identity would be more appropriate. The ideal would be that the employee could perform his many tasks using his true name, personal history. For example, we saw the case in which the employee is of military age, and naturally, he would normally be

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fulfilling his military obligations. If he divulges his true age, a guerrilla would suspect that this employee has some connection with the government. After analyzing the mission of the employee, his personal history, and his personality, we retain those parts of his true history that could be used for identification purposes and discard the rest. The CI agent combines the useful information of the history with the rest of the identity. He must be certain that the new identity of the employee will stand before the investigation of the guerrillas. Examined the identity in detail to make certain that it is realistic and it is according to customs and activities of the area. The identity should satisfy the questions which the guerrillas commonly make. It is impossible to create an identity for an individual if the last details are not arranged to complete satisfaction of the employee. The employee must meet the necessary requirements in order to be able to LIVE his identity naturally and complacency, and he must be able to fulfil the assigned mission. The identity is not so complex or weak that does not offer the employee time to complete his mission. For example, he must not give an employee the identity of a fisherman who must be introduced in a rural coastal zone and at the same time, work from sunrise to sunset, fishing in a boat far from the coast.

On the contrary, he is given a less demanding identity and the economic means that allow him certain freedom of movement. At the same time, the identity must provide the employee a reasonable explanation of certain "tools related to the mission" that could be in his possession. Once again, we must be flexible and use common sense. There is no imaginable identity that could disguise the reason that a migrant farm worker has in his possession a Leika camera with telephotographic lenses. In this case, we conceal our actions. Therefore, the identity is in agreement with the character of the individual, at the same time he must be provided a means of support that may not be the compensation that he may receive from the search and information gathering activities.

d. CONSIDER THE ENVIRONMENT:

Immediately after, the counterintelligence agent considers the environment in which the employee is getting ready to go to work. Analyzes the conditions under which the employee is going to perform. Is it an urban or a rural area? In an urban zone, a strange face would arise less suspicion than in a rural community. Under what circumstances could the individual solicit information in the area? What freedom of movement has the employee? Would a walking traveler arise suspicion? The employee must be prepared to explain why he travels from one place to another where he has been, and what he presently does. According to what we deal with at the initial testing, an investigation must be made of the area to determine the conditions and activities which prevail in it. In the case of the employee who is resident of the zone, the

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counterintelligence agent or an employee who provides support will do the investigation. The information obtained, like other reports obtained from the archives or other investigating means, must be then incorporated to a general identity. If an employee is going to be introduced into an area, which the CI CANNOT enter, said agent could use an investigating support agent. If this is not possible, the CI agent will have to depend on the information he has about the employee, the information he has compiled from captured local guerrillas, or the investigation he did of the archives and publications.

D. TYPES OF IDENTITY:

1. In addition to position and action identities, there are two other types of identities. Instead of being based on actions of the employee, the other two categories are based on the degree of veracity that the information has.

In other words, we define the types of identities, according to amount of information needs to be used to develop them.

2. We already have discussed, during the lecture, the true identity related with the development of the identity. We said that the counterintelligence agent must analyze the personal history of the employee and his personality, and COMBINE THEM to adopt them to the identity. In this manner, the true identity is the employees own identity. The ideal would be that the only NOT REAL aspect of the employee's pretext (or identity) were the relations with the CI agent or supervisor in his secret mission. The REAL identity is the best type since it can be substantiated. In a way it does not matter how intensely the guerrillas study or investigate the employee, these parts of his identity which are real will remain credible at all times. On the other hand, an employee who resides in the zone and remains there, could use the real identity with good results. He will only have to conceal the relationship he has with the government representative and offer credible reasons for his absence during the periods or moments in which he is meeting with the counterintelligence agent. The real identity is combined with the action identity to disguise the clandestine actions with an apparently NATURAL and CONTINUOUS action. In another way, an employee who has carried out a penetration and has been placed in an organization or group, could use his true identity and benefit from it. He must disguise the reason for which he joined the group and conceal his clandestine activities, but his own identity could counteract any investigation, if he uses his true personal history. This way, we see that the true identity provides credibility and a solid base of existence. That could only be developed through a detailed analysis of the personal history of the individual and his personality. As you already know, the CI agent deals with the employee ALL aspects of his identity in a way that he is in agreement with the true nature of the employee and mainly consists

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of facts taken from his real life. Thus, the guerrilla has less probabilities of suspecting that the former is conducting an investigation of the latter, will not discover the true mission of the employee.

3. As its name indicates, the fictitious identity is false and, therefore, cannot stand up to a constant analysis. It must be used up to a certain point; all depends on the mission, on the environment in which the employee must operate and on the employee himself.

The CI agent, who works closely with the employee, will decide what part of the identity should be false in order to protect the employee and the mission, if this is credible and will support a careful examination.

4. There are cases in which it is necessary to introduce the employee to a guerrilla organization. The employee could play the role of a government deserter who is willing to work for the cause of the guerrillas. The government provides him with certain information which he must present to the guerrillas at the same time, on his part, he tries to gather information. His identity as a rule is completely false and could be discovered easily. The guerrillas suspect these men and they also investigate carefully. These "introduced" employees are rarely used. The "introduction" of an employee who resides in the area is much easier, because although his reasons for joining the guerrilla force are false, the rest of his identity is real. Here, we must remember that the communist guerrillas are familiar with these actions and conduct exhaustive investigations of the recruits who aspire to join their ranks. This way, we say that any operation which the employee may carry out, the identity whether real or false, must be able to resist a careful analysis.

5. Another type of fictitious identity is that which is used when the employee is surprised in the act of fulfilling his mission. It is logical to think that the employee will provide him a reasonable action identity, and that will serve to disguise his true action. Now then, what would happen if this identity fails? The employee is prepared to present another credible reason, although false, for his conduct. In normal circumstances, if the action identity does not disguise the fact as it should, the employee becomes a center of suspicion. Since the intelligence activities are suspicious, and when the action identity fails, the employee must then make the guerrilla believe that he is conducting criminal acts instead of intelligence operations. It is possible that the employee could disguise his intelligence activities if he admits his guilt to a criminal act that would reasonably explain his suspected action:

6. Now that we know what identities could be true or false (fictitious), we must devote then ourselves to analyze the

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two types of cell identities that are used.

The different of the position and action identities , which are based on the position the employee occupies in the community, in his actions and in the true and fictitious identities that are defined according to veracity of the information used, the cell type identities are catalogued according to types of positions the individual cells enjoy. These two categories of cell identity could be based on real or false information. All depends on the identity that is needed.

7. We said that a cell has more than one employee or counterintelligence agent who work together in a specific clandestine mission. For reasons of coordination, training or due to nature of the mission, perhaps may be necessary to hold periodic meetings with members of the cell who, because of their position, are not of the same social class and for that reason cannot meet with the same frequency without arousing suspicions. The counterintelligence agent or the employee supervisor must then select a natural and frank reason to hold a meeting. Therefore, must have an identity which provides a credible excuse so that this group of individuals may meet. In a rural zone, a meeting of this nature is very difficult to prepare and impossible to hold without arousing suspicion of the population and of the guerrillas. As you know, it is very easy in a rural zone to watch all movements that persons who live there make. The family connections, the relatively reduced number of people, the hates and passions of the people -all these factors combine to make the environment very suspicious and open, naturally for that reason constitutes a threat to security. On the other hand, the situation in the urban areas is entirely different. Due to urban environment, the people are accustomed to constantly change jobs and residence; everything is crowded in the city. Due to the fact that in the urban environment prevails an attitude that we could call " unconcerned", it is much easier to hold here cell meetings and to use the cell identity. Sheltered by said identity, just as a celebration of a national holiday, a meeting o theology studies, or a book club, or games, etc., the counterintelligence agent or the employee supervisor could hold a meeting without arousing alarm or suspicion. The type of meeting (simple or sophisticated) and nature of the identity that is needed depends on the mission and requirements of the employee. However, such meetings must be held only when they are absolutely necessary and the identity of the cell must be thoroughly and totally credible.

Of course, just like the case of the other identities, this must be in agreement with the activities and natural identities of the specific employee.

a. ORGANIZATION IDENTITY:

1) We are now going to consider an identity to provide to

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cell employees, a positive reason of working regularly together. For example, when the administration, direction or support given to a clandestine activity must be carried out through the combined effort of persons who have to justify their constant association, an organization identity must be then created under the shelter of which all interested could work together. In the first case, a false identity would be necessary. In the latter, the true identity could be used. The organization identity is used to disguise and protect the employees and their activities, as well as the installations where the clandestine activities are carried out. Let's see an example: In the case of the latin American countries, a fruit company could serve as an excellent front or "cover" for an organization, real or false, since under the pretext of buying land or fruit, or of inspecting certain locations in respect to fruit marketing, the employees could gather large amounts of highly useful information. Now then, it is logical to assume that the type of organization identity used will depend on the security requirements and the efficiency demanded from the employed personnel. As you can imagine, the organization identity is very convenient since it allows a close coordination and protection to archives of easy access. Just like the case of the other types of identities, the organization identity depends on the individual. That is to say, each employee or agent must LIVE his identity in order to be able to sustain the pretext of the group.

E. AUTHENTICATION OF IDENTITY:

1. The identity is used to disguise the fact that they are carrying out clandestine operations. Said identity must be a complete summary of the past, present and future of the employee, presented in such a logic and realistic manner that it avoids to raise the suspicion of the guerrillas and the subsequent identification of the employee. The counterintelligence agent must be certain that all aspects of the employee identity are dully tested and authenticated. For example, that the total identity be credible and realistic.

For the authentication of an employee three steps are given: the identity is developed, the documents which sustain said identity are selected, the personal property is inspected and the natural appearance is given to articles which the individual carried in his pocket.

a. DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDENTITY:

- 1) We already have considered the points to consider when the identity of an employee is developed. A good identity includes a position and an action identity which gives the employee access to the objective. The identity must: follow closely the personal history of the individual to be sufficiently detailed to appear real; be sustained by the necessary documents, consider all possible contingencies, be faithfully memorized by the employee.

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The counterintelligence agent must train and rehearse the employee in the use of his identity. He must be certain that the employee knows it thoroughly and that he does not forget his true identity, while performing his mission. The employee is sent to the area only after he has been thoroughly trained, and he is sufficiently trained to perform all aspects of his identity. In addition, the employee must live in the area and practice his identity it is to him entirely natural. Now then, this is necessary when the degree of identity needed is determined. As we have seen, there are cases in which some employees can retain all aspects of the real and present life, and only have to disguise their association or their relations with the counterintelligence agent. We saw others, in which the employee assumes a totally new or different identity to be able to perform his mission. Such employees practice and live their identity, before they attempt to carry out the mission.

2) In selecting the identity of the employee, the counterintelligence agent selects also the documents which he needs to sustain said identity. The documents identify, grant privileges, or provide a measure of control. The amount of documents necessary to authenticate the identity of an employee depends on the area of the objective and the mission that is going to be carried out. Let's see. In an urban area, it is very possible that an employee only needs those documents that confirm his identity. For example, if it is the case of an employee who has the identity of a traveling salesman, the documents could include an identification card in which is stated his place of birth, residence, etc., an authorization to travel, and, if his identity demands it, a falsified card of affiliation to a guerrilla organization.

In Malaysia, the government has employees "placed" inside the guerrilla organization, whose mission was to obtain passes or permits and identification cards of the guerrilla organization. Each time the guerrillas changed the preparation form, color or other aspects of the cards, the government also was changing theirs and issued them to employees. The number of employees that were discovered by the guerrillas as a result of the use of these documents was small. We have then that the required documentation depends on the identity to be adopted. The counterintelligence agent must ascertain that the documents complement the identity. The employee must become thoroughly familiar with his documents. However, this is better than an anonymous system - depending on an excellent set of documents and to know that the employee is totally familiar with his identity. For that reason, must not be substituted. The documents sustain the identity of the employee but the success of both is craftiness.

2. Since the majority of low level employees available to carry out an internal defense operation will be residents of their village or city, neither the personal appearance of the same nor the property, such as clothes, represent a problem as it refers to identity. However, on authenticating the employee's identity, the

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counterintelligence agent considers such points like mannerisms of the individual, his height, his accent and vocabulary use. He must be certain that everything is in accordance with the position he occupies in the locality. A traveling sales man who has a motorcycle could raise suspicion if he is found in an area where the roads are very deficient, or where there are few mechanical means. A villager would attract much attention if "without warning" and without acceptable justification acquired new clothes or other conveniences.

3> If for any reason, the employee is subjected to a search by the guerrillas, all papers or articles found in his possession have to confirm or verify his identity. That is to say, even when these documents certify his identity, it is very possible that the articles that he carries in his pocket could incriminate him. Let's see an example: The receipt of an article bought in a village could support the statement of the individual who insists of having been in said town. On the other hand, could confirm the suspicions of the guerrillas that the individual is lying.

SUMMARY:

We have dealt with the subject of employee and cell identities, and of course, we have seen that they are very necessary to security. Because the employee's operations are so extensive, security becomes a constant reason of concern for the counterintelligence agent. In order to maintain a good security system, credible identities are developed in his organization of employees. In doing so, takes into consideration the mission to be carried out, the specific employee who is going to do it, and the area where it is going to be done, BEFORE HE CAN DECIDE what identity is the most convenient. Naturally, the demands or requirements that must be met limit up to a certain point the alternative possibilities. Nevertheless, tries then to do the possible because the identity is in agreement with the true history and personality of the employee. After analyzing the employee and working with him, moves on to consider the operational environment in which the mission is going to be carried out. He must develop a position identity and another of action in order to give the employee a credible excuse of his presence in the area and another to disguise his actions. In developing an identity uses the employee's personal history as much as possible. A fictitious identity could be introduced whenever the need to do it arises, but must be realistic and credible. There are times when a cell identity must be developed to disguise the clandestine reason that supports the meeting of persons, who apparently are from different social classes. The counterintelligence agent develops an identity of an organization whose purpose is to disguise in a realistic manner the activities of the group of persons who work together.

After considering and developing the identity, must

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authenticate it with documents, and to obtain miscellaneous articles for the pocket of the employee, to substantiate it. The counterintelligence agent must train and test persistently the agent to assure that everything is in agreement with the chosen identity.

We must not forget that in order to develop the identity, a careful preparation of plans and close coordination must be carried out with the individual or individuals who are concerned with the matter. If we do not give the necessary realism and credibility to each phase of the identity and if the employee does not memorize and play his role faithfully, WE HAVE LOST THE SECURITY, and it is probable that the success of the mission comes into play.

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CHAPTER IX

SCRUTINY OF EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION.

In the last chapter about individual security and on cell security, it was learned how important is to strictly follow certain established methods, techniques and principles. It was also learned that in order to achieve a secure and effective network of employees, we must maintain their action controlled on the basis of a careful analysis and appropriate planning. Consequently, the CI agent must plan and initiate the scrutiny of the employees in order to make certain that all members of the network submit to established discipline; it also serves to prevent employees from acting on their own, allows to test the honesty, to determine the level of training and what additional training is necessary. Finally, but no less important, serves to frustrate the attempts on the part of the guerrillas to penetrate the agent's activity and subsequently subvert his employees inducing them to cooperate with the opposition. As it can be seen, the scrutiny of the employee is carried out by many different techniques. At this time we shall deal with the subject of when, under what circumstances, how and for what purpose the agent begins the scrutiny of the employees. During the presentation it would be possible to determine that we are not personnel dedicated to test only the activities of the employees, but we also have to test the communication lines, hiding places, and convenience addresses.

A. DEVELOPMENT:

1. In talking about scrutiny of the employees in general terms, we must consider the following factors: First, what other activity has to do with the employees, the scrutiny of these must be carried out under a proper control. Each inquiry must be planned in such a way that it serves to verify or produce a specific fact or facts. Thus, each inquiry and the corresponding results must be recorded and the archives verified before beginning a new probe. Fourth, the inquiry must be valid, that is to say, must be prepared in such a way that the produced results are positive or negative in nature.

1. GENERAL CONSEQUENCES:

a. Due to the nature itself and purpose of the scrutiny of the employees, the methods and techniques of the inquiry shall be different for each employee and for different areas. The methods and techniques will depend on the history of the employee or employees submitted to scrutiny, the availability of certain facilities and requirements and local directives. In the scrutiny of the employees, development of harmony must be a continuous process. Every evaluation must be backed through a verification.

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b. We already have said that the methods for the scrutiny of employees varies from one area to another. Why do they vary?

c. Now we shall speak of the following problem which certainly is more than enough linked to the first, that is, take into consideration the history of the employee.

Why is this consideration important?

d. In order to illustrate what was said before, let's look at the following example: We suppose that we are checking an employee to determine the veracity of his statements. In order to do this we solicit a simple inquiry. We interrogate the individual carefully and make precise annotations of his statements. Few days later we interrogate the employee again asking the same questions. If we find discrepancies between the two statements, it can be assumed that there is a possible deception. However, in order to have valid proof, we must take into consideration the education level and intelligence of the interested, because it is possible that a person with little education or little intelligence to forget some facts, could have misinterpreted them or even relate them falsely, which could produce discrepancies in his statements. If the case is so, must not think that the individual is intentionally lying. On the other hand, in the case of a more intelligent individual, such discrepancies could very well be indicative of intentional deception.

e. The third determining factor for this type of inquiries and methods to be used is the availability of means to conduct the scrutiny of the employees, like all other intelligence activities, it must be a well planned activity. Before examining an employee it is imperative to consider many factors and to compile numerous operational data.

2. Inquiring methods. The agent has available the following three types of inquiries:

a. Investigative inquiry

b. Mental examination

c. Mechanical examination.

d. INVESTIGATIVE INQUIRY:

1) We shall analyze the first type, the investigative inquiry. Like in any other type of testing, in order to investigate it is necessary to have certain pertinent data. In order to obtain the desired information previously planned questions are asked. The answers are noted and in their turn these are examined and compared with other specific data. This way the veracity of the first statement can be determined. We must remember one thing during friendly character interrogations, the CI

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agent will always take the initiative to ask the questions. He must never accept as true the statement of an employee, if first he has not examined it and proven to be true. One must remember that we are not newspaper reporters in search for a sensational story, we are counterintelligence agents in search of concrete facts. It is imperative to keep in mind, that even in dealing with an old employee, he must be subjected to scrutiny, his statements must be investigated and his honesty determined. Must never accept the statement of an employee without verifying it first. The problem is to do the verification without damaging the harmony already developed. The desired success is to make the employee understand that the direct interrogatory is a routine matter, which is a good system, and it is necessary to fulfill the mission, as well as to protect him and the rest of the personnel. The employee must be made to see that one is testing the operational matters not because of lack of confidence in him, but more so for the purpose of guaranteeing his own personal safety, that is to say, to make certain that he is not discovered by the opposition. Every agent must understand that operational control measures, including scrutiny of the employees, in rare occasions are conducted not only for investigating the employee personally, but even more so serve as a means to sustain him because of the guerrillas, as well as to protect the members of the network.

2) The Investigative inquiry.

Not every employee who may have been dishonest is a guerrilla sympathizer. The reasons for the lack of honesty are many. Some employees lie in order to obtain monetary gain, to cover mistakes, or to appear that they are not afraid. But whatever the reason may be, in order to protect our mission, it is our duty to discover the absence of honesty wherever and when it occurs. The professional counterintelligence agent must constantly analyze his employees, he must try to detect in them any indications of having too much confidence or of being afraid. Once this is done, he must discover the cause and give a solution to the problem. Security imposes this duty on the agent.

3) We illustrate this point as a true case that occurred during an operation. The employee was an old lady, who worked as a nurse and who during a revolt succeeded to enter as such in the area. She had succeeded to recruit a local employee (a resident in the area of the guerrillas) who agreed to supply information about the movements of the guerrilla forces. Naturally, the employee was supplied with pertinent data from the new employee. The appropriate checking of the archives was made but the results were negative. A little time later a new employee became quite productive. Every month the nurse in question made trips in the area of the guerrillas where she remained two or three days. On returning from these trips, she stated of having established a hiding place near the village of the employee in which he planted the information. The nurse reported to the counterintelligence

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agent all the details of the hiding place as well as the circumstances of collection. The counterintelligence agent was satisfied with the report until he realized that the nurse had not provided sufficient details in regards to her trip in the area, nor how she had established the hiding place, that is to say, how she did the trip, the distance, etc. The supervisor of the counterintelligence agent mentioned this matter to him and they agreed that in the next visit the agent would obtain the pertinent data.

He was agreeable to the suggestion since in this manner he would eliminate any doubt his supervisor could have about the nurser. It is unnecessary to say that when the lady in question supplied all the required details, it was easy to determine that she had not established any hiding place in the guerrilla area. She showed the hiding place on the map and indicated that she had made the round trip by foot to said place using the same route and with a duration of time of four hours. After which the CI agent measured the distance between the town and the hiding place, which convinced him that the nurse had lied, because it was impossible to have made the trip in four hours. It was possible to determine through an investigation that the nurse had acted operationally dishonest. She had recruited a local employee who had agreed to cooperate, but a little time later he was forced to leave the area by the guerrillas. The nurse thought that because of the fact of having lost her employee, she could also lose her employment. Consequently, she opted to lie about the operation. The information which she provided was invented in the friendly area, and not like she had stated before, when she stated that the events occurred in the area controlled by the guerrillas. Taking a firm stand in the basic problem, that is, the scrutiny of the employees, we can clearly see that the truth is developed by the investigative actions: First, through detailed debriefing and second on making a comparison between the information and other available operational data.

4) Now I will give you another interesting case to illustrate this point. An intelligence agency relied on a very reliable employee, who for some time had supplied valuable intelligence information. He was an employee easy to control and very disciplined. His reports were always detailed and exact. It is easy to understand why the counterintelligence agent as well as the group supervisor held this employee in high esteem. With time the counterintelligence agent was assigned to a new post, and he was replaced by another agent. The new agent studied the file of the employee in question and was able to tell that in effect the individual was a highly productive source of information, and according to operational reports, he was also an honest employee.

He noted that the file was up to date, but he opted to have it as complete as possible. It would be preferable to prepare a new Declaration of Personal History (DPH). The agent took this occasion to compare the old DPH with the new. The agent

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interviewed the employee and prepared the DPH. He began with the years of youth of the employee and annotated all the corresponding details, he took note of the employee's military service, including the period he was prisoner of war of the Soviets, as well as his record as such. There was nothing derogatory in the new DPH, even during the interrogatory the employee left the agent completely satisfied. When the agent returned to his office, he again reviewed and studied the DPH. This time, the name of the city Tallin in the Soviet Union drew his attention. In his statement the employee had stated that he had been a military personnel prisoner in various prisoner camps. He also said that in 1944 he and others were moved to Tallin. The agent agreed that Tallin had a special significance, but he could not remember exactly what it was. For that reason, he reviewed the archives and found what he was looking for. According to reliable reports, the Soviets transferred to Tallin only prisoners selected to be trained in brain washing. Also had been reported that a number of graduates were recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Service to serve as clandestine informants.

5) With this information at his disposal, the counterintelligence agent began his task. Before much time had elapsed the employee admitted that he was a Soviet informant, whose special mission was to infiltrate the government intelligence agencies. He also admitted that the information which he had been supplying had been received through his control agent and that all was false. One can observe that this type of problems are not easy to resolve, there is no easy way of determining when an employee does not tell the truth. We must keep in mind one thing, a trained double employee does not act as such. He also appears as a valuable employee, the most disciplined and the most honest. Therefore, it is necessary to check the whole world - all the employees under your control, regardless of what contributions they have made before or what are the positive factors in their favor. The method and the technique that have to be employed will depend on the case, the history of the individual and means available. Everything must be used, but most than anything logic; must be objective and use common sense. One must not develop sentimentalism for his employees and must not let be influenced by beliefs or false illusions. The agent must maintain the control and security making use of planning, scrutiny and his professional ability. Now we shall speak about other types of investigative actions that we could use in the scrutiny of our employees. In the first place are the surveillance and countersurveillance.

When we meet with our employees we must ask the following questions:

a) Has the counterintelligence agent been followed to the place of the meeting?

b) Has the employee been followed (watched) to the place of the meeting?

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c) Is the place of the meeting under surveillance?

6) In order to obtain answers to these questions and to test our employee, we must make arrangements to establish the surveillance and countersurveillance. The surveillance can be established in two ways: simple, conducted by the CI agent himself or complex conducted with the assistance of a surveillance team.

7) Other scrutiny methods could include the following: We suppose that a CI agent wishes to check if his employee keeps files of supplied information or not. This fact constitutes a serious operational violation which must be prevented for various reasons: First, it could be that the employee is selling the information either to another friendly intelligence agency or to guerrillas. Second, the employee perhaps maintains his files for the purpose of pressuring the agent later. Third, perhaps the employee wishes to maintain his file with no apparent reason. In any case, the CI agent must make certain that the employee does not keep any files. A simple way to discover this is the following: The CI agent tells the employee that on rendering his last report to his superior (of the agent) it was necessary to send it without having time to study it. The he asks the employee for a copy of the previous report in order to analyze it. If the employee promises and delivers the requested information in the next appointment, the CI agent must determine if the report is a word for word copy of the original. If this is the case, the agent will be reasonably certain that the employee prepared the report copying it from a copy he kept. There are various ways of making this test and one could have his own ideas of doing it.

8) Another method of checking is to assign the employee to areas already known. Through this method it could be determined if the employee has entered in the indicated area or not, it could also be determined if he observes things well and how well is to carry out orders as well as to absorb training.

Another method that could be used is to assign the employee fictitious tasks, this way could corroborate his honesty and loyalty that he may have. This method is excellent for those cases where the employee is suspected of having been preparing false reports.

3. MENTAL TEST:

a. There is a number of tests that could provide us an indication about the stability and psychologic reaction of the employee.

1) TEST THROUGH ALCOHOL.

The ancient romans had a saying " in vino veritras" there is truth in wine - with that they wanted to say

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that a drunk man reveals his true thoughts and his real reactions. If we observe our employee drinking or in a drunken state, we could learn much about him.

2) TEST TO PROVE HONESTY:

An excellent way to prove honesty is the following: In paying the employee pretend to make an error in counting and pay him more. If he is honest and realizes that he has been paid more, he should state that there is a mistake in the payment, if he remains silent then it can be deduced that the employee is dishonest.

3) TEST TO PROVE REACTION:

If it is necessary to determine how the employee would react on being under tension or pressure, one could provoke the situation to create such conditions. A situation could be created in which the employee is made to believe that he has lost something valuable. His reaction would be a clear indication of how he would act under real conditions. Another type of important reaction test is the test done to determine if the employee has the aptitude to sustain his false identity. We already have learned that the employee must live under an identity. Consequently, use the reaction test to make certain that in case the employee is interrogated by the guerrillas or their supporters, he will not reveal unintentionally his true identity, or also in the event he has to pass through a control post he is not going to do the same or arise suspicions by acting nervously.

In order to test the attitude and reaction of the employee, one could simulate such conditions. For example, he could be awoken up during the night and be asked questions about his identity. In certain cases it could reach the extreme and simulate an arrest to see how he will react under adverse conditions.

4. MECHANICAL TEST:

a. I am going to mention some of the mechanical methods to test, which could be used under certain extenuating circumstances. Sodiopentathol compound, which is an anesthetic and hypnotic drug, it could be intravenously injected and would have results of a "truth serum". In the majority of cases the agent would have to have a clinic or a hospital at his disposal to make the injection. In addition, he would have to be aided by health specialists. Another method that can be used is hypnotism. For the test through hypnotism you will also need to depend on highly trained personnel. We must keep in mind that even with the personnel and necessary means, these methods cannot be used indiscriminately. Such tests must be done only if the operation specially requires it and if such process has been approved by a duly authorized headquarters.

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5. EMPLOYEE EVALUATION PROCEDURE:

a. The employee's evaluation is conducted on the basis of the opinion formulated by the agent about the employee, of the scrutiny results, and the general evaluation which the agent prepares about the employee's performance. The counterintelligence agent at the level of the activities area does not evaluate the product, that is, the intelligence information. He only evaluates the credibility, reliability, honesty, integrity and intelligence of the employee, as well as the validity of the operation. Through a careful evaluation and careful analysis of the employee by the agent, the higher headquarters determines the veracity of the information submitted by the employee. As it was already explained during the instruction about contacts, the counterintelligence agent forms an opinion about the employee, first, by means of a DPH analysis and second, through personal contact. During the meetings the agent makes use of the previously mentioned tests to be able to form a more concrete opinion about the employee. He must test all aspects of the employee's situation, he also must verify the training condition and his intelligence, since in reality only through an adequate scrutiny he can evaluate the employee.

SUMMARY:

In this chapter we have discussed the different types of tests that the employees could be submitted to and which we make use to prevent the guerrillas from penetrating our ranks. Said tests serve also to prevent swindlers and information traffickers to impose on us.

We must keep in mind that the tests are not more than aids for the agent. The tests do not replace in any way common sense and intuitive knowledge, nor have to serve as support, that is to lean on. Even the best test does not serve anything if the results are not properly reevaluated, said test will not have any validity either unless it is correctly applied or if it is not the test corresponding to the case in question. Often a single test is not enough to achieve satisfactory results. Normally will be necessary to depend on more than one test as well as with different types of tests. Most of all, we must remember that employee who passes the test with negative results will have to be submitted to other tests one way or another, so that the counterintelligence agent can properly formulate his opinion.

We must be concerned ourselves of the employee who is efficient and disciplined and not the one who makes mistakes and does not produce. If the guerrillas sent us one of their penetration agents, he will do all that is possible to be very efficient and so outstanding, in order not to give reason to suspect him. In certain occasions, when a counterintelligence agent was ordered to submit his employee to a scrutiny, he responded: "Him?" But he is my right hand man. "I have more confidence in him than I have on some

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of my work colleagues". A little time later said counterintelligence agent had to submit his employee to a test. What were the results? As you may have guessed, the employee had been working for the guerrillas for some time.

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CHAPTER X

SEPARATION OF EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION:

Until now, in the sequence of using and obtaining the employee we have explained the functions of the intelligence agent in locating, investigating, recruiting and using an employee. However, there would come a day in which the employee wants to discontinue his activities. This could happen at any time. The intelligence agent, on the other hand, could decide to terminate the employee's services for any number of reasons. In any case, the intelligence agent must always be prepared to initiate termination proceedings with very little notice.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. SEPARATION PLAN:

1. The most effective way through which an intelligence agent could carry out a quick separation is that the agent keep ready a separation plan. The separation plan must be planned in the face of the employee's recruitment. Why is this necessary? It could be determined, after a careful analysis of the problems that could emerge related to separation of a potential employee, that it would be best not to continue with the possible recruitment. The risks, time and money, plus the possible separation difficulties perhaps are not worth the trouble for the information or services that you expect to obtain from the employee. Even if the problems do not seem to be so great, and it is decided to go ahead with the recruitment, some of these separation problems require planning and advance coordination, and must be outlined in detail so that adequate planning and coordination can be achieved.

2. The initial separation plan could be very brief but, as the time passes and depending on the employee's activity, the plan could be quite extensive. The format of the separation plan can be dictated by the government policy or be left to the discretion of the agent.

Nevertheless, it must contain the following information:

a. A summary of the case up to preparation date of the separation plan. This must include information related with the location, evaluation, recruitment, recruitment circumstances, date of recruitment and personnel involved in the recruitment.

b. The security aspects must be recorded with as much detail as possible. For a detailed explanation, this portion of the termination must include:

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- 1) All operation techniques used by the intelligence agent that are known to employee.
- 2) Operational means known to employee, such as meeting places used.
- 3) Communication methods known to employee.
- 4) Data obtaining requirements of the intelligence agent known to employee.
- 5) Miscellaneous (knowledge of personnel, operational, identity, names, description of personnel, telephone numbers and signals):

The information in this paragraph would probably change from time to time, for that reason, must be corrected accordingly. The need to register this information could serve as effective control of the amount of information the employee possesses. If at any time seems that he knows more than he should or due to contemplated operations needed to know more, this in itself could be a determining factor in his separation.

c. Compromises made:

This portion of the plan must include only the compromises made with an employee at the time or before the draft of the separation plan. Must also include any special promise made to an employee at any time during his employment.

d. Proposed separation actions:

1. In good terms:

a) This portion of the plan must contain information about the proposed action in the case the employee is separated in "good terms". The termination of an employee in this condition normally is achieved easily and without serious security problems. He can decide to resign or the intelligence agent could have his employment terminated for many reasons without hostile sentiments among them. Occasionally, the employees are suspended if their posts are abolished. The intelligence agent recruits employees to fulfil certain requirements, and when the requirements cease to exist, then he must separate the employees who occupy these posts. The employee could also lose his job in the area. He could be transferred or promoted to a position not related with the are of interest to the agent.

b) Another reason for the termination could be the wish of the employee to resign due to personal or family problems. Perhaps the security procedures have increased in the area, and his fear of being discovered may have increased to the point that he feels he has to resign. He perhaps took advantage of an

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opportunity to change his regular employment. A change in ideology, insufficient compensation,, a desire to move to another place or a personality conflict with the agent could also cause the employee to resign. If an adequate solution to the problem is not possible, it is usually prudent to separate an unhappy employee since retaining him could constitute a security risk and because probably he would not discharge his duties in an acceptable manner.

c) A chronic illness is also a reason to dismiss (terminate) an employee. An employee who is continuously ill will be of little value for the agent. There is the probability that his reports may be continuously wrong, and confuse and aggravate the agent's work. The cover and movement of the employee within the area will be limited. He will have difficulty in fulfilling his appointments with his agent on time, or in some cases could not attend to his meetings at all. Also, the employee could possibly demand more monetary assistance in order to help defray the medical expenses.

d) This type of employee generally does not make demands or threats. He is converted to an ex-employee who is eligible for re-employment. Nevertheless, although these persons are separated under friendly circumstances, they represent a security threat. Since they may stop being friendly or simply careless, they are danger for you and your operation, in a way that you must continue exercising control over them.

2) In bed terms:

a) This portion of the plan must contain information relative to proposed action that has to be taken in case that is necessary to separate an employee in " Bad Terms". In this category are included individuals who, due to their own fault, have been compromised, apprehended, exposes or that in some way have disqualified themselves from further employment.

b) The most common reasons for employee dismissal in " Bad Terms" are:

1. Security violations:

The agent must be concerned with the degree of danger that the employee represents. For example, if the employee is an alcoholic, a drug addict or a sexual deviate, his dismissal must be obligatory. The employee could be competent, but if he is under the influence of alcohol, narcotics or for any other reason associates openly with the agent, then he must be dismissed.

2. Swindler:

This category includes those persons who sell information to various governmental agencies and fabricators who provide opinions, false information available to the government

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from such sources as newspapers, press releases, publications and police communications.

3. Ineptitude:

Under this term falls the employee who has been constantly unstable. The employee who does not produce during a period of time must also be considered inept. The employee who does not produce could be because of the agent's poor technique, or as I mentioned before, could be due to a personality clash between them.

4. Law violators:

In an insurrection situation, the persons involved in illegal activities are more useful than they would be in a conventional situation. That is possible because government activities may include the coordination with the police agencies so that the employee is not apprehended. However, an employee who does not participate in illegal activities when he is recruited and later he is seen involved in such activities without the knowledge of his agent must be immediately separated after the revelation of his activities.

5. An employee who has been or is discovered to be under the influence of the guerrillas or their intelligence system is eventually separated, after he has been completely exploited. This type of employee is normally separated in "Bad Terms".

6. An individual who provides information to other friendly intelligence agencies will also be terminated due to reason of double effort of the intelligence agencies, and could be offering the same information to both agencies.

3. PRIOR SEPARATION PLANNING:

a. The agent will always try to initiate separation proceedings, not the employee. This allows to make the necessary plans that the situation could demand. This must include the necessary changes in operations, operation techniques, personnel communications and operational means, in order to neutralize or eliminate any security risks that may be possible in preparation of the actual separation. If this is done properly, the employee will not be able to prevent the operation even if he expressed hostility towards the government.

4. CONVENTIONAL SEPARATION TECHNIQUES OF EMPLOYEES:

a. We shall deal with the separation techniques dividing them in two general types: Conventional techniques and informal separation techniques:

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1) Conventional:

Are the most common and preferred. The informal will not be used unless the employee is hostile, threatening, uncontrollable or a known security risk.

The normal techniques are merely equivalent to providing an indemnization to employee for quitting his job and the employee signs a separation document. If the agent suspects he could have difficulty in separating an employee, it will be necessary to fabricate a reason to convince the employee that the separation is to his advantage. That could convince the employee that he has been compromised by the guerrillas. That continuing working for the government could result in serious consequences for the employee and his family. If the employee does not believe this story, other measures could be taken to convince him placing anonymous telegrams or sending anonymous letters. Many other techniques could be used which are only limited by the agent's imagination. Some times an employee who is going to be separated will have expensive or compromised equipment that was delivered to him. An attempt must be made to remove this material before delivering the termination notice. The method by which this can be achieved without arousing the suspicions of the employee will depend again on the ingenuity of the agent. If this is not done discreetly, the employee could appropriate an expensive camera, invisible ink, etc. As I have mentioned, the separation formally consists of the notification that the employee's services are no longer desired, or cannot be used any more, a possible payment in the form of an indemnization for quitting his job to show that the actions of the agent are honorable, and the signing of the separation document by the employee. This separation document in essence must state that the employee will not voluntarily reveal any identity he may have assumed, that he has been paid in full for his services, and that neither he nor his family will make subsequent claims.

2. INFORMAL SEPARATION TECHNIQUES:

a. This technique must only be used when it is impossible or impractical to separate an employee in the conventional manner. An employee could refuse to be separated unless a reasonable compensation was met for quitting his job and other unreasonable demands. It could be an employee who, for some reason after a long period of employment, became dissatisfied and is openly carrying out acts to destroy the effort of the government. It could be an employee who has been under the control or influence of the guerrillas, and would be impractical for security reasons for an agent to meet with such a person at least one more time. There are many other cases in which the informal techniques could apply.

In almost all cases where informal separation applies, the separation will have its own reasons.

b. In the majority of cases, the purpose of the informal

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separation technique will be to have the employee " placed on the black list" by all government agencies, or threatens to expose himself or admit his activities, or bring about his removal by means of imprisonment, threat of imprisonment or voluntary or forced re-establishment. The methods that have to be used in informal separations must be carefully planned and approved by higher authority before being applied. The agent must be certain that the technique will not place the government in a difficulty. Threats should not be made unless they can be carried out and the employee realizes that such threats could be carried out. There are many disadvantages in the use of threats of physical violence or true physical abuse.

c. There are many techniques that could be used to force an employee to accept the separation or to neutralize him to such a degree that he does not constitute a threat to the intelligence effort of the government. Some of the suggested techniques are shown below:

1) Must use the fact that his pay has been exempt of taxes. Depending on the urgency of getting rid of the employee, he could be threatened of being revealed or exposed. Naturally you do not appear as the accuser of taxes. A more subtle means is by means of an anonymous tip to tax authorities that the employee has a source of income that has not been declared. They will investigate the employee and that will achieve his fall. The agent must not meddle in this investigation, even though he must coordinate with them.

2) Another method that could be used, if the employee is receiving illegally goods as compensation, such as foreign cigarettes, liquor or coffee, the agent informs secretly the custom authorities just after the employee receives his goods.

3) In inducing the employee to commit an illegal act for which he could be held responsible could prove effective, especially if the agent can maintain control of the situation in such a way that he could use it as a lever to obtain control of the individual.

4) If the insurrection advances to last phases and the guerrillas dominate certain areas that create borders, there is a series of things that could be done, especially if the main thing is to get rid of him and it is not important if he talks with the guerrillas or not. Changing his identification is a way that he could not pass verifications by the guerrilla security elements, sending him in a specially dangerous mission for which he has been inadequately prepared, or pass information to guerrilla security elements are methods that could be used.

3. INVESTIGATION AFTER SEPARATION:

a. The intelligence action almost never ends. The

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termination of services of an employee does not mean that the responsibility of the intelligence unit has ended. Discreet investigations must continue to assure that the separated employee is not unintentionally or not doing something considered harmful for his intelligence activities. An employee could be separated according to conventional techniques. Much later you discover that this individual showed hostility towards his government. There is a particular danger that this could happen with employees when it seems imminent the triumph of the guerrillas and they want to be at the side of the winner in order to avoid reprisals if the guerrillas win and discover that they have been collaborating with the government forces. When this situation occurs then you would have to resort to the use of informal techniques to prevent him from compromising his association as well as the operation. The important point to remember is that the agent must retain some element of control on the separated employee.

4. OPERATIONAL CHANGES AFTER SEPARATION:

a. It was previously mentioned during this lecture that the agent must initiate the separation proceedings in order that the necessary operational changes could be made to distract the employee on being separated from current active operations. This must be done in order to disable the employee in regards to current operations, personnel and operational installations. In some cases, as it has been mentioned, it will be the employee who initiates separation proceedings, and the separation could become effective at once. When this happens, it will be necessary to make the needed operational changes after the separation of the employee. The changes after separation must continue until the separated employee is considered completely harmless for the government intelligence forces.

The operational changes must include, but not limited to change the identity name of the operator and possibly change his location, change his telephone numbers if necessary, avoid meeting places that were used with the employee, change the vehicle license numbers, and if the employee has knowledge of other government employees, then it must be determined if these employees must be retained.

5. SEPARATION SPECIALIST:

a. In all prior discussions, it was not mentioned who will carry out the separation process. Perhaps it was tacitly considered that the employee's agent would do it. In some cases this is convenient, especially if the separation must be done quickly, since it would not have any purpose to expose another agent to this employee. In every case, however, must consider to refer this employee to another person for separation. This has some advantages:

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1) This separation specialist could remove the employee from the missions, operational techniques and operational means. In the prior operator tried this, seen a change in the pattern, the employee could suspect that something bad was going on. While he expected that a new agent would manage him in a different manner.

2) The separation specialist is a specialist in the techniques and must do a better job that the agent who has many other requirements to fulfil.

3) The prior agent is proven as a non-productive source.

4) The division could be achieved by compartments since the separation specialist could conduct such operation which could not be traced to any government operation.

6. NEW CONTACT PLANS:

a. It was previously stated that many separated employees must be considered as re-employable. With such individuals, necessary arrangements should be made for a possible new contact in a future date. An address of convenience could be given to employee to write if he wished to come in contact with you or could be given a recognition signal that could use another government agent or another employee in the future.

A separated employee has been frequently re-employed with effective results, but even if you have no intention of re-employing him, making a recommendation and informing him that he could be called, could leave the employee with a feeling of friendship towards the agent and the government and will make him feel as if he was appreciated. Never forget that this is very convenient from the public relations point of view, the reason for separating the individual is that you do not need him. Assure him that no arrangement to come in contact with the employee again creates a situation in which you do not want him. Go away from him on the most friendly base as possible considering the existing circumstances and let him leave with a sentiment that the need may arise to want him.

SUMMARY:

In brief, we could enumerate what we have discussed about the separating employees as a series of "POSITIVE" and "NEGATIVE" actions.

a. BEGIN the separation planning of the employee as soon as possible, preferably before his recruitment. Do not recruit anyone whose separation problems are so difficult that place in doubt the value of his services.

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- b. REVISE and amend a separation plan frequently.
- c. REMEMBER that the most important factor in the separation of an employee is the security aspect.
- d. BEGIN the separation proceedings yourself in a way that the employee would have been completely removed from current operations before his separation.
- e. CONSIDER the use of a separation specialist when you plan the separation of an employee.
- f. Treat the employee correctly in his separation in a way that he does not feel any hostility towards the government.
- g. FULFIL all the promises made to employee.
- h. DO NOT make unusual promises such as re-establishment or large sums of money without specific approval from the appropriate authority.
- i. DO NOT consider the application of an informal separation technique without consulting first with your superiors.
- j. DO NOT make threats unless these can be carried out and make certain that the employee is aware of this.
- k. DO NOT make threats of physical violence or use violence or physical abuse.
- l. DO NOT lose control of the employee after his separation.

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ATTACHMENT A
CONTROL OF EMPLOYEES

INTRODUCTION:

During the study of the last two chapters until the present time that you have done of the employees, you could have concluded that the agents work independently without supervision from their superiors. That is not so. The procedures to locate, interview, recruit, test, train, and use and dismiss the employees requires a large amount of planning and coordination. With the number of persons involved in such activities, the tactfulness of many operations and due to security problems that agents and their employees have to confront, the agents must strictly observe the necessary administrative requirements. In some cases an agent thinks that he is excessively restricted by the different administrative requirements, but it must be understood that the strict application of such requirements is essential to prevent duplication of efforts, to increase security of operations and to assure a general program of more effective and efficient employees. The agents must accept that it is to their best interests that they must cooperate completely with the administrators and to send them quickly and precisely all the requested data, in return they would receive a quicker response to their requests. The majority of employee control functions area devised to provide the agent with support and guidance. A good Employee Control Section could usually advise the agent in regards to the amount of money that he must offer to a potential employee, warn him if he is developing a definite behavioral pattern in the interviews with his employees, provide him information based on the reports of other agents when they are applicable to his needs, besides many other services.

In this attachment we will discuss the fundamentals on which a good control program of employees must be based as well as the different reports necessary to provide the government with an efficient program of employees.

DEVELOPMENT:

A. EMPLOYEE CONTROL PRINCIPLES:

1. Coordination of Employee Recruitment Program.

a. We have talked many times of the large number of persons- objectives that government employees interview during an insurrection situation. The government tries to cover almost each one of the aspects of its society. This program has as its objective the continuation of this effort. The new persons-objectives added to the difficulties that exist to interview previously designated persons make the maintenance of a continuous

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recruitment program imperative in order to carry on a satisfactory cover. The administrative coordination and control are necessary to prevent an employee from working for two or more agents without their knowledge. The danger here is that the government agents of higher echelons on receiving these reports, not noticing that these reports were written, prepared, by the same individual, they would consider them as confirmation reports.

b. It is essential, therefore, that the government establish by necessity a centralized control system of employees to prevent that two or more agents interview the same individual. Such system must prevent the agents from interviewing any individual without notifying the headquarters Employee Control Section of their intentions in order to receive the corresponding authorization.

2. Preparation and Maintenance of Basic History Information about all current, potential and prior employees. Later on we will discuss the content of this archive.

3. Compilation and Maintenance of Employee History:

This is the most important record of the employee maintained by the government. We shall discuss the content of the Employee History at this time.

4. Initiation and maintenance of Administrative Records related with the recruitment and development of employees:

This includes all correspondence between intelligence agents and other government echelons related to employee recruitment and development authorizations. Such requests would start a search in the upper level archives to determine if the information available at such levels is favorable or unfavorable with respect to potential employee or present employee.

5. Maintenance of Employee Evaluation and Production Records:

This generally includes monthly records that carry the title (subject) of the report, file number and date. All agent reports state the information presented to government by the employee. The Evaluation Record refers to period reliability evaluation of an employee. The intelligence agent must evaluate periodically the reliability of his employee and also, at first, the intelligence reports he presents. I know that I indicated earlier that all intelligence reports are evaluated by the production section and that is true. However, remember that the intelligence agent knows his employee much better than any other person. All other persons form a concept of this employee only through his written work. No other government official knows personally this individual more than the agent with whom

-135-

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Warning Notice-Intelligence
Sources and Methods Involved

Dissemination and Extraction of
Information Controlled by Originator

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

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establishes contact. Through the personal interviews, the agent could detect any problem the employee may have in gathering information or personal problems that may have recently emerged which could hinder the employee's effectiveness. He knows how reliable and punctual his employee is, as well as his attitude towards his work and his character in general. Consequently, the agent is in a better position to evaluate his employee than the personnel of the production section that bases its evaluation on the presented reports only. Now in regards to reports, the intelligence agent is usually qualified to make an initial evaluation since he is required to make a person-objective analysis at the beginning of his operation and must familiarize himself completely with the person-objective. This will allow the agent to judge properly the true value of a report.

The production section personnel usually has more knowledge about the activities in general, mainly because it has available other resources which the agent does not have at his level of operations. In a way that in the intelligence reports evaluation the duplication effort is really convenient, especially when the echelons, the lower and upper, use different perspectives. In effect, this results in a system of balanced checking.

5. Maintenance of the Person-Objective Record File.

This allows the authorities responsible to know the extend of person-objective coverage. These files serve as guides for the recruitment of more employees or the elimination of some in order to avoid unnecessary expense of resources.

6. Maintenance of Comparative Expense Records of an Employee in relation to number of reports he submits:

a. The maintenance of such records is not so difficult as is the task of analyzing objectively and thoroughly the results. If an employee delivers ten (10) reports a month to a prior agent and now he only submits two (2) reports to his present agent, What would this situation indicate? The initial reaction usually is that the employee is not working as hard for the agent that he has at present than he did for the previous agent. Possibly his new agent does not interview him as often as his predecessor did. Perhaps the two reports are always more extensive and are full of valuable details, while the ten (10) reports submitted before contained a minimum of information.

b. This type of record is a valuable resource of the general evaluation authority of the government employees program. However, there is danger it may become an end to itself. In other words, this type of record encourages the establishment of arbitrary standards. For example, the responsible authority could establish arbitrary cost/ production standards such as: the employees who submit 50 reports would receive such a payment;

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those who submit from 50 to 100 reports would receive so much, etc. This way of thinking is not correct and must be avoided.

In all our discussions about employees we have stressed that each employee is different, with inherently different problems and each one must be evaluated individually and not under a system or arbitrary numbers. The value of these production-cost relationship records is that they can be used as an efficiency indication of the employee. When the number of reports in relation to cost is low, an investigation must be then initiated to determine the cause. This investigation should include a discussion between the employee control and the agent of this particular employee. A low number of reports in relation to cost in very few cases could be the only cause to get rid of an employee. The quality and other factors could be more important.

7. EMPLOYEE RECORDS:

a. The use of necessary records in the control of employees will be discussed in this section. These records must be compiled at some level by someone if the desired control of employees has to be used by the government.

b. Once the agent has developed a lead, he must immediately send the name of this individual to employees control section for investigation of the name. All information necessary up to that point is the basis history information. The agent is required to submit a justification or statement of intention of use of this individual. The agent must not interview this individual unless he has received a reply of the name investigation and corresponding approval to continue with the recruitment process>

c. For the protection of employees a very limited access must be made in employee records and these records must be maintained in a restricted area separate from all other government records. Only those records who have an absolute need to know must have access to these records. The agents must not know the identities of the employees of other agents, unless it is for a specific reason. The insurgents knowing the identity of government employees, not only they would cause serious harm to government efforts, but also the life of the employees would be in danger. Another security practice is to assign the employees a code number which he has to use in any necessary correspondence pertaining to employee. The assignment of code numbers must be centralized to prevent that two employees have the same code number or that an employee may have two code numbers.

d. Supposing that the agent receives approval to continue with his recruitment, he continues evaluating the individual until he is certain that he has all the desired qualities and that he wishes to be recruited. The agent is then required to present a interview plan, this must contain information pertinent to:

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- 1) Where the interview will take place.
- 2) Names of the persons who will be present.
- 3) When the interview will take place.
- 4) How the agent will attempt to approach the individual.
5. What assignments wishes the agent to make.

e. If the individual accepts the offer to work then the agent must obtain all the information he can about the history of the individual.

f. The history information of the employees is usually found in at least two different records.

- 1) The employee registration card.
- 2) Employee history.

g. REGISTRATION CARD: it is used as an instant reference file about prior and present government employees. Includes information related with the employee and is used when immediate and concise information of the same is desired. The size of the card itself usually is small, it requires that the information is brief. The information included in this card is normally provided to Employee Control Section by the agent. The following information must appear in the card:

1) Personal Data:

Real name, identity name, code number and a photograph.

2) Biography:

Must include only prominent aspects of the employee's life.

3) Political and Military History:

Every political position that he may have had, either by appointment or by election, whether for or in opposition to the government. His military history shall contain information about his military service, how long he served, in what service branch he was, such as infantry, artillery, etc., rank he achieved and under what circumstances he was discharged from the service.

4) Habits, hobbies and characteristics:

Usually when an agent is selected to deal with a particular employee, one of the considerations is that the agent must be compatible with the employee. Some times this compatibility is established and maintained through a mutual interest of some type, in a way that the pertinent information to hobbies or

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characteristics is very important when the agent has to be replaced.

5) Date and circumstances of first contact:

6) Frequency, places and methods of contact to include the arrangements to meet in emergency cases.

It is not possible to know when the agent or any other person could have an emergency, so that it is convenient to include this data in the card.

7) Identity of all other lower employees involved.

8) Covert persons-objectives and relationship of the employee with the same.

In some cases the employee has direct access to a person-objective and could have indirect access to others. It is necessary to know the relationship of the employee with the person-objective in order to be able to evaluate better the information.

9) Type, amount and method of remuneration (payment):

It is necessary to have this information available in the event an emergency arises and another person, who is not the regular agent, may have to talk with the employee.

When we speak of the type of remuneration we refer to money or material goods, etc. The amount is self-explanatory. The remuneration method must include the compensation form, that is to say, if the person receives a regular salary or if on the contrary this money is kept in an account until the person completes his services. If he is paid directly, how often is he paid? The remuneration of employees is very important, especially for those employees whose only motivation is the money or material profit, and effort must be made to make certain that all payments are made on time.

10) Employee's current evaluation.

11) Real name of his agent and substitute.

The use of the substitute agent is a practice which is still doubtful. Some persons allege that the use of substitutes is of value because it helps in that the change from one agent to another takes place without complications. In addition, in emergency situations, the employee will not have to be interviewed by an agent that he has never seen. Other persons insist that the advantages of using a substitute are not sufficient to compensate the security disadvantages inherent in the use of a substitute. They allege that more government agents would be exposed if the employee gets in a jam.

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h. EMPLOYEE HISTORY:

Since the Employee Record Card would allow only a brief and instant identification, the detailed information related to employee could be found in the Employee History. The History of the Employee is the employee's most important and complete record maintained by the government. In this record is included all information available about the employee. This record is used by the employees Control Section any time it wishes to obtain detailed information about the employee. It is also of great usefulness in the orientation of the agent selected to assume control of a group of employees. The agent could inform himself quickly from the Employee History above all those who are under his control. It is not sufficient that the agent review the History one time only, he must review it occasionally because in some cases information received from other sources is added.

This record is established by the Employee Control Section before the recruitment of the employee and must contain the following:

- 1) Personal history including fingerprints and a photograph of the person.
- 2) History information: This must include the original and subsequent investigations conducted about the employee.
- 3) His identity (if applicable): Security precautions taken by the employee to avoid setbacks. Security precautions which the agent must take on interviewing the employee.
- 4) Areas covered by the employee (and his employees), his position (and that of the employees below him) in relation to person-objective, methods used to obtain information of the person-objective and abilities of the employee.
- 5) Identity of ALL employees under the employee and history of the same.
- 6) Frequency of meetings, location of the meeting places, and contact methods between the employee and ALL employees under him.
- 7) Employee's Production and Evaluation Records.
- 8) Payment record of the employee and employees under him.
- 9) All special reports and official correspondence about the employee and employees under him.
- 10) A copy of all reports on operational interviews.

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i. REPORT ABOUT OPERATIONAL INTERVIEW:

1) This is a detailed summary of all information related to a meeting between an agent and an employee. This report must be prepared by the agent after each meeting with the employee. It is a way to ascertain the use of effective security precautions and the operational techniques. This report must not include any information about the gathering requirements.

2) This report is usually prepared in a narrative form. Must not use a prepared form in order to avoid a routine pattern and in order to force the agent to include specific observations. The following must be included in the report, but not necessarily in the order indicated:

a) The names or code designations of the persons present at the meeting.

b) The exact date and time, and the location of the meeting place.

c) Transportation used by the agent to go and return from the meeting place. If a government vehicle was used indicate the vehicle's license number.

d) Must list in detail the security precautions taken by the agent to and from the meeting location.

e) Must list the payments he made.

f) Must state the source of the information if it was not the employee.

g) New assignments given to employee during the meeting to obtain information must be recorded with the inclusion of the approximate surveillance dates.

h) Should include the history information related to past, current and future activities of the employee disclosed at the meeting. The more knowledge you have about the employee's activities, the better you will be able to control him and obtain maximum utilization of him.

i) The last point must include any comments which the agent believes that may be pertinent in regards to the meeting with his employee. The type of comment that has to be included in this paragraph should be a reference to security failure, an indication that the meeting was under surveillance or an opinion about the behavior or conduct of the employee during the meeting.

j) The report on Operational Interview is of particular interest to supervisory personnel responsible of

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ascertaining that the security and operational techniques were duly used by the intelligence agent since the collection requirements are assigned and satisfied within adequate amount of time. This report allows the supervisory personnel to follow the course of operations of the intelligence agents and their employees.

J. PERSON-OBJECTIVE RECORD CARD.

Another record maintained by the Employee Control Section, which does not have direct relationship with the employees, is the Person-Objective Record Card. The Employee Control Section maintains all person-objective files. This aspect we shall examine briefly:

- 1) Name or code symbol of the person-objective.
- 2) Precise location of the person-objective, whether it is the street address and number or square coordinate.
- 3) The basis for the designation of the person-objective is usually the objective and most recent date of the person-objective list.
- 4) The code symbol of the employee or employees who carry out the cover of the person-objective.
- 5) The name of the agent assigned to person-objective.
- 6) Appraisal of the coverage percentage of the person-objective and date.

10. It is considered that these are the basic records of the employee which must be compiled and maintained in good order in order to establish the necessary control of employees in order to have an effective and efficient program of government employees in general. These must be considered as the minimum amount of records that have to be maintained.

11. Although it is the responsibility of the Employee Control Section to compile these records, the majority of the information contained in the records is provided by intelligence agents usually in response to a requirement of the Employee Control Section. Perhaps it should be emphasized at this point that the Employee Control Section is responsible for the establishment of administrative procedures related to employees and necessarily must impose certain requirements on the intelligence agent. However, the Employee Control Section will usually not have any operational control or command authority over the agent.

B. FEES.

1. We spoke previously of records related to production and

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costs of employees and in another occasion we briefly discussed the payment or compensation of some kind. Perhaps,, this may be a good time to discuss with some detail the fees of employees.

2. The majority, not all, of the employees who work for the government would receive remuneration for their services. A danger is the possibility that the payments made to employees may cause the employees to be compromised. The decision of the amount which the employee will receive is usually coordinated in a conference between the agent and the Employee Control Section.

3. The following factors are considered in determining the amount of money which an employee is going to receive:

a. Type of employment:

The type of employment or mission of the employee will determine the amount of compensation that he will receive. For example, the introducing employee will usually receive a greater payment than the employee who routinely collects information of general nature during his normal activities, because the information collected by the former is much more difficult to obtain.

b. Economy of the Operations Area:

The economy of a particular area where the agent works would serve as a guide for the compensation which the employee will receive.

The security of the employee demands that the employee may not have in his possession more money than he could explain as its apparent source.

c. Information Quality:

The quality of the information provided by the employee will affect his payment. It is logical to assume that the person who provides the most important information to receive more than the person who supplies lower quality information.

d. The amount of information must merit a lesser criterion only in the determination of the employee compensation.

e. Timely presentation of information, risk and effort:

These three factors must receive considerable attention. Often, with certain type of information, there is only a small amount of time with which to determine the difference whether this is intelligence or history, and this is particularly important in the guerrilla environment. Obviously, the risk involved and the employee effort in obtaining the information will influence in the amount paid to employee.

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4. The employee wages shall be determined by his motivations and the economic situation in the area. Usually the compensation is made in money of the locality. However, the delivery of the money to employee involves a security risk especially in the case of large sums of money. A large number of agents have given to this a sound solution withholding a portion of the employee's payment and depositing it in an account until the employee has fulfilled his obligation. This prevents the employee from being compromised through indiscreet use of his money.

5. It can be paid to employees in consumer articles such as food, cigarettes, coffee, tea, etc. In some cases these articles are difficult to obtain and possession by the employee of this articles in large amounts that are scarce in the locality could cause problems.

6. Payments at regular intervals are common. Usually the employees are paid monthly. This reduces the administrative effort and can dedicate more time to activities. Generally, the payment at regular intervals is more satisfactory to employee.

He knows the amount of money that he will receive and could plan his budget. However, if an employee is slow and does not present all the required information because he knows that he will receive the same monthly payment regardless of what he submits, then his compensation could be reduced or eliminated. In having performed in an outstanding manner in a particular case, the employee must be given a bonus. The bonus must not be given very often since that way they could lose their psychological value.

7. Payments to employee based on the number of reports submitted have advantages and disadvantages. In spite of some obvious disadvantages, some agents prefer this method of payment since it is thought that this will induce the employee to a greater effort.

SUMMARY:

In this attachment we have discussed the Employee Control Section of the government and we have determined that the employee recruitment coordination, the maintenance of records for all employees and persons-objectives constitute the principal function of this section. This section advises the responsible officials about cover of persons-objectives, use and deployment of employees and maintains up to date statistics which show individual the productivity of employees and the percentage of cover of person-objective.

The majority of employees will receive a compensation in accordance with their efforts, risks taken, their social conditions and, of course, according to valuer of the submitted information. We stress the fact that the deferred payment, or the establishment of a savings account is often a convenient method of payment for the employee.

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